S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 164 Series
No. 934
Memorandum Prepared by the
Operations Coordinating Board1
Progress Report on NSC 164/12
U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to Austria
(Policy approved by the President, October 14, 1953)
a. summary of major actions
1. A Western offer at the Berlin Conference in February to sign an Austrian treaty including the Soviet versions of the unagreed Articles was not accepted by the Soviets and was subsequently withdrawn. The Western powers and Austria rejected Soviet proposals to conclude a treaty providing for (1) retention of occupation forces in the zones; (2) withdrawal of occupation forces from Vienna, and (3) Austria’s neutralization.
2. Following coordination with the West, Austria proposed on July 22, a five power committee in Vienna to consider alleviation of occupation burdens. The Western Governments accepted this Austrian proposal but it was rejected by the Soviet Government which proposed instead the resumption of treaty negotiations based presumably on their Berlin proposals.
3. In unilateral efforts to alleviate Austria’s burdens, the U.S. has (1) turned over to Austrian control the Linz and Salzburg stations of our radio network; (2) agreed in principle to an increase in the transportation rates paid by us in Austria; and (3) obtained a Congressional appropriation of $1,000,000 for the construction of dependents’ housing in Vienna. In addition, emergency assistance has been provided to relieve the situation caused by the July floods.
[Page 1975]4. Soviet threats against the Austrian Government in May were countered by airing the matter in the Allied Council on U.S. initiative. Except for the reestablishment of Soviet zonal border checks on two occasions, and occasional stoppage of German tourists in the Soviet zone, Soviet threats have not been carried out.
5. As a further step toward meeting its obligations for trade liberalization under the OEEC code, in June 1954 Austria raised the level of imports from the EPU area which are not subject to quantitative restrictions from 50% to 75%.
. . . . . . .
(For detailed development of NSC courses of action, see Annex “A”3).
b. operational considerations bearing on policy
7. In the opinion of the Working Group on Austria, NSC 164/1 remains effective, timely and capable of continuing implementation.
c. emerging problems and future actions
8. Study is being given to the likelihood that we may be faced in the near future with the problem of modifying our position on the Austrian treaty negotiations. The Austrians are expected to be increasingly resentful of any refusal to negotiate and British and French support of the Austrian position is anticipated. This study will give consideration to the possibility of renewed negotiations on the basis of the Soviet Berlin proposals which would, presumably, be the only basis upon which negotiations could be reopened. The U.S. Berlin position will, in the meantime, be maintained and all efforts will be made to prevent a deterioration of the status quo.
9. Tripartite consideration, in consultation with the Austrians, is being given to inscribing the Austrian item on the UNGA agenda this fall and to submitting to the UNGA a tripartite report on Western efforts to conclude an Austrian treaty in response to UNGA Resolution of December 1952.4 Aside from its propaganda value it is hoped that this action would serve to strengthen Austrian willingness to resist possible Soviet overtures to renew treaty negotiations or to engage in bilateral negotiations.
10. The Working Group on Austria believes that it would be preferable to leave until after the event as little as possible of the planning necessary to cope with the sort of situations envisaged in [Page 1976] paragraphs 17f, g and h of the Courses of Action. It has, therefore, agreed upon the study described in paragraphs 17f, g and h infra. It remains a question as to how much useful advanced planning is possible, but it is believed worthwhile to examine the specific situations that might arise and at least to attempt to plan to meet them. The decision to undertake this study does not imply that the Working Group foresees any early Soviet action to partition Austria, blockade Vienna, or make illegal use of armed force. Such actions, however, are always possible and the Soviet behavior mentioned in 17a (5) infra could have represented initial steps toward partition.
11. Notwithstanding the progress that has been made in building up the Austrian gendarmérie, the problem of the defense of Austria against full-scale Soviet attack, the maintenance of the U.S. position in this area, and the protection and support of the southern flank of NATO is a matter of continuing concern. The long-awaited settlement of the Trieste situation and the development of the Balkan Pact, consistent with U.S. and NATO planning, can contribute substantially to easing this concern but until this planning is more fully developed, the need for adequate security in the area, particularly in the light of the unilateral British and French withdrawals late last year, remains critical.
d. extent of agency interests
12. No other executive department or agency has had a significant role or interest in the activities of the Working Group.
Attached to the source text was a covering memorandum by Elmer B. Staats, Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), dated Sept. 17, to James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, informing him that this was the second progress report on the implementation of NSC 164/1 and that it covered the period Jan. 20, 1954, through Aug. 24, 1954. For text of the first progress report, see Document 908.
Also attached to the source text was a memorandum by Lay to the members of the NSC, dated Dec. 29, which noted that this memorandum was being circulated for information and that it was not scheduled for the Council’s agenda because it made no substantive recommendations.
A copy of this progress report is also in OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “Austria”.
↩- Document 895.↩
- This 10-page annex, not printed, gives a detailed accounting of major actions related to paragraphs 16a through 21 of NSC 164/1.↩
- See Document 840.↩