Office of the Historian

763.0221/9–1653

No. 888
The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

top secret
Washington, September 16, 1953.

Dear Mr. Secretary Attached is a copy of a letter forwarded today to the President, transmitting to him the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 11 September 1953, on the subject of United Kingdom and French forces in Austria.

Pursuant to these recommendations, the Department of State is urged to initiate diplomatic measures calculated to secure a reversal by the British and French Governments of their decisions, and to seek from them assurances that matters of NATO concern, or having an important bearing upon NATO, not be taken without prior consultation.

Sincerely yours,

C. E. Wilson
[Page 1899]

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret
Washington, September 11, 1953.

Subject:

  • United Kingdom and French Forces in Austria.
1.
General Gruenther has informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the British and French Governments, because of the reduction in their respective Austrian occupation budgets, have decided to reduce considerably the strength of their forces in Austria. Such units as remain will be kept for symbolic purposes only and will not be placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe for emergency use.
2.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff view this matter with utmost and urgent concern. Accordingly, your attention is invited to the possible serious and adverse results of such troop withdrawals upon the U.S. military position in Austria and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and unilateral strategic planning.
a.
U.S. forces in Austria would be exposed to encirclement in the event of a sudden attack.
b.
A military vacuum would be created thereby endangering the southern flank of Allied Forces Central Europe and the northern flank of Allied Forces Southern Europe.
c.
The impact on Yugoslavia would be severe. It would be taken as further indication of a lack of interest in the Yugoslav northern flank, with the consequent result that the Yugoslavs likely would abandon plans for a strong defense in the north.
d.
The alteration of Yugoslav defense plans, deemphasizing a defense in the north, would expose Italy to penetration from the east and northeast.
e.
The position of the US–UK forces in Trieste would be seriously jeopardized if not rendered untenable within a comparatively short period of time.
f.
The period of time of warning of attack would be reduced.
g.
Reduction of French and British Forces in Austria to token size places the United States in a difficult position politically as being the sole Western Power retaining its current occupation forces in Austria.
h.
Withdrawal of all occupation forces prior to the establishment of an adequate Austrian security force would expose Austria to Soviet inspired civil war, insurrection, subversion or direct Satellite aggression.
i.
There would be a distinct adverse psychological reaction throughout this area derived from the belief that the Western Powers were abandoning the defense of small nations for reasons of domestic economy.
3.
Aside from the effect upon the U.S. military position in Austria and strategic planning, the British and French action would have decided though unpredictable effect upon the entire NATO concept. It would presumably establish the precedent of sanctioning unilateral withdrawal of troops previously earmarked for NATO, confidence would be undermined, and other nations already more or less affected by neutralist leanings could be expected to seize upon this action as an excuse to reduce their own commitments and efforts.
4.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States Government should take up this matter with the British and French Governments without delay.
5.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you transmit this memorandum to the President for his information, as a matter of urgency, and that a copy be sent concurrently to the Secretary of State informing him of your action and requesting that he approach the United Kingdom and French Governments without delay seeking reversal of their decisions, and assurances that the taking of such unilateral, uncoordinated decisions on vital NATO matters will not be repeated.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford

[Enclosure 2]

The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President

top secret
Washington, September 16, 1953.

Dear Mr. President: Attached for your information, pursuant to their recommendation, is a copy of a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 11 September 1953, concerning a contemplated reduction in the level of British and French forces in Austria. A copy has also been transmitted to the Secretary of State, with the request that he initiate diplomatic measures calculated to secure a reversal of these decisions by the United Kingdom and France, and to seek from them assurances that matters of NATO concern, or having an important bearing upon NATO, not be taken without prior consultation.

I share the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the military implications of such unilateral decisions by the United Kingdom and France. Moreover, under present world conditions, the maintenance of a firm understanding and area of consultation with these [Page 1901] major Allies on all matters affecting our common defense would appear to be as important as our joint partnership in NATO itself.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

C. E. Wilson