Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

763.0221/8–2553: Despatch

No. 884
The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of State¹

secret
No. 310

Vienna, August 25, 1953.

Ref:

• Embassy’s Despatch 2068, June 12, 1953²

Subject:

• Recent Soviet Policy in Austria

Summary

The recently instituted “soft” policy practiced by the Soviet Union in Austria is not entirely a departure from former Soviet practice here, Soviet policy in Austria having been notably more lenient in Austria than in Germany, for example, ever since 1945. It may be regarded, rather, as the intensified use of one element in Soviet tactics which has always been present here. The fact that the “soft” policy has been practiced by the Soviets in such a way that no significant position of Soviet power has been sacrificed would not seem to support expectations of Soviet readiness to sign a State Treaty at the present time.

Assuming that the Soviet Union’s chief purposes in Austria have been (1) to retain a position of military power in the West, (2) to maintain a position which could be traded off for something of greater importance, and (3) to exploit Austria economically, no change in these basic motives appears to be inherent in the recent Soviet concessions.

There are still many concessions which the Soviet Union can offer Austria without significant cost to itself, chief among them, perhaps, being the return to Austria of part of the USIA economic complex. Presumably the concessions will continue for a time. Considering all factors and present indications, the Embassy doubts the Soviet Union is prepared in the next few months to conclude an acceptable State Treaty. The possibility that recent Soviet “concessions” might culminate in a proposal to withdraw all occupation troops despite the absence of a Treaty should not be entirely overlooked even though in the Embassy’s opinion, such a proposal is unlikely. As regards the effect of recent Soviet actions, they will not make headway with Austrian public opinion until the Soviet Union demonstrates its willingness to conclude a State Treaty.

Our own policy would therefore seem to call for emphasis in public statements on the necessity for a State Treaty; for continued efforts to get the Soviet Union to the conference table; and for putting the Soviet Union under as much pressure as possible to agree to an acceptable State Treaty for Austria.

Recent Soviet Policy in Austria

The striking series of moves by the Soviet Union toward Austria since late April naturally gives rise to many questions centering about the relationship of Soviet policy in Austria with Soviet policy in general. Among such questions are:

(1) Does the recent trend of Soviet policy in Austria represent a change in local Soviet tactics; or (2) a change in local basic Soviet objectives; or (3) both; or (4) does it represent merely a change in tempo and intensity of the previous tactics pursued here by the Soviet Union? (5) How in the past has Soviet policy in Austria been coordinated with general Soviet foreign policies? Is there a clue in the present Soviet line in Austria to present general Soviet policies?

It goes without saying that the Embassy is not in a position to make useful deductions concerning some of the problems here raised; and even on those problems with which it can appropriately deal, more time for the still fluid situation to develop and more intimate knowledge than is here possible of trends in Moscow, Berlin, and elsewhere are needed for a useful reading of overall Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless, the gradual unfolding of a trend in Soviet tactics in Austria since Stalin’s death seems to have reached a point where some conclusions concerning the questions listed above can be drawn.

Soviet Aims in Austria Before the “New Look”

Soviet policy in Austria before last April displayed a degree of flexibility, and sensitivity to public opinion both in Austria and elsewhere, considerably greater than did Soviet conduct of affairs in Germany and in relations generally with the West. That is not to say that the Soviet occupation of Austria was not marked by the arbitrary exercise of power. Indeed, arbitrary acts by the Soviet authorities here were constant, as an examination of the records of the Allied Council will disclose. From time to time Soviet interference in Austrian internal affairs almost reached the point of challenging the Austrian Government’s sovereignty. Examples of such interference are provided by Soviet interference with the police during the October 1950 general strike; and by Soviet removal of rubber truncheons during the recent Federal election campaign from the equipment of the gendarmerie (provincial police force), a normal police weapon provided for under the legal regulations of the Austrian Government.

Yet, Soviet arbitrariness in Austria differed, not only in degree but in kind, from that practiced elsewhere. Austria was not divided into two parts; anti-Communist political parties were permitted to flourish in the Soviet Zone, with the result that the Austrian Communist Party was unable to become more than an insignificant minority party; the Austrian Government was permitted to retain the essentials of sovereignty; travel and commerce between the occupation zones was allowed, albeit with irritating hindrances at times; the Allied Council, although often stultified by Soviet intransigeance, continued to function with at least a show of common purpose.

