763.00/5–1854: Telegram
No. 922
The Acting United States High
Commissioner for Austria (Yost) to the Department of State1
2857. Helmer, Figl, Kamitz, Pittermann expressed confidence today that Austrian Government can handle latest Soviet attacks (Embtel 28462). Cabinet session May 18 approved Raab’s press statement denying Soviet allegations, and ordered parliamentary debate May 19. Coalition party spokesmen, led by Raab, planning to use Parliament session to reject Soviet charges and threats. Austrian Government evidently convinced that situation can best be met by moderate but firm rejection of Soviet allegations.
During call on Helmer today, I assured him US prepared to offer any support he may need to withstand Soviet pressure. He did not appear unduly concerned over situation. Helmer believes it is still too early for full appraisal Soviet motives and intentions. Available [Page 1963] evidence suggests to him essentially local motives for recent Soviet outburst, e.g., unrest among Soviet occupation troops; pique at “little Austria’s” defiance in contrast with certain “great powers” deference to Soviets at Geneva; and closer coordination between Soviets and local Communists. Helmer regards “closer observation” of zonal frontiers by Soviets as possible consequence, together with ban on German tourists and Soviet effort exercise greater control over gendarmérie (which Helmer confident he can resist). Figl and Pittermann also regard Soviet threat as primarily local matter which they know how to handle. Kamitz, on other hand, sees possible tie-in with Geneva and Far Eastern events.
While Embassy cannot accept without reservations optimistic attitude of Austrian officials toward new Soviet move, we do not believe this heralds any drastic change in Soviet policy toward Austria and it is certainly not to be interpreted as indication that Soviets aim at partitioning the country. Since Berlin, in Austria as well as elsewhere in the world, propaganda advantages have fallen to western powers owing to the adamant Soviet demands for the retention of occupation troops here. Neither before Berlin nor after have Soviets used the full resources of their propaganda machine to justify the Soviet Berlin stand on Austria. We believe that one motivation behind this present Soviet action is an attempt to regain propaganda initiative and to seek broader justification of their unpopular, hard-to-explain policy on Austrian state treaty.
On other hand Soviets may have felt some concern recently with post-Berlin developments in Austria. Raab, who last summer showed tendencies to desire quiet bilateral negotiations, has been forced by events to speak out openly against Soviet policy. The Austrian Government has exhibited a spirit of independence and a tendency to ignore the occupying powers which the Soviet element may be concerned to check at an early stage.
Embassy does not believe, however, that this Soviet action motivated entirely by local considerations. Probable Soviets hope by these charges and threats not only to apply brake to Austrian Government’s policy of closer association with various forms European integration movement and cooperation with western occupying powers but to cause British and French to move slowly in matters concerning Austria. Also by playing on French fears of Germany and future of Austro-German relations, they may hope to add one more obstacle to conclusion EDC.
In sum, Embassy believes Soviets may be prepared to go as far as partial or general reimposition of zonal check points and to attempt exercise greater pressure on and control over police and gendarmérie in Soviet zone, but we doubt that Soviets are prepared to [Page 1964] take measures which would result in a crisis of major proportions in Austria.