Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 237
Memorandum by the United States
Commander in Chief, Europe (Gruenther) to the President
You have asked my comments on the advisability of stationing the U.S. Trieste Forces temporarily in the Leghorn area.1
You are aware of the fact that we are most eager to have these forces to cover the gap which now exists in the Villach area. To fulfill that mission they should be located so they can move quickly on very short notice. Leghorn would offer many complications from that point of view. From operational considerations the U.S. Zone of Austria would be a much preferential location.
Now for the political aspects of the Leghorn solution. You know that the U.S. has been having considerable trouble in making satisfactory arrangements with the Italian Government for the stationing of U.S. Air Units in Italy, and for the procurement of suitable facilities which will probably be required in time of emergency. To move an additional force of 3,700 combat troops into the Leghorn area would create a complication which might very well meet with serious objection on part of the Italian Government. Furthermore, the training facilities there are almost non-existent, and the same situation exists with respect to housing.
I agree with you that the Southern front will be strengthened when we reach a solution of the Trieste problem. This should improve the situation in Southern Austria. Personally, I feel very strongly that as a long-term proposition, it is completely unsound to expect the U.S. to furnish forces for the defense of the Villach corner. But present facts are that—at least for the time being—unless the U.S. does make forces available for this mission, the area will be undefended. The Italians simply do not have the capability at this time. Even if they could handle the problem militarily, it would take some time to have them accepted by the Austrians. An additional factor is that an increase of our forces in Austria would compensate for the British and French withdrawals, and should strengthen the Austrian belief that the West does not intend to let their country go by default in an emergency.
I realize that there are some officials in Washington who feel that the Trieste forces should be returned to the U.S. It is not clear [Page 494] to me why the Leghorn solution would be palatable to that group, unless it is that it appears to be a temporary solution. But surely some time limitation can be imposed in connection with the decision to move the troops to Austria—if that is really a factor.
I, therefore, feel that it would be highly preferable, from almost every consideration, to place the Trieste forces in the U.S. Zone of Austria, rather than in the Leghorn area.
General Mancinelli, the new Italian Chief of Staff who has succeeded General Marras, is coming to see me today about the reorganization of the Italian Armed Forces. He has a plan to present which unfortunately will require approximately 3 years to implement. One of the points that I am going to stress with him is that the Italian forces in that area must develop a capability to move forward to seize critically important terrain in Austria.
- No record has been found at the Eisenhower Library or in Department of State files of a communication from Eisenhower to Gruenther asking Gruenther’s views on this matter.↩