It is a debatable point whether Soviet conduct in Austria, less direct and brutal than elsewhere, was due directly to a Soviet policy decision to pursue different tactics here; or was primarily the result of certain differences between the Austrian and German situations which might have caused the Russians to regard full exploitation of their capabilities for mischief as unwise. Whatever the cause, it seems to be an established fact that Soviet policy in Austria was marked by a degree of flexibility, persuasiveness, and sensitivity to outside opinion which, while still far from enough to be convincing, was nevertheless notably greater than was exhibited elsewhere.

The purposes of Soviet policy in Austria from the end of the War to Stalin’s death seem reducible to three main points, which taken as a whole would seem to account for the contradictory elements of intransigence and tractability which the Soviet Union showed here:

1. Maintenance of a military position representing the high tide of expansion to the southwest by the Soviet Union, provided the Soviet Union with an ideological and military buffer between the West and the Soviet satellite empire, as well as a legal pretext for maintaining Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania. Of limited but tangible defensive value to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Zone would also seem to be of offensive military value; offering the Soviet Army a possible opportunity, after a comparatively short march over good roads and accessible terrain, to overrun the land routes connecting Yugoslavia and Italy with one another and to separate them from their supporting Allies in the North.

2. The economic exploitation of Austria, while in some respects of only minor importance to the Soviet Union, is of enough significance in at least one product, petroleum, to regard its retention as one of the objects of Soviet policy here.

3. Retention of a position in Austria which could be traded off for something of greater value elsewhere, in the event of an eventual settlement with the West in Central Europe, may well have been one of the guiding aims of the Soviet Union’s policy here.

If it be assumed that Soviet tactics in Austria were in fact designed to serve these ends, then there can be perceived a thread of consistency between Soviet actions within Austria, Soviet foreign policy generally, and the Soviet Union’s obdurate refusal to sign a State Treaty on any reasonable terms. However, with the death of Stalin and the inception of a series of seemingly spectacular and conciliatory moves by the Soviet authorities in Austria, it is well to ask whether these developments might conceivably call for changes in our assessment of Soviet tactics or aims, or both.

The Soviet “Concessions” in Austria

As reported in Embassy’s Despatch 2068 of June 12, the current series of conciliatory gestures may be considered to have begun late in April and to have developed considerable momentum by the second week in June. During the period when these moves in Austria were developing a good head of steam, it will be recalled, the Soviet Union refused to send its Deputy to the Treaty meeting in London called by the Western Powers for May 27, 1953. Despatch 2068 expressed the Embassy’s conclusions that Soviet policies had not yet given cause in Austria to believe that Soviet aims here had undergone any basic alterations; that the “concessions” did not entail any significant recession of Soviet power in or from Austria; and that nothing had occurred in Austria to suggest Soviet readiness to achieve a reasonable settlement of the Austrian problem either alone or as part of a more general settlement.

After the flurry of Soviet concessions during early June, there followed a period of relative quiescence, during which no major developments in the Soviet line could be noted. However, Soviet conduct in Austria continued to be predominantly “soft”. Improved relations with the Austrian Government, particularly with Chancellor Raab himself, were sought by the Soviet authorities during this period, and not entirely without success. The Soviet occupation seemed to develop a new appreciation of the fact that a sovereign Austrian Government existed. Minor concessions, such as a very slow but continuous derequisitioning of Soviet-occupied buildings, were carried out. The return of the Ybbs-Persenbeug dam site to the Austrian Government was carried through, an arrangement which for reasons given in the reference despatch would fit into Soviet plans to remain in Austria indefinitely but which Chancellor Raab welcomed nonetheless because of his political interest in Lower Austria. That some economic negotiations of an inconclusive nature took place between representatives of the Austrian Government and the Soviet occupation seems to be implied by the fifth point of the Austrian Memorandum of June 30, 1953 delivered to the Soviet Government at Moscow.³ (It will be recalled that the Austrian Memorandum, forwarded to the Department under cover of Despatch 2162, June 29, 1953,⁴ referred to “certain supplementary proposals” made by the Austrians to the Soviet authorities in Vienna “in recent days.”)

