Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

761.5622/11–2252: Telegram

No. 537
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (O’Shaughnessy) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Moscow, November 22, 1952—1 p.m.

813. Tokyo’s 21, November 19 sent Dept 1603.² We see no urgency in the matter of making a public announcement.

However, we still believe it desirable to give some warning to Soviets for the following reasons:

1. Postwar Japanese Government has not to our knowledge publicly made known its position re overflights. Sovs have consistently and clearly defined their position with regard to unauthorized overflights of their territory. We do not possess full documentation on this point here, but latest exchange of notes with Swedes is a good example. Moreover, we note that a statement made by Vyshinsky to the Swedish Ambassador³ here May 24, 1952 and published in Pravda the next day, contains following paragraph:

Begin Verbatim Text.

“The Ministry also considers it necessary to recall the instruction, in force in the USSR as well as in all other states, by virtue of which when a state frontier is violated by a foreign aircraft and when the foreign aircraft penetrates into alien territory the airmen of the state in question are obliged to force it to land at a local aerodrome and, in the event of resistance, to open fire on it.”

End Verbatim Text.

2. If and when the Jap Government wishes to protest a particular violation of its territory through the channels of the US Government or any other, its legal and diplomatic position will be firmer, more clear-cut and easier to handle vis-à-vis Sov Government. Also, it wld strengthen our hand in the event we might some day wish to take action along the lines of Deptel 504, Nov 21.⁴

3. By giving prior warning, we would avoid placing ourselves in position of Soviets—who shoot and then protest—and would be more likely gain support for our position from other countries. Prior warning would be particularly desirable in this case since both we and Japs have apparently for some time permitted and ignored Soviet flights over Japan.

4. The statement which we have in mind is for purpose of record and could be couched in general terms and cover shipping as well as aircraft. It was never our thought to issue a statement to effect that we intend engage aircraft violating Jap territory.

Re B–29, we believe Soviet Government’s repeated warnings re violations of their territory are considered by them as being applicable to case of B–29, in view of Pushkin’s statement to me that Soviet Government considered Yuli [Yuri] Island to be Soviet territory.

O’Shaughnessy

1. Repeated for information to Tokyo.
2. See footnote 6, supra.
3. Rolf R. Sohlman.
4. Not printed.