Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 236
Memorandum of Discussion at the
210th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington,
August 12, 19541
eyes only
Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 4); the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 5 and 6); General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Vice Admiral Gardner for the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Pate for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 5 and 6); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State (for Items 1, 2 and 3); Marshall Smith, Department of Commerce (for Item 1); Walter S. DeLany, Foreign Operations Administration (for Item 1); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Trieste.]
[Page 492]5. Redeployment of United States Forces in Trieste (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 4, 19542)
Mr. Cutler called attention to the reference memorandum of August 4, which contained (1) the JCS recommendation that U.S. forces in Trieste be redeployed to the U.S. Zone of Austria in the event of a political settlement of the Trieste issue, and (2) the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense that U.S. forces in Trieste be redeployed to the continental U.S. at such time as it is practicable for them to be withdrawn from Trieste. Secretary Wilson said the reasons for his recommendations were fully set forth in the August 4 memorandum.
The President said he simply would not decide now what to do with U.S. forces in Trieste in the event of a political settlement of the Trieste issue. We should wait to see what kind of a political settlement is reached, if any, and also decide whether Italian forces will be able to provide a NATO reserve in the north. Meanwhile, we should drag our feet. The President added that the political value of these forces was out of all proportion to their monetary cost and military value.
Secretary Wilson then called attention to present plans calling for the temporary redeployment of U.S. forces to Leghorn, Italy, in the event it should become necessary to move them prior to reaching a final decision. The President thought this was a good plan.
Secretary Dulles remarked that a Trieste settlement could not be taken for granted. Both the Italians and the Yugoslavs were finding it advantageous to keep the Trieste issue alive, even though the differences between them appeared infinitesimal. Secretary Wilson suggested that we might hasten a settlement by letting it be rumored that we wanted to keep our troops in Trieste.
The National Security Council:
- (a)
- Discussed the subject on the basis of the memorandum from the Secretary of Defense transmitted by the reference memorandum.
- (b)
- Noted that the President did not wish to make a final decision on the redeployment of U.S. forces in Trieste at this time pending more definite indication as to the final form of any Trieste settlement, but agreed that in the event of such a settlement these forces should be temporarily redeployed to Leghorn, Italy.
Note: The action in (b) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Trieste.]
- Prepared by Gleason on Aug. 13.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 232.↩