Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

663.001/8–2653

No. 885
Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in Austria¹

secret

Vienna, August 26, 1953.

Memorandum on Austrian Neutralization and the State Treaty

summary

While there is no strong evidence that the Soviet Union intends in the near future to introduce into State Treaty negotiations a proposal for the neutralization of Austria, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union has been, and still is, aware of the possibility of doing so. On balance, the Embassy does not regard as probable a Soviet Union proposal for Austrian neutralization at the present time. If the Soviet Union should introduce a proposal for Austrian neutrality, a number of factors might make it difficult for the United States to refuse to accept it if the conclusion of a State Treaty seemed to depend on our agreeing to a neutral status for Austria. If we should be forced to agree to some such proposal for Austrian neutrality, the Embassy believes that a strong effort should nevertheless be made to keep the door open to Austrian cooperation with the West.

the problem

There have been a number of indications recently that the Soviet Union may propose, as one of several courses available to it in dealing with the problem of an Austrian State Treaty, that in one form or another Austria be neutralized. The Soviet Union may put forward such a demand either as the price of its agreement to a Treaty, or as a delaying tactic to avoid signing a State Treaty at the present time.

The purpose of this paper is to call attention to some of the principal factors in Austria which should be considered in determining the position to be adopted by the United States and the Western Powers if faced by such a proposal by the Soviet Union.

[Here follow sections concerning the definition of neutralization, the Soviet concept of neutralization, a description of certain indications that the Soviet Government may raise the neutralization issue, the Austrian attitude toward neutralization and the attitude of the Western powers.]

recommendations

There is some evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union may introduce the question of Austrian neutrality in the course of future Treaty negotiations, although possibly only for purposes of diversion.

A neutralized Austria would raise difficult problems, economic, logistic, and strategic, for the West and for Austria. In addition, our agreement to Austrian neutrality would be contrary to the stated purpose of United States policy in Austria, since it would constitute an infringement of Austrian sovereignty. However, it might be difficult for the United States to receive official and popular Austrian support in rejecting a Soviet proposal for Austrian neutrality accompanied by the likelihood of Soviet agreement to a State Treaty, in view of the intense Austrian desire for any “bearable” Treaty. U.S. rejection of a neutrality proposal in the face of Austrian readiness to accept a neutral status might be next to impossible.

Naturally, the position to be taken by the United States on this issue will take into account many factors which the Embassy cannot appropriately consider. From the viewpoint of the Embassy in Vienna, the difficult problems Austrian neutralization would create for American policy and for Austrian sovereignty would seem to recommend that any proposal by the Soviet Union designed to neutralize Austria should be opposed by the United States, if the situation permits. A situation may arise, however, where Austrian pressure, and British and French acquiescence, may make it impossible for the United States to hold out against some form of Austrian neutralization. The Embassy recommends that, if the United States should find itself unable to hold out against Austrian neutralization, we should, in accepting neutralization, design our tactics to achieve the following conditions:

1) Austrian neutralization should be in a form to permit Austrian participation in European political, economic, and cultural organizations.

2) Austrian neutralization should be in a form which would not preclude her receiving military assistance from the United States, and the West in general, for defensive purposes.

3) Austrian neutralization should take the form of a unilateral Austrian declaration rather than a quadripartite guarantee.

4) The neutralization of Austria should not be accompanied by any enforcement clause, since the latter could be used by the Soviet Union to impair Austrian sovereignty.

5) Our agreement to Austrian neutralization should be part of a quid pro quo for Soviet Russian agreement to revision of Article 35 of the Long Treaty Draft. Obviously, genuine neutralization would be impossible for Austria if the Soviet Union should retain the extraterritorial status granted her by the present form of Article 35.

6) The West may find it feasible, in the course of negotiations with the Soviet Union over an Austrian State Treaty, to raise the possibility of neutralizing one or more of Austria’s satellite neighbors (e.g. Hungary or Czechoslovakia) if the Soviet Union introduces the question of Austrian neutrality. Such a course would seem to be particularly justified by the fact that Hungary is a former enemy nation, whereas Austria has been declared by the Four Powers to be a liberated, rather than conquered, nation.

1. Drafted by Johnpoll, Terry, and Compton and transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 1 to despatch 314. According to this despatch, the memorandum was drafted in response to a request from the Department for the Embassy’s views on the subject of neutralization. (663.001/8–2653)