750G.00/12–1653: Telegram

No. 153
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State1
top secret
niact

2319. Secretary spent ¾ hour with Pella, interpreter, and Merchant morning December 16 at United States delegation office, Palais de Chaillot. In establishing date Secretary told Pella he was unwilling discuss in detail or negotiate regarding Trieste. Following conclusion talk, both agreed they would tell press that discussion was informal, covering wide range subjects and that there was no technical discussion nor negotiation on Trieste.

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After opening statement covering in some detail delicate domestic political balance in Italy and importance solution Trieste to enable him to continue execution pro-NATO foreign policy, Pella asked that United States do all possible to solve Trieste problem. In this connection he referred in complimentary terms to Secretary’s understanding of and sympathy for Italy.

Secretary replied substantially as follows: He had said day before that he did not wish to enter into technical discussion regarding Trieste because current negotiations were in hands of Minister Holmes now in London and he deplored simultaneous conduct of two separate negotiations on same subject. Insofar as general problem was concerned, it has been our desire to bring about just and definitive solution of Trieste which is important in itself but also is important for defense of all Europe which requires cooperation in that area between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy.

Secretary, pointing to a map, said it was impossible to achieve the necessary defensive strength in the region so long as existing tensions remain between Yugoslavia and Italy. He went on to say that we had made the October 8 pronouncement in the expectation that it would be acceptable to both sides. Perhaps our intelligence regarding Tito’s attitude was somewhat inaccurate. We had relied considerably on the views of British who, we felt, had closer relations with Tito than the United States.

We still believe that the basic decision of October 8 will be carried out though as he had explained in Washington to both Ambassador Tarchiani and Ambassador Popovic, we had always recognized the decision was a “bare bones” decision on which must be put flesh, such as provision for protection of minorities, facilities for use of port of Trieste, and possibly mutually acceptable adjustments of the line between Zones A and B before it was a fully matured decision.

Secretary went on to say that talks were going on between Holmes and British Foreign Office in London. He added that it is not as easy to act in matters such as these when two or three partners are involved as it is when one is acting alone. But, nevertheless, the fact cannot be ignored that the United States is not sole occupying power of FTT, the United States shares occupation in Zone A and Yugoslavia is occupying power in Zone B.

Secretary continued that one of great difficulties is feeling between peoples if not governments of Italy and Yugoslavia. Hence, any action taken which is satisfactory to one country almost automatically has to be rejected by other. With a smile he added possibly strong welcome Pella gave to original proposal contributed to strength of Tito’s rejection. Secretary said his impression was that actually difficulty between the two countries was really very small [Page 350] and he asked Pella to contribute as he recently has to an atmosphere of calm which will contribute to a solution since the differences in his estimate were more psychological than material.

In conclusion, Secretary said he wanted to assure Pella we appreciate difficult position of his government and desire to move in a way to help him meet the internal problem presented by the extremes of left and right. He said he believed Pella can trust us to seek in every possible peaceful way to bring about an equitable solution of problem along lines of October 8 decision.

Pella who had listened intently (though responding with a smile to Secretary’s reference to his original enthusiasm regarding October 8) thanked Secretary for his statement reminding him Italy had accepted October 8 decision even if it had not been fully satisfied thereby and also accepted terms of November 13 approach. He said he was willing to continue to run risks for support of foreign policy in which he believed and that he had no other comments to add. In leaving, however, Pella reminded Secretary that whereas Parliament would recess shortly it would reassemble January 15 by which date he was convinced we must have found a solution to enable him to carry on.

Atmosphere of meeting was relaxed and friendly and it was evident that Secretary had made deep impression on Pella.

Achilles
  1. Repeated for information to Rome, Belgrade, Trieste, and London for Holmes. The Italian Government’s summary notes of the DullesPella conversation on Dec. 16 were transmitted to the Embassy in Rome on Dec. 24. An English translation of these notes prepared by the Embassy staff was one of several enclosures to a memorandum from Durbrow to Luce, Dec. 28. Luce had returned to the United States on Dec. 2 for consultations. (Luce files, lot 64 F 26, “Washington Trip—January 1, 1954”)