763.0221/9–553: Telegram
No. 887
The United States High Commissioner
for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of
State1
599. Arnold unavailable until Monday [September 7]. His preliminary thinking before British action2 was that we should devise means of giving British and French additional support to enable them maintain strength here possibly diverting gendarmérie support this purpose. This would, of course, have serious adverse effects in Austria and am doubtful whether acceptable to British and French.
Believe we should immediately through diplomatic channels urge Paris take no action pending full consultation to be followed by discussions through both diplomatic and military channels. It seems particularly important that no action be taken before date fixed for Foreign Ministers’ meeting.3
On instructions Paris, French Chargé consulted me this morning and revealed that French considering suggestion that we both follow British line and put pressure on Soviets for similar reduction. I expressed strongly personal view this worse possible course follow at this time. It would appear to be assisting the Russians in carrying out their present strategy in relieving pressure for state treaty and in enabling Soviets to keep essentials of their position here and by partial withdrawal of few miles to Hungary, they could seriously weaken defense position of West. I urged that if French feel obliged to reduce forces to meet loss occupation costs they do so with no announcement. I pointed to the great expense of our military investment and installations here and the difficulty of reinforcing our troops if we should reduce them. Chargé agreed in part but pointed out fact that French forces now considered insufficient and build-up out of question. Also concerned Austrian public opinion.
When I urged Caccia not to stress relationship their action to Chancellor’s speech, he replied they were concerned their action might be considered based solely on loss occupation costs. We believe [Page 1898] in fact British have had this more under consideration since British military have never liked situation because of exposed position, poor LOC, and having more troops than required for occupation duties but insufficient for any real defense. This aggravated by current shortage British troops.
General Arnold had planned make announcement new housing construction in Salzburg next week awaiting only confirmation Chancellor our agreement. Believe we should at least proceed to request bids since delay impossible if construction to be started before winter freeze. Will report further after consultation Arnold.4
- Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and Rome.↩
- Reference to the British decision to reduce the strength of their forces in Austria from three battalions to one, a decision communicated to U.S. officials on Sept. 4. An analysis of this British policy was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 400 from Vienna, Sept. 11, 1953. (763.0221/9–1153)↩
- For documentation on the exchange of notes with the Soviet Union concerning a possible four-power meeting, see Documents 257 ff.↩
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In telegram 623 from Vienna, Sept. 9, Thompson informed the Department of State of Arnold’s concurrence. Arnold noted that the British reduction of force had little effect on the present military capabilities in Austria since their previous plans envisioned only light delaying action and withdrawal into Italy. He hoped that the British could be persuaded to reverse their decision but, if not, U.S. forces should be increased in strength and additional emphasis placed on the Austrian gendarmérie program. (763.0221/9–953)
That same day, Thompson also informed the Department in telegram 611 that Raab personally confirmed to him that he saw no reason for any reduction of American forces in Austria. Raab also appeared unconcerned that the French might take similar action and said that he never had any confidence in the combat effectiveness of the French forces in Austria. (763.0221/9–953)
↩