It need hardly be added that any hint of an accommodating attitude toward the Soviet Government on the part of Chancellor Raab arises, not from any weakening in his opposition to Communism and Soviet power, but from the fact that a State Treaty and Austrian independence hinge largely on Soviet agreement. In addition, a certain amount of accommodation by Raab toward the Soviet Union is made unavoidable by Austria’s status as a country partly occupied by the Russians; and by the inclination of the Austrian Government to do everything within reason to encourage further concessions from the Soviet Union. Chancellor Raab’s desire to give his own People’s Party some political advantage over the other coalition party, the Socialists, by a show of personal ability to wring concessions from the Soviet Union is an important internal factor that helps to explain some of the Chancellor’s recent pronouncements.

A certain show of independence from the United States on the part of the Austrian Government is a natural accompaniment to its policy of encouraging Soviet concessions, particularly at a time when Soviet tactics have made Austrian assertion of such independence appear somewhat less dangerous to themselves than in the past.

On July 29 a new flurry of Soviet activity in Austria began, heralded by the Soviet Note to the Austrian Government on that date⁵ calling on the Austrian Government to renounce its support of the Abbreviated Treaty Draft, hinting at Austrian participation in future negotiations for a State Treaty, but offering nothing but vague and stale promises. There followed in rapid succession the Soviet announcement on July 30 that it would no longer charge Austria for occupation costs; unilateral Soviet abolition on August 11 of postal, telephone, and telegraph censorship in the Soviet Zone; Soviet agreement at the Allied Council on August 14 to abolish all quadripartite censorship; and several minor concessions such as opening the Danube to a few French barges, removal of a few guard posts on the British–Soviet zonal demarcation line, continued derequisitioning on a small scale of Austrian buildings, and permission for the Austrian Federal Railways to use freely a number of railroad cars (for the most part obsolete) seized by the Soviet Union as war booty.

Paralleling these developments in Austro-Soviet relations was the delivery of two Soviet Notes to the Western Powers dealing with the State Treaty problem. Of chief interest in this connection, aside from the Soviet Note directly to the Austrian Government calling for renunciation of the Abbreviated Treaty text, were the Soviet Notes to the three Western Powers of July 30,⁶ calling for withdrawal of the Abbreviated Text but without any tangible offer of a quid pro quo; and the Soviet Note of August 5⁷ to the three Western Powers “accepting” an invitation to a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers, but with such conditions as to render it virtually a refusal, and at the very least opening up the possibility that the Soviet Union might make agreement on an Austrian State Treaty dependent upon prior solution of the German problem. Also falling into this period was Malenkov’s speech of August 9 in which he dealt, inter alia, with Austria but not in a manner to suggest any change in Soviet policies toward the settlement of the German or Austrian problems.

It is of course impossible at the moment to predict whether another lull in the development of the Soviet line in Austria has now been reached, such as occurred during July, or whether further Soviet actions in the current series are to be immediately forthcoming.

The Pattern of Soviet Activity

The more recent Soviet “concessions” do not differ in kind from the concessions offered during the Spring. As in the previous concessions, the latest ones seem designed to make a spectacular show of relaxation but actually involve little or no sacrifice of any consequence on the part of the Soviets. Surrender of occupation costs will at most impose only a minor additional financial burden on the Soviet Union’s budget. The sum of approximately 150 million schillings (equivalent to about $5,770,000) is insignificant in a budget the size of Soviet Russia’s. Furthermore, should the Soviet Union so decide, it could easily make up the 150 million schillings per year through increased exploitation of its economic position in Austria. While not entailing any significantly increased burden or sacrifice for the Soviet occupation, the Soviet action in giving up the occupation costs does serve the purpose of embarrassing Great Britain and France, and has already resulted in England’s renunciation of occupation costs while France seems likely to follow suit in the near future. The Soviet action also served the purpose of maintaining the momentum of the “peace offensive”, and at an insignificant price.

