Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Trieste”

No. 232
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

top secret

Washington, August 3, 1954.

Subject:

• Redeployment of United States Forces in Trieste.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the problem of the redeployment of United States Forces in Trieste in the event of a political settlement of the Trieste issue. They have reiterated their previous recommendations that these forces be redeployed to the U.S. Zone of Austria and have stated that they consider from the military point of view such redeployment to be in the best United States national interest. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request an early decision in order that planning for this eventuality may proceed.

2. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in commenting upon the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that he does not disagree with the basic recommendations of the J.C.S. but does feel that while from a military point of view the J.C.S recommendation is sound, other and perhaps controlling reasons of a political or international public relations nature might well make it unwise to redeploy United States troops from Trieste to Austria.

3. Should it become necessary to redeploy United States Forces from Trieste prior to reaching a final decision in the matter, it is presently planned that they be moved to Leghorn, Italy, where they can remain for a period of from thirty to sixty days.

4. I recommend that the U.S. Forces in Trieste be redeployed to the Continental United States at such time as it is practicable for them to be withdrawn from Trieste. Upon the withdrawal of the present U.S. Forces in Trieste it is considered that the mission which originally dictated their assignment to that area has been accomplished and that their redeployment to the U.S. Zone of Austria or to other countries in Europe is unwise. It is also considered unwise for U.S. Forces to be redeployed to Austria in order to reinforce the weakened defenses in that area occasioned by the withdrawal of other allied forces. The political settlement of the Trieste situation, which we hope will soon be accomplished, is predicated upon the assumption that the Italian and Yugoslavia forces can effectively contribute to the security of that area. Substantial U.S. funds in the form of payments to these countries is involved in the Trieste settlement and the advantages to this country in returning these U.S. Forces to the United States will serve in some way to reduce the total overall cost of the settlement of the Trieste situation.

5. While it is true that the combat elements of the U.S. Forces in Trieste are presently indicated as available to SHAPE in the event of war and are so listed as part of the U.S. contribution of forces to NATO, their presence in Europe is, however, in response to a commitment which existed prior to the coming into being of NATO. Should withdrawal of these forces from Europe and from their NATO obligation be decided upon, the United States would of course follow presently agreed procedures for prior notification to the North Atlantic Council through the U.S. Permanent Representative.

These forces could remain committed to NATO for redeployment after M–Day in the event of hostilities, even though they were in the United States.

6. It is requested that this subject be made an item on the agenda of the National Security Council at its meeting on August 12th in order that an early decision in this matter can be reached.

C.E. Wilson

1. This memorandum was distributed by Lay to the members of the National Security Council under cover of a memorandum dated Aug. 4, which indicates that the subject of the redeployment of United States forces in Trieste would be considered by the Council at its meeting on Aug. 12.