Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

611.81/12–1654

No. 408
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)

confidential

[Washington,] December 16, 1954.

Subject:

• Call of the Greek Ambassador

Participants:

• George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
• Herbert Hoover, Jr., Acting Secretary
• William O. Baxter, GTI

The new Greek Ambassador, in paying his courtesy call on Under Secretary Hoover today, opened his remarks by saying that it was his earnest intention to do his best to maintain and further the close friendly relationships between Greece and the United States. Although the two countries have the same objectives and policies, he pointed out that his arrival coincided with one question of deep concern to his Government on which the United States had taken a position less favorable to Greece than had been hoped. Mr. Hoover said he thought we were all pleased that a formula had been worked out yesterday in the United Nations which Greece had been able to subscribe to and which had passed unanimously.¹

Ambassador Melas said that, in this connection, he wished to express the profound regret of his Government, as has already been done to Ambassador Cannon by Prime Minister Papagos, for the irresponsible anti-American demonstration in Athens. Mr. Hoover mentioned press reports of further demonstrations and showed the Ambassador the ticker story of the attack on the USIE library in Salonika during the course of which a portrait of President Eisenhower had been burned. The Ambassador was visibly shaken by this news and entreated Mr. Hoover most earnestly not to believe that such actions are representative of true Greek feeling nor that the Greek Government is in any way involved. Mr. Hoover pointed out that with a free press such as ours these events in Greece would receive wide publicity and would have an unfortunate effect on American public opinion. He hoped the Greek Government would take all necessary steps to prevent further outbreaks of this nature and would also seek to place before the Greek public in their true light the recent developments concerning Cyprus in the United Nations. After all, the Greek Government had officially agreed to and voted for the same motion which the United States had supported.

Ambassador Melas stated that his Government had accepted the United Nations formula not from choice but because it had no other recourse when it was announced a day or two ago that the United States would oppose the very mild Greek resolution.² This news had come as a profound shock to the Greek people, who had always looked to the United States as the leading exponent of the ideals of liberty and independence of peoples. The cause of Cyprus is a deep national conviction on which all Greeks are united and on which they all feel elementary justice is on their side. Of course, the Greek Government had known that the United States looked with disfavor upon its introducing this question in the United Nations, but the intransigent refusal of the British to discuss this matter through normal diplomatic channels and uncompromising public statements in the House of Commons had forced this course of action on the Greek Government. United States abstention at the time of voting on the inscription of the Cyprus item had been a disappointment to the Greek Government but had led it to believe that the United States would remain “neutral” throughout. Indeed the Secretary had “promised” Prime Minister Papagos when they met in Paris in October³ that the United States would maintain a position of “neutrality.” In mid-November the Secretary sent a personal message to Papagos⁴ informing him that the United States would oppose a “substantive resolution”; since that time, the Greek Government has bent every effort to working out a resolution “so mild that it could hurt no one.” In a meeting with Mr. Jernegan last Saturday⁵ the Ambassador had, without instructions from his Government, even further diluted the proposed resolution and had received no indication that the Department considered it substantive. It was not until Monday, in a meeting with Mr. Key,⁶ after the United States position had been fully divulged in the press,⁷ that he realized the United States would accept only a purely procedural motion without even any slight references to principles enunciated in the Charter and so frequently repeated in other official statements.

The Ambassador said that, although the United States had, for reasons of its own, not been able to support Greece at this time, he would urge us, when we considered the timing more appropriate, to use our great influence with the British to bring about a settlement of this question. Even the President, whom he saw when presenting his credentials a week ago, had expressed the belief that some solution to this problem should be worked out “by the two governments.”⁸

As the Ambassador rose to leave, Mr. Hoover said he was sorry that the Ambassador’s arrival to take over his new duties was clouded by the untoward happenings in Greece. The problem now for both of us, he said, was not to look backward but to work together to find a constructive way of getting things back into perspective so that there will be no lasting harm done to the firm friendship and close cooperation which have so long characterized relations between our two countries.

After the meeting in Mr. Hoover’s office, Mr. Baxter took the occasion to state again, as he had in a previous conversation with the Ambassador, the Department’s understanding of the meeting in Paris between the Secretary and Marshal Papagos. According to our reports, Papagos referred to the United States abstention when Greece sought to have the Cyprus item inscribed and urged that, if we could not support Greece when the item came up for discussion, we would at least maintain “complete neutrality.” Papagos also suggested the remote possibility of postponement of the item. The Secretary gave no commitment but had tried to find some solution along the postponement line. Mr. Baxter also explained that there might be some difference of interpretation as to the term “neutrality.” The United States has always said that the Cyprus question was one of primary concern to Greece and the United Kingdom, that the United States interest was only the broader one of concern that this divergence of views between two friends could adversely affect solidarity of the free world. We therefore do not wish to see discussions that would enter into the substance of the question nor did we wish to take a position against either of the two countries at interest. By supporting a motion which avoided any reference to the substance of the question and which was not directed against either Greece or Great Britain, the United States had, it seemed to Mr. Baxter, played a neutral part. We could not interpret the term “neutral” in such a narrow sense as to mean nothing but abstention on a Greek motion seeking application of the principle of self-determination to the people of Cyprus.

1. For the voting in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly on the Cyprus question, see Document 410.
2. Reference possibly is to Lodge’s statement in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 14; see Document 410.
3. See Document 389.
4. Document 396.
5. Dec. 11; no memorandum of that conversation has been found in Department of State files.
6. A memorandum of that conversation by Key, Dec. 13, is in file 747C.00/12–1354.
7. e.g., see the New York Times, Dec. 13, 1954.
8. Melas presented his credentials to Eisenhower on Dec. 9; no memorandum of that conversation has been found in Department of State files.