Abolition of censorship fits into the same pattern. From information available to the Embassy it appears that both the unilateral Soviet censorship and the quadripartite censorship were of little intelligence value to the Soviet occupation. Here again is a “major concession” costing the Soviet Union nothing. The intense Russian desire to get favorable headlines in Austria was well illustrated by the manner in which the Soviet Union went about abolishing censorship. It will be recalled that the three Western powers publicly gave up censorship in their zones of occupation during 1947; and that the Soviet Union was the only power still known to be practicing it. At the August 7 meeting of the Executive Committee of the Allied Council the Soviet representative requested that a Western resolution abolishing all censorship of postal, telephone, and telegraphic matter be postponed to enable the Soviet authorities to give the matter further study. Then, on August 11, three days before the next scheduled meeting of the Allied council, the Soviet occupation authorities announced with great fanfare that unilateral censorship in the Soviet Zone was being abolished. Then, at the August 14 meeting of the Allied Council the Soviet Union finally agreed to the abolition of all postal, telephone and telegraph censorship. It seems clear that the timing of Soviet action on censorship was designed primarily to permit the Soviet occupation to be able to claim credit for the initiative in granting this concession to Austria’s sovereignty.

What May Be the Motives Behind Soviet Action in Austria?

Although Soviet moves in the last few months in Austria do not appear to offer evidence of new Soviet goals or even tactics, it is quite evident that Soviet conduct in Austria has undergone some changes since the beginning of April. Perhaps it might be most descriptive of this change to label it an intensified and shrewder application of an element of Soviet tactics which has always been present, to a lesser or greater degree, in Soviet policy in Austria. The probabilities seem to indicate no significant changes in Soviet aims; no reasonable Austrian State Treaty; no reasonable Central European settlement. The Soviet game, at least as it has exhibited itself up to now in Austria seems aimed at giving increased credence here and abroad to the supposed Soviet “new look”, and attempting to win back for the Soviet Union as much support in Austrian public opinion as possible. From the texts of the recent Soviet notes it appears most unlikely that the Soviet Union has any serious intention of concluding a State Treaty acceptable to the Western powers. It does not even appear likely that the Soviets would be prepared to accept the Long Treaty with the Soviet version of the unagreed articles. It is almost tautological to point out that the ambiguous Soviet references in its August 5 note to Asian affairs, to the usefulness which a prior German settlement would have for a conclusion of an Austrian Treaty, and insistence upon Western withdrawal of the Short Draft without a Soviet offer of quid pro quo, seem to indicate Soviet preparation of excuses in advance for stalling a State Treaty if all other excuses should fail. It is interesting to note, also, that the Communist press in Austria has claimed repeatedly during the past few weeks that the Western Powers have not withdrawn the Abbreviated Text. This may possibly be a preparatory maneuver publicly to blame the West for the presumably foreordained breakdown of Treaty negotiations. Still another indication that the Soviet Union may not be prepared to conclude a State Treaty at the present time is to be found in the implication of the Soviet Union’s July 30 Note to Austria that Austria may herself become a party to Treaty negotiations. In the past, of course, the Soviet Union has insisted that the State Treaty is a subject only to be decided by the Council of Foreign Ministers or by the “Big Four” Chiefs of State. It is difficult to regard this move by the Soviet Union as consistent with a desire to settle the State Treaty problem.

If the Soviet Union had any serious desire to achieve a State Treaty it could presumably force our hand by making a flat offer to sign the Long Draft in its present form, and depend upon pressure from Austria, France, and England to win our agreement. For example, members of both major parties in Austria have stated to Embassy officers their willingness to accept the Long Treaty in the absence of availability of a better one, and presumably the Soviet representatives in Austria are aware that this is the viewpoint of People’s Party and Socialist leaders. It would seem to follow, therefore, that, if one were to assume Soviet willingness to sign the Long Treaty in its present form, the Soviet Government would see the tactical advantage it could draw from an unqualified statement of readiness to sign the document. Such an offer might well either force United States acquiescence to the Long Treaty, or else might cause a very serious rift between the United States on one side and Austria, England, and France on the other. Much as the Soviet Union would welcome such a rift in the West evidently not even that objective is important enough to the Soviet Union to warrant the risk of having to sign the Long Draft State Treaty.

In this connection it may be worth noting that it would be in keeping with present Soviet tactics to inject the “neutralization” of Austria into the State Treaty discussion. Whether Austria’s neutralization is in fact an objective of Soviet policy and whether the Soviet Union would accept any assurance of Austrian neutrality except under impossible guarantees that would violate Austrian sovereignty appear extremely doubtful. However, as a tool with which to provoke discord in the West and with which to attempt to shake the predominantly pro-Western orientation of the Austrian Government and public, a “neutrality” proposal might serve the Soviet Union very well.

