Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

601.6111/12–2352

No. 538
The Secretary of State to the Director of Central Intelligence (Smith)¹

confidential

[Washington,] January 9, 1953.

My Dear General Smith: I have received your letter of December 23, 1952, concerning restrictions of travel within the United States of members of the Soviet Embassy.² I believe from your letter that you may have been misinformed as to the reasons on which our Government’s action in imposing restrictions on the travel of members of the Soviet mission was based. The action taken by our Government in regulating the travel of Soviet officials in the United States was intended specifically as a measure of retaliation for limitations imposed upon the travel of American representatives in the Soviet Union, rather than as a measure of security control. This matter is covered fully in Intelligence Advisory Committee Document IAC–D–2/1, February 1, 1952, which paper was subsequently approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on February 7, 1952. (Copy attached)³

The Department is extremely concerned regarding the problem of effectively neutralizing improper activities of Soviet diplomatic personnel stationed in this country, without at the same time bringing about further restrictive practices by the Soviet Union toward the representatives of our Government resident in that country. Even though the freedom of movement of our representatives in the Soviet Union is limited, such travel as they are allowed to undertake is extremely valuable, both for intelligence purposes and for a general appraisal of the situation in that country. It was to deter the Soviets from placing further limitations on travel and hence on our ability to gain important information that travel restrictions were originally imposed on Soviet personnel in the United States. If in applying these restrictions we should cause the Soviet Union further to restrict travel of our representatives in the Soviet Union, we would not have accomplished the purpose which we originally intended. We might also develop a situation which might make it difficult to maintain our mission in the Soviet Union. In addition to the valuable intelligence which our Government derives from the maintenance of a diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union, the continuance of that Mission is based upon most important political considerations, notably upon the desirability of maintaining contact with the regime, avoiding the increased tensions which would inevitably result from the severance of relations, and for the purpose of providing a diplomatic channel to exploit any opportunity which may eventually arise to reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union on basic issues.

There is, of course, one additional factor that must be taken into account in any thorough consideration of the problem of regulating travel of Soviet official representatives—as to whether the further restrictions of such travel would effectively deny the Soviet Government information available to the general public in this country.

The Department is fully appreciative of the seriousness of the problem presented by the fact that Soviet officials may have opportunity to gain data at technical meetings and through other sources as a result of their travel within the country. In this regard, the Department’s communication to the Attorney General dated December 30, 1952, requested an expression of views from the Attorney General as to whether some practicable means can be devised for neutralizing espionage activities of Soviet nationals as a whole rather than concentrating on activities of individuals. (Copy of letter is attached.⁴)

With your permission, and because of the responsibility of the Attorney General (through the FBI) for the internal security of the United States, I would like to forward your letter to the Attorney General for his comment, and particularly as to, if it were decided by our Government that the control of travel of Soviet representatives should be based on security considerations, whether the FBI would be in a position to provide vetting procedures for the travel of Soviet nationals. The procedure would have to be extremely expeditious if we were not to go beyond the bounds of retaliation, inasmuch as the vetting procedure within the Soviet Union provides for 48 hours notice.⁵

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson

1. Drafted by Stoessel (EUR/EE) and cleared by Barbour, Thurston, and Davis (EUR/EE), Bohlen (C), Matthews (G), Perkins and Bonbright (EUR), Trueheart (R), and the Office of the Science Adviser.
2. In his letter, Smith noted that Soviet Attachés had extended opportunities to gain important defense information by attendance at American technical conferences and meetings, that it was his understanding that one of the purposes underlying the Department of State’s ruling controlling the travel of Soviet official personnel was to restrict opportunities to gather economic and technical information, and urged that technical conferences and meetings in the Washington–Baltimore area be classified “restricted” in order to deny attendance by representatives of hostile powers. (601.6111/12–2352)
3. Not printed. Regarding the IAC decisions on Feb. 7, 1952, see footnote 2, Document 494.
4. Not attached to the source text and not printed. (601.6111/12–3052)
5. In a letter of Jan. 22 to W. Park Armstrong, the CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence concurred in the Secretary’s suggestion as presented here. (601.6111/1–2253) The exchange of letters between Director Smith and Secretary Acheson was duly transmitted to Attorney General Herbert F. Brownell under cover of a letter of Feb. 2. (601.6111/1–2253)