750G.00/12–453: Telegram
No. 149
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia
(Riddleberger) to the Department of State1
niact
750. Limited distribution. Tito gave farewell lunch for Harmony today at which time I had opportunity of exchanging a few words with him on Trieste. I told him we hope to make new approach within few days that I hope Yugoslav Government would give most serious consideration and do everything possible to accept what would be on our part a most earnest effort to find a compromise in order that a conference could convene. I said we had read his Jacje speech2 most carefully and Tito responded that he had now gone even farther in ordering the demobilization of one division and one brigade in the frontier region. With reference to the proposed conference, he said that he must emphasize one point and that is it would be impossible for Yugoslav Government to accept any implementation of October 8 decision before some kind of conference was convened. I asked him if he were referring specifically to the transfer of posts and whether his government was prepared to discuss the possibility of transferring certain symbolic posts during the course of the conference. I recalled that we had not yet heard from Yugoslav side what was meant by “posts of a symbolic character”. Tito hesitated somewhat and then said that perhaps this could be considered but he did not make a particularly definite reply. I said that the three governments were now making a determined effort to find a formula which could be accepted in both Rome and Belgrade and I urged him to make some kind of effort on Yugoslav side to go as far as possible in finding a compromise which would lead to a conference. Tito said if necessary when we came to discuss next approach, perhaps three Ambassadors could meet with him informally in an effort to reach a solution.
Tito made one allusion in course of this conversation which indicated he was informed as to reasons for our delay, i.e., that Bidault had made last minute difficulties which had not yet been cleared away. I confined myself to replying that when three distant capitals were involved it always takes time to obtain unity of views but that I was certain we would be able to approach his government very soon.
[Page 344]While foregoing may be useful as indication of Tito’s willingness to find compromise re conference, I do not interpret it to mean that Yugoslavia will accept November 13 decision unmodified. It does indicate however that we should make approach here as soon as possible before additional suspicion arises on Yugoslav side that we are negotiating with Italians before discussion problem again with Yugoslavia.
From Tito’s remarks and information obtained by French and British Ambassadors in separate conversations with Bebler, the form of probable Yugoslav reply begins to emerge. It seems likely that our next approach on basis contemplated instructions will be met with Yugoslav proposal to confine transfer of some posts to City of Trieste and that this only be done after convening of preliminary conference. This is in line with what Bebler told me in Sarajevo (Embtel 7303).
In conversation with French Ambassador Bebler outlined instructions which he had just cabled to Yugoslav Ambassadors Washington, London and Paris, outlining basis on which Yugoslavs would be prepared to discuss substance of settlement in a conference. In Yugoslav view Italians should be prepared to give up claims to Zone B in return for Tito’s renegotiation of claims to City of Trieste so that conference would turn around how much of Zone A should go to Yugoslavia. Both sides however should be prepared to give extensive guarantees in areas of present FTT to be retained by them re minority rights which would give these areas in effect a separate or semi-autonomous status inside Yugoslavia and Italy.
In addition to what Tito said re demobilization, Bebler also told French Ambassador that when Tito read AFP despatch this morning, dated December 4 from Bermuda, to effect that pending a solution the evacuation of US/UK troops would not be effected, he instructed Yugoslav Minister Rome to approach Italian Government with suggestion for simultaneous withdrawal from frontier regions.