Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

750G.00/12–1853: Telegram

No. 154
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State

top secret

London, December 18, 1953—9 p.m.

2696. Limited distribution. Holmes and I discussed Trieste plan with Eden. Kirkpatrick, Makins, Selwyn Lloyd and others were also present.

It was agreed that French scheme reported Belgrade’s 798 to Department¹ was quite impractical. Also agreed, in light of results of Riddleberger’s discussion with Popovic (Belgrade’s 797 to Depart-ment²), it would be inadvisable to pursue present effort any further with Tito. To do so might only irritate him, obtain nothing acceptable to Italians, and jeopardize chances of getting any agreement from him later on. We should move immediately into second phase of plan, i.e., ascertain final Italian position. Preliminary five-power meeting without conditions. It was felt we should simultaneously inform Yugoslavs this being done in order to be able to assure both sides they are being kept fully informed of our efforts. British instructing their Washington Embassy to propose foregoing to tripartite group suggesting that instructions be sent Ambassadors Belgrade and Rome to take this step.

Assuming this does not succeed we should proceed to make United States-UK approach to Tito as outlined in plan. Eden was heartily in favor of this phase of plan, as we believe all others present were, and characterized it as excellent.

Eden would not agree, however, to statement of numbered paragraph 7 that in last resort Tito could be told he could have choice between our proposal or implementation of October 8 decision. He stated it would in first place require reversal of Cabinet decision, which he is not prepared to request at this time, and secondly we all feel that chances of settling problem have now improved and that both Yugoslavs and Italians genuinely want an agreed settlement. He was unwilling to commit himself now to enforcement of October 8 declaration, saying that we should make decision at time it becomes necessary and in light of situation then obtaining. Although Eden unwilling to give firm commitment or to put question now to Cabinet, it was clear that he was impressed by the necessity of a solution without retreat from October 8 and by our firmness in this regard.

With regard to possibility of letting question go to UN (i.e., Assembly, not Security Council), Eden said “we once favored UN but it is now at bottom of list.”

It was agreed that for present no reference to question of “last resort” statement to Tito re October 8 would be made outside Foreign Office and Department. Any discussion of this point and consequent possible leakage might jeopardize chance of putting proposal across. Minutes on this will be drafted and telegraphed Washington when agreed between Foreign Office and Embassy.³

It was also agreed that negotiations with Yugoslavs could best be carried out in either Washington or London, because this would be only way secrecy could be maintained and possibility of final appeal to Tito would be left open if necessary. It was tentatively agreed that Yugoslavs would be given choice of Washington or London for discussions.

Recommend that Department inform Paris, Belgrade and Rome of plan on basic noforn except British.⁴

Butterworth

1. Telegram 798 quoted as follows a summary of a proposal Bidault made to Eden on Dec. 16 which had also been furnished the Embassy in Belgrade:

   “Before a conference and with the agreement of the two parties AMG would transfer to the Italian authorities for the City of Trieste only the contemplated administrative posts. On the other hand it would abrogate Fascist legislation still in force, proclaim an amnesty for Slovenes sentenced on the basis of this legislation and would guarantee freedom of teaching in Slovene.

   “This step taken, a five-power or two-power conference should be organized with the purpose of seeking a definitive solution. Italy would give up claims to Zone B, Yugoslavia would give up claims to the City of Trieste, territorial exchanges between Zone A and Zone B would take place.

   “The three powers would emphasize that the settlement in order to be definitive should include a regional autonomy for the two zones, reciprocal guarantees in favor of minorities, a privileged position for Yugoslavia in the Port of Trieste through arrangements similar to those which operated in Salonika between the two wars.” (750G.00/12–1853)

2. Telegram 797 reported a conversation between Foreign Minister Popovic and Riddleberger on Dec. 17, during which Riddleberger, acting on instructions from the Department of State, had proposed certain modifications to the conditions for convening a five-power conference on Trieste. Popovic had said that the Yugoslav Government insisted on a balanced implementation of the Oct. 8 decision, that is, that guarantees for the rights of the Slovene minority in the city of Trieste would have to be decided upon at the same time that Italian officials were introduced into Zone A. (750G.00/12–1753)
3. No copy of the agreed British-U.S. minutes of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
4. In telegram 754 to Belgrade (2121 to Rome, repeated to London, Paris, and Trieste), Dec. 23, the Department of State outlined the new plan regarding Trieste. (750G.00/12–1753)