Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

747C.00/12–2354

No. 412
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Kitchen)¹

confidential

[Washington,] December 23, 1954.

Subject:

• Call of Greek Ambassador re Cyprus (December 23, 1954, 5:00 p.m.)

Participants:

• Mr. George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
• Mr. John D. Jernegan, Acting Assistant Secretary, NEA
• Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Director, GTI

The Ambassador commenced by referring to the Secretary’s letters of July 28 to the Greek Foreign Minister² and November 16 to Prime Minister Papagos.³ He said these letters showed that the United States was willing to assist in seeking a mutually acceptable solution for the Cyprus problem.

The Ambassador then became rather emotional and asked why the United States had seen fit to go along with the British as far as UN action on the Cyprus issue was concerned. He recalled the American tradition of freedom and expressed the opinion that our action in this matter was inconsistent with that tradition. He then adverted to recent conversations with his “Turkish colleague” which led him to believe that the Turkish Government had not acted as a free agent in taking a stand against the Greek resolution but had, in fact, been subjected to great pressure. Ambassador Melas clearly implied the British Government had put such pressure on the Turks.

Mr. Melas inquired rhetorically what the British wanted out of this and what they expected the result could be. He had read in the New York Times that the British were again considering offering the Cypriots a parliament with an appointed majority. This, of course, was completely inadequate and unacceptable. In the House of Commons debate, the Colonial Secretary had said the British position was strengthened by the UN vote. If the British intended only to pursue their old course, it would be a great mistake. They couldn’t have everything their way. He stated with great emotional emphasis that international relations were now governed by a set of accepted standards and practices embodied in the Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter, the Potomac Charter, and similar basic agreements to conduct international relations on a just and legal basis. The Greeks, he asserted, could not be treated as “colonials”—they were neither Zulus nor Sudanese. Although he had received much of his formal training in Britain and was an admirer of their institutions, he was at a loss as to how they could realistically and genuinely maintain the position they had assumed in connection with Cyprus.

Mr. Jernegan stated that our position with regard to Cyprus, and the reasons why we had pursued the course which had culminated in our UN vote in favor of deferring consideration for the time being, had been clearly stated in the Secretary’s communications to the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. It had also been set forth in discussions in Washington, and by our representatives at the UN. There was no need to review the history of the United States position at this juncture. In answer to the Ambassador’s question, one could presume that the strategic position of the island and the matter of prestige had played a considerable part in the formulation of the British position. Regardless of whether prestige was a rational or logical consideration on which to base a position it, nevertheless, was a real factor which could not be discounted in international dealings.

The Ambassador interrupted, seizing on the question of prestige, and said that in the modern world “prestige is not enough” on which to base a course of action on a matter as important as this. He was afraid the United States gave way to outward form. The British could keep a few battalions of fusiliers on the island and scatter them around the Middle East from time to time to “protect the oil lines” as occasion demanded, but their usefulness was not comparable to the devoted willingness of some 400,000 Greeks on Cyprus to defend that soil as part of their homeland. The Ambassador then suggested the military problems involved should be examined by a team of top military men in order to decide on actual base requirements on the island. There could be no doubt that Greece would make the bases available. Greece was on the allied side. They had no Bevan; sent no goods to Red China. Could they be considered less reliable? The United States apparently considered its arrangements on Crete satisfactory, and the Ambassador regarded the United States Sixth Fleet as more of a factor in area defense than “the island” as such.

Mr. Jernegan said that while much of what the Ambassador had said was logical, yet he believed one could safely assert prestige constituted approximately 90% of the British position.

The Ambassador interjected that, with all due respect, the United States should not be “entangled” with this. The Cypriots had all the prerequisites to be free—and no valid reason for not being free. He referred to the recent regrettable “riots” in Athens and Salonika. To be candid, he was distressed, but not astonished. Greece was a peninsula of eroding rocks whose economy had been resuscitated and was now kept going by United States assistance. Although Greece had been a poor country for 400 years, her one great contribution had been her love of liberty and her defense of freedom. He reiterated that in modern circumstances prestige and the British concern for “position” was insufficient in face of the overwhelming facts and reasonableness of the proposition that Cyprus should be a part of Greece. He begged the United States to consider not only its history, but the negative effect on its influence which would result from its appearing to defend colonialism. A colleague in the Greek Foreign Service, who had recently written to him after a trip to Southeast Asia, expressed great concern because in that area the United States had been successfully labeled by the communists as a defender of the colonial system and a protector of the colonial powers. The implications in connection with United States world leadership were very great indeed and should be weighed carefully by the United States Government.

Mr. Jernegan replied that all factors had been taken into account in determining the United States position. It was not true that on the Cyprus question the United States was simply defending a colonial position. As we had stated in our communications to the Greeks, our overriding concern was that there should not be an open split between our friends and allies in the UN. Such a debate at this juncture could not hope to produce a beneficial result. It was appropriate for the Greek Government to bring to our attention its concern in relation to future developments. We intend to seek ways for a satisfactory settlement. What we can accomplish is another matter. He urged the Greeks not to draw gloomy conclusions from the speech of the Colonial Secretary.⁴ From his experience in Tunisia he was aware that parliamentary speeches were frequently intended primarily for home consumption and contrasted past statements in the French Assembly to recent favorable developments in Tunisia. With a release of pressure, the Colonial Secretary might be more forthcoming. He strongly urged an attempt at rapprochement between the British and Cypriot leaders. The latter should talk with the British even if the initial British proposal is not regarded as good enough. A refusal on the part of the Cypriots even to discuss would be regrettable. The history of other British colonies showed they were not unbending. He differed with the Ambassador in that the United States did not regard it as its responsibility to see to it that all nations lived up to all principles of all charters. It was certainly desirable that they do so, but as a practical matter the United States could not be expected to execute a universal policing responsibility. However, this Government continued to be concerned that a satisfactory solution be worked out between the parties at interest, and we would continue to seek one.

The Ambassador apologized for calling “on Christmas Eve” but said that his Government and he personally were concerned that the United States should continue to be conscious of the need for a reasonable settlement.

1. Drafted on Dec. 30.
2. Document 375.
3. Document 396.
4. Not further identified.