763.0221/3–3154: Telegram
No. 920
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Aldrich)
to the Department of State1
4272. From Thompson. Met today with Wallinger, who is departing for Vienna tomorrow, and Harrison. British had received only this morning report from their Embassy similar that contained in Vienna’s 2412 of March 24.2 I inquired whether this would affect their proposal to suggest Austria joining the Council of Europe. Their first reaction was negative, pointing out that they would not propose to pressure the Austrian Government but merely make suggestion. After pointing out I was out of touch with Austrian affairs and could, therefore, only express personal opinions, I said there appeared to be differences between the Socialists and People’s Party on this subject and that even on the basis of a mere suggestion from us the Socialists might grab the ball and run and that Raab might not be able to control the situation. It appeared to me that timing was most important and that the logical order would be first, talks on the use of Austrian manpower; second, talks on the Austrian proposal for a five-power discussion on measures of alleviation and finally the Council of Europe suggestion. I personally thought any step which tied Austria into the European Community was useful, but it might be unwise to give the Soviets an excuse for refusing to discuss alleviation.
[Page 1960]The British policy paper on the approach on use of Austrian manpower is in the hands of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and approval expected shortly.
On subject five-power conference, British have some vague doubts as to how specific British interests can be protected. They apparently have in mind using leverage of German assets to obtain satisfaction on property claims, release from nationalization, Jewish claims, etc. They are concerned that in five-power discussion this bargaining weapon might be lost. These were preliminary and not considered reactions as neither Harrison nor Wallinger familiar with technical details. They were also troubled to know how question of German claims would be handled. On this, I said I imagined Austrians would first have to inform Western Powers results of their studies this subject and their proposed line of action. If Austrians could work out satisfactory arrangement with Germans this might be put to five-power meeting, otherwise different arrangement might have to be worked out regarding Western and Soviet Zones.
I said I would recommend that before agreeing to five-power conference my government should have understanding with Austrians as to what steps if any they contemplated taking in five-power conference regarding reduction of forces. I did not believe that we should agree to such a conference if Austrians were going to make a proposal which would in effect allow Russians to determine numerical level of our forces. For this reason, I attached importance to taking up use of Austrian manpower first since realization by Austrian Government that we did in fact have plans for the defense of Austria would make them less likely to press us to reduce our forces. British expressed understanding this point of view.
British also appear to have misunderstood nature and extent of our heavy weapons training program and were reassured by my description. They were sympathetic with my opinion that by the time of the next Austrian budget the Austrians should openly reveal at least some expansion of the gendarmérie,
- Repeated to Vienna and Paris.↩
- Document 918.↩