Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

763.00/5–2154: Telegram

No. 925
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Moscow, May 21, 1954—9 p.m.

1450. We are inclined to agree with Vienna’s estimate (2857 to Department, repeated information Moscow 156²) of immediate origin Soviet attempts intimidation (Department telegram 734³). It appears to be in part, at least, motivated by desire to buttress Soviet thesis that Anschluss is real danger in order to attempt to justify Soviet unwillingness to withdraw troops together with typical big power arrogance in face of Austrian spirit. Tass despatch in Pravda today (Embassy telegram 1446⁴) appears to confirm this view. However, whatever its motivation, unless actions of this kind are dealt with firmly in opening stages they can of themselves develop along much more serious lines. Chief purpose, therefore, of Western action would be to bring about cessation of Soviet threats and all other considerations should be subordinated to this end. It is for this reason, that we are inclined to believe that publicity should not be overdone and that chief action should be firm and united Western position in support of Austrian Government in Control Council. Publicity up to certain point is essential ingredient of Western position, but it should be handled with care in order not to raise, unnecessarily, prestige issue which might make it more difficult to compel Soviet Government to abandon its present threats.

Bohlen

1. Repeated to Vienna, London, Paris, and Geneva.
2. Document 922.
3. Same as telegram 3369 to Vienna, Document 923.
4. Telegram 1446 summarized Soviet press reports, including statements about pro-Anschluss propaganda issued by the Austrian Government. (961.61/5–2154)