Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, “Trieste”

No. 131
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Barbour)

secret

[Washington,] October 12, 1953.

• Subject: Trieste

Participants:

• Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koca Popovic
• Yugoslav Ambassador Vladimir Popovic
• Dr. Mirko Bruner, First Secretary, Yugoslav Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Mr. Walworth Barbour, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

The Foreign Minister¹ opened the conversation by noting that the recent US-UK decision on Trieste is unilateral and without advance consultation with the Yugoslavs, but that Yugoslavia, being anxious for a peaceful settlement, has two proposals to present to the US and UK in this connection. The first is that the City of Trieste be administered as an autonomous entity under Italian sovereignty for ten years while the rest of the Free Territory be similarly administered by Yugoslavia for the same period. This is the maximum that Yugoslavia could accept. The Foreign Minister added that the Secretary General of the UN had been informed of the matter as one which could endanger the peace and Yugoslavia reserves the right to bring the matter to the attention of the UN if the Western Powers do not accept the second Yugoslav proposal, which is to call a Four-Power meeting of the US, UK, Italy and Yugoslavia to find a peaceful solution. The Foreign Minister remarked that the US-UK decision had been a source of deep bitterness among the Yugoslav population, but Yugoslavia has a strong interest in the continuance of good relations with the US, UK, etc.

The Secretary said that the decision had been taken in the expectation that it would end a situation which was interfering with good relations between the US, Yugoslavia and Italy and with the partnership relation which we want with the Yugoslavs. Happily, military conversations have been taking place between the Yugoslavs, Turkey and Greece.² Similarly, recent military talks had been held with the Yugoslavs at the Pentagon.³ However, difficulties had arisen over Trieste and such military conversations cannot be fully developed in the absence of a Trieste solution. The Secretary was surprised that the US–UK decision had not met with acceptance by the Yugoslavs. The Trieste problem constitutes a clear obstacle to closer relationships in the future. On the basis of our impressions the decision should be acceptable to the Yugoslavs. We had no advance talks with the Italians nor the Yugoslavs. In the latter case the Yugoslavs were aware no such talks took place. They would have to take his word for the former. The Secretary went on to say that we had reason to believe a solution on a Zone A–Zone B basis, subject to any further negotiations on details that might be desirable, would be acceptable. We expected difficulties with the Italians. A month ago the Secretary had made a statement to the press in regard to the relationship between the 1948 Declaration on Trieste and possible solutions.⁴ That statement had evoked satisfaction from the Yugoslavs but not from the Italians. Therefore the decision which presages a definitive settlement along the lines of Zone A–Zone B was expected to be accepted by the Yugoslavs. It constitutes a departure from the 1948 Declaration for the Italians but it was thought to be approved by the Yugoslavs. There must accordingly be a misunderstanding over this action. The Secretary referred specifically to the violent character of Yugoslav reactions and the physical injury suffered by US officials in Yugoslavia.

Foreign Minister Popovic stated that the Yugoslavs had not supposed that the governments exercising mandatory authority in Zone A would impose a solution without consultation when Yugoslav rights were affected. Yugoslav reaction might have been anticipated, US and UK assumptions in that connection having been incorrect. This could have been avoided had they taken account of Yugoslav positions which were known to them. The problem, he said, involves both the past and present. It cannot be forgotten that the Italians attacked and dismembered Yugoslavia. Italian appetites have recently increased, they have been penetrating the area and now they desire the whole territory. They have harshly and brutally denationalized Yugoslavs on territory under Italian domination. For these reasons the US-UK decision is unacceptable and has prompted the Yugoslav proposals which take into account the rightful interests of Yugoslavia.

The Secretary said that it is a distressing point of view that the Yugoslavs cannot forget the past, and present and future actions must be based on the past. The quality of greatness is as much to forget the past as to remember. A program to rebuild and strengthen Europe involves the French and Germans forgetting the past and looking toward the future. The US, particularly in the Pacific, suffered in the past but now forgets and looks toward the future. Unless the past is forgotten we will have a world of increasing enmity. The future world depends on forgetting and, while we realize it is difficult and would not expect the past to be totally forgotten, inspired statesmanship and a desire to build the future is the role to which we welcome Tito. He is now working with Greece and Turkey. Unless a proper spirit develops between Yugoslavia and Italy, plans for Europe are dubious.

The Secretary noted the Foreign Minister’s concern that Zone A would be a base for further Italian aggrandizement. The Secretary did not believe that this is a realistic concern. In any case, plans can be made to reduce it and it thus does not justify the Yugoslav reaction. The Secretary admitted it would have been a more normal procedure to have consulted with the Italians and the Yugoslavs but we have done that for five years. The two governments were not prepared to carry indefinitely a responsibility which was originally intended to be only temporary and believed that now was the time for a decision to end the hostility between Italy and Yugoslavia, who [sic] we want as friends and with whom we wish to work on a more constructive scale in the future.

The Foreign Minister said that Yugoslavia has given evidence that they wish to forget the past, as the Secretary suggests, to the extent possible. The best proof thereof is that Yugoslavia has made constructive proposals to establish good relations with Italy. The Italians should forget. Their relations with Greece and Turkey have been developed. The West, however, has supported Italy and the more support Italy has received the more their aspirations have increased. The Foreign Minister is afraid that they cannot be sure that this will not be the effect of the present decision, despite the motives the Secretary outlined. It is Yugoslavia’s deep conviction that the decision endangers relations between the two countries. Regardless of our assessment, we are in a concrete situation. He hoped the Secretary would agree on the necessity of bringing about a just settlement.⁵

1. Koča Popović was in the United States to attend the Eighth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. For documentation regarding these conversations, see Documents 306 ff.
3. A summary report of these talks held in Washington, Aug. 24–28, is in file 611.68/8–2453.
4. Secretary Dulles’ statement to the press on Sept. 3 regarding Trieste is quoted in Document 94.
5. A typewritten note on the source text indicates that the conversation was suspended at this point to permit the Secretary to keep an engagement with the President and that a further meeting was arranged for 2 p.m., Oct. 13. A memorandum of this subsequent conversation is infra.