750G.00/2–2554
No. 914
The United States High Commissioner
for Austria (Thompson) to the Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs (Merchant)
Dear Livie: In Paris last weekend I had a long talk with Generals Gruenther and Schuyler, and also a long talk with Chip Bohlen about Berlin, which was very helpful. The two subjects I discussed with Gruenther were the problem of the use of Austrian manpower and the possible transfer to Austria of the Trieste troops.
With regard to the first, I pointed out that there appeared to be a fundamental difference between us and the British over the possible defense of Austria and on basic strategy. It seemed doubtful whether the British would really attempt to make any use of Austrian manpower in their Zone unless and until their ideas on strategy could be reconciled with ours. I pointed out that General Collins did not seem to have gone into these basic questions and this was confirmed by General Gruenther. He said that SHAPE was currently engaged in drawing up complete new plans and agreed that this issue would have to be thrashed out. I also pointed out that because of the compartmentalization that existed on the U.S. side there never seemed to be any possibility of all those concerned coming to grips with a problem such as this. Because of this we had lost at least a French battalion, and I hoped there would be an opportunity to consider the political aspects together with the U.S. military and the NATO military aspects as well.
With regard to the Trieste troops, I pointed out that I had supported General Arnold’s request for the transfer of these troops despite the obvious political difficulties and risks this might involve. In order that there might be no misunderstanding, however, I wanted him to know that I saw no prospect whatever of it being possible for these troops ever to be stationed in the British Zone in peace time. He indicated he was aware of this. I also said it was my guess that following their disappointment at Berlin the Austrians would likely now move openly to expand their gendarmérie and possibly even to press for the creation of an Austrian Army. I described the differences of opinion between the Socialists and People’s Party on which of these courses should be followed. I said that if the Austrians took the risk of an overt expansion program, the simultaneous increase of our military forces would, if it became known, considerably add to the risk of Soviet reaction and possibly of Austrian resentment. I was out of touch with Austria, but would [Page 1950] guess that in keeping pressure on the Soviets to withdraw their force, the Austrians would also press us for reduction or withdrawal. In view of these facts, I was having some second thoughts on supporting the transfer of the Trieste troops. I tried to draw him out on his attitude toward this transfer and whether or not he considered it essential.
Gruenther said that from his point of view he would have to say that the reinforcement of our troops was desirable, but the other matters I had raised involved political decisions.
I then said that the crucial point seemed to me to be whether if this reinforcement were not made our military would consider that the force we had were insufficient to do the job and that we might as well, therefore, drastically reduce them. General Gruenther indicated he did not think this was the case, although he said some of our commanders in Germany might tend to take this view.
I realize I should not attempt to engage in any back-seat driving from here, but thought you and Charlie should know of this conversation. From the progress or lack thereof so far, it does not appear that the disposal of the Trieste troops will pose an immediate problem, but I am still an optimist.
Best regards to you both,1
- The source text is unsigned.↩