Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

663.001/12–854: Telegram

No. 948
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

confidential

Washington, December 9, 1954—6:24 p.m.

3126. Re London’s 2677.²

1. Department continues consider proposed tripartite working group undesirable. Embassy should inform British following views in attempt convince them. If British remain determined hold meeting they should realize following will be position US representative.

a. US position remains as in September 10 and November 29 notes³ though already compromised by Mendès-France’s UN speech.

b. Soviets have given no indication readiness sign treaty providing for troop withdrawal at any fixed date.

c. Until Soviet proposal at hand no basis for or context within which to consider such implementing details as troop status and continuation control agreement exist.

d. Implication entering discussion with Austrians on application Mendès-France’s proposal would be US–UK acceptance. (FYI and for British same applies to French. Admittedly Mendès-France’s proposal has probably established Soviet minimum position as two years between ratification and withdrawal from which point they will expect negotiate upward but we should retain such freedom of action as we have left.)

e. At such time as Soviets commit themselves to satisfactory fixed date for withdrawal, details tripartite position can be developed. Any discussion such details with Soviets or Austrians prior that time would run risk making further concessions to no avail. We will also insist that troop withdrawal date be fixed by Five Powers prior any discussion neutralization question on which for present we do not wish indicate to Austrians we would even consider reviewing our position (FYI and for British same applies to French).

2. Re second para reftel we had in mind three Ministers would discuss over-all problem tripartite solidarity in order achieve clear understanding responsibilities each Government this regard rather than any details re Austrian Treaty.

3. Since primary result treaty and restoration Austrian sovereignty would be end foreign occupation seems hardly necessary develop thesis for arguments against delaying evacuation. Department would however be happy examine and comment on UK paper if and when British prepared offer it.

4. If British insist on tripartite working group meeting US representative will be expected confine himself points para (1) above and stipulate his position reserved on discussion beyond those points.⁴

Dulles

1. Drafted by Freund; cleared by Thurston and Merchant; and repeated to Paris, Vienna, Moscow, and Bonn.
2. Telegram 2677 reported the desire of the British Foreign Office that there be a tripartite discussion in London concerning the Austrian evacuation problem. It was believed that this preliminary discussion would be desirable before Dulles, Eden, and Mendès-France met in Paris to discuss this issue at the time of the NAC meeting in mid-December. (663.001/12–854)
3. For texts of these two U.S. notes, both of which concerned the question of European security, see Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 20, 1954, pp. 397–398, and ibid., Dec. 13, 1954, pp. 901–902.
4. Despite earlier expectations (see footnote 2 above), Secto 8 from Paris, Dec. 17, reported that Austria had not yet been discussed in talks with Eden or tripartitely while Eden, Mendès-France, and Dulles were in Paris for the NAC Ministerial meeting of Dec. 17–18. (663.001/12–1754) No record of any discussions in Paris were found in Department of State files.