Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

750G.00/10–1453

No. 135
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)

top secret

[Washington,] October 14, 1953.

• Subject: Trieste

Participants:

• Ambassador Tarchiani, Italian Embassy
• The Secretary
• The Under-Secretary
• Mr. L. T. Merchant, EUR
• Mr. H. M. Byington, Jr., WE

The Ambassador said that he wished to leave with the Secretary a brief statement of the Italian Government’s position regarding the recent developments over Trieste (statement attached¹). The Secretary read the statement and spoke with the Ambassador along the following lines:

Our Government had been greatly concerned over the situation which had arisen between Italy and Yugoslavia with regard to Trieste and attached the utmost importance to achieving a final solution. We had envisaged that the decision which we had announced on October 8 would provide an acceptable foundation for a basic division between Zone A and Zone B which could in the future be adjusted by agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia to include an exchange of areas in either zone according to the desires of both Governments.

The Secretary emphasized the difficulties we were now going through with our Yugoslav friends. He believed these difficulties had not been helped by the excessive welcome with which our announcement had been greeted in Italy. We wanted the Italians to like it but had hoped they would exercise restraint and moderation in the public statements of their officials. The Secretary told the Ambassador of his conversations yesterday and the day before with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister who had come down from New York to see him.² He said it was most important that the Italian Government should not under-estimate the seriousness of the Yugoslav reaction to what had occurred. He said that yesterday in his discussion with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister reference had been made to the statement of Marshal Tito that if a single Italian soldier should enter Zone A, Yugoslav troops would enter Zone A at the same time from Zone B. The Secretary took occasion to point out to the Yugoslav Foreign Minister that during the course of the transfer of authority there would necessarily be Italian troops in Zone A as well as British and American troops. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister had officially reaffirmed in behalf of his Government the statement of Marshal Tito and had emphasized that the Yugoslav Government was not bluffing. Ambassador Tarchiani would understand, therefore, the very great need that at this juncture the Italian Government should make every effort to allay tension. We do not intend to be deterred by threats of this sort but we must not assume that this threat is purely a verbal one which we can control. The Secretary referred to the type of Government in Yugoslavia, its emotion and fanaticism and its adherence to the principles of Communism although a different Communism from that of the Kremlin but nevertheless based on belief in the use of force to achieve its objectives. He mentioned the parallel between Syngman Rhee and Marshal Tito and that just because an action of the type indicated seemed reckless it would be foolish to be positive that Tito would not do it. We must realize that the restraints from the use of force inherent in a Christian Society are not present in the Yugoslav regime. He repeated again his request that the Italian Government at this point exercise restraint. In this connection he mentioned, for instance, the provocative speeches which Mayor Bartoli of Trieste which made it appear that the Italians were fully intending now to use Zone A as a point of departure for the acquisition of Zone B. The Italian Ambassador said that he could give the greatest assurance on the part of his government that it would do everything in its power to keep calm in this situation. He said that no utterance of the Government had been provocative, there had been no demonstrations, no flags, no disorders in front of the Yugoslav Embassy in Rome, nor had there been a single Slovene hurt in Zone A. In fact, the Italian Government, far from indicating in any way that it would try to get Zone B by force, on the contrary merely reiterated its preference for a plebiscite.

The Secretary said that only this morning he had discussed this question with the President³ who also, as the Ambassador knew, felt a great affection for Italy and knew personally Prime Minister Pella. It was the hope of the President, as well as General Smith and the Secretary, that the Italian Government would exercise moderation. The Ambassador said that he was very glad to have this information, that he would communicate at once with his Government and that he was confident that Pella would act in accordance with our wishes in the speech he would have to make Friday⁴ before the Senate. He pointed out that Mayor Bartoli was under the Trieste administration but that his Government would endeavor to persuade the Mayor not to make any more foolish speeches which might threaten to ruin all that we were trying to do.

The Ambassador then said that there was one phase of what the Secretary had said that seemed to him of the greatest importance. He said that this menace of Tito was an act of international criminality and he did not believe that the United States and the United Kingdom could remain under such a menace. If that were the case it would mean that a bandit, even a small bandit, could prevent the settlement of a most urgent international problem.

He referred to the fact that the city of Trieste had never been a part of the Yugoslav system. They had never lost 600,000 men defending it, a fact which they were inclined to overlook. The Secretary intervened by saying that the Ambassador was getting excited which was exactly what he was asking him not to do. The Ambassador laughed and said that what he wanted to say was if we went back on our declaration of October 8 that action in Italy would be disastrous. There would be demonstrations in Rome instead of in Yugoslavia and no Italian would be able to understand our action. He went on to say that Italy had always been willing to negotiate with Yugoslavia and had even come so far as to offer the railroad and port in the city of Trieste itself. It had agreed to a line which we had drawn last March with the exception of a slight addition. Now it would be the full intention of the Italian Government to sit down with Yugoslavia and see what could be worked out along the lines that the Secretary had indicated. The Ambassador again attempted to draw the Secretary out on what our attitude was now in the face of the Yugoslav threat. He was seeking assurance what we would do. The conversation, however, returned to the question of the need for restraint, and the Ambassador repeated that he would inform his Government at once of what the Secretary had told him.⁵

1. Not printed.
2. For memoranda of these discussions, see Documents 131 and 132.

3. In his memoirs, President Eisenhower recalls the following incident:

   “When Foster Dulles informed me on October 14 of the Yugoslav threat, I was surprised but determined to be prepared to deal with any foolhardy movement on Tito’s part. A check with the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that it would take thirty-six to forty-eight hours to move important elements of the Sixth Fleet into the upper Adriatic. Warships were sent without delay.” (Mandate for Change, p. 414.)

   No record of this incident has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library.

4. Oct. 16.
5. Later that day, Minister Mario Luciolli came to the Department of State, under instructions of Ambassador Tarchiani, to seek a clarification of the remarks Secretary Dulles had earlier made to Tarchiani. Luciolli asked Merchant whether he could assure him that the United States intended to implement the Oct. 8 decision. When Merchant demurred, Luciolli asked whether that meant the United States was thinking of backing down “in the face of the Yugoslav threat.” Merchant replied that it was up to Tarchiani to make his own interpretation of the Secretary’s remarks, but that Tarchiani would certainly be aware that the Secretary had made no such inference. The two men also discussed the Secretary’s request that the Italian Government exercise restraint. (Memorandum of conversation, Oct. 14; 750G.00/10–1453)