Referring back to the list of three objectives held to have governed Soviet policy in Austria until last spring (paragraph 7 of this despatch), it would seem that on the basis of Soviet conduct here in the last four months there is no reason to believe any of the objectives have changed. However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet Union is using its position in Austria as a lever with which to play off one Western Power against another, and trouble Austro-American relations, more skillfully than in the past.

It appears not unreasonable to predict that further efforts will be made by the Soviet Union to convey the impression that its foreign policy is reasonable and accommodating. The Soviet Union does not seem to have made any really imposing gains yet through its “new look”; but it may hope that a continuance of its present policy for a longer period of time may result in more impressive results. At any rate, it has cost the Soviet Union nothing; and some small dividends have already accrued to the Soviets in the form of more favorable headlines in Austria; some disagreements over foreign policy between the two Austrian coalition parties; loss by the West, at least for the time being, of the Abbreviated Treaty Draft as a bargaining position; and a new show of Austrian independence from Western tutelage which, while really a healthy sign, is probably pleasing to the Soviet Union for reasons quite apart from Austria’s political health.

If the recently exhibited Soviet flexibility should continue to grow, a number of Soviet moves, not now on the horizon, might become possible. They might have rather embarrassing consequences for United States policy here unless we shall have worked out a reasonable and secure position in advance. An example of such a possible Soviet move would be the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria without regard for the absence of a State Treaty. Such a move might merely mean to the Soviet Union a withdrawal of its troops a few miles to the East and North, although the Soviet Union’s troops might be recalled to Russia if the Soviet Union should regard the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian Armies as strong enough, and sufficiently under Soviet control, to maintain the Soviet position. Militarily it would seem to leave the Soviet Army in almost as favorable a position as it would be if it were to remain in Austria. Presumably such action by the Soviet Union would bring strong pressures on the Western Powers to follow suit. If it were decided to evacuate Western armed forces, the Soviet Union would then have achieved the propaganda advantage of initiating the military evacuation, while forcing the Western Powers to face some very difficult problems inherent both in remaining in Austria with military troops, and in evacuating their troops from Austria.

Arguing against the possibility of Soviet troop withdrawal from Austria is the bald fact that the Soviet Union has never, since the end of the war in Europe, voluntarily withdrawn from an advanced military position; and there have yet been no firm signs discernible here that Soviet foreign policy has acquired the degree of flexibility to withdraw from a position in the absence of stronger pressures than are known to bear at present on the Soviet Union. After all, the Soviet Union could withdraw its troops from Austria, by agreeing to the conclusion of a State Treaty which would mean also the withdrawal of Western troops. Since all signs point to Russia’s refusal at the present time to sign a State Treaty; since there have been no firm indications up to now that the Soviet Union would withdraw from an advanced position without the existence of strong pressures to do so; and since such pressures do not now seem to be present; the greater probability seems to be that the Soviet Union will not withdraw its forces from Austria in the foreseeable future, either by signing a State Treaty or unilaterally. At the same time, such action by Russians has been the subject of recent rumors here, and cannot be altogether ruled out. Should the Soviet Union’s assessment of the European situation lead it some time in the future to place even greater emphasis on the importance of stirring up Western dissension (e.g. in the event of imminent French ratification of EDC), the Soviet Union might then well consider troop withdrawal from Austria as a cheap price to pay, particularly since a logistical study could conceivably lead the Soviet Government to believe that the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Austria would be a net military gain for the Soviet Army.

A further conclusion may be drawn from this reasoning: that while the Soviet Union’s refusal to sign a State Treaty is strong evidence that the Soviet Union is not prepared to reach a final settlement of the principal international problems, the converse is not necessarily true. If the Soviet Union should at some future time be prepared to sign an Austrian State Treaty, that in itself would not necessarily indicate Soviet readiness to settle on reasonable terms other international issues. As pointed out above, signing a State Treaty or unilateral troop withdrawal can be used by the Soviet Union as a weapon in the Cold War, a weapon of considerable potency in the accomplishment of certain Soviet policy aims. The Soviet attitude toward an Austrian State Treaty, and Soviet moves in Austria as a barometer measuring Russian overall intentions, would seem to give reliable readings only when viewed against the background of Soviet moves elsewhere, particularly in regard to Germany and the Far East.

In the meantime, while the Soviet Union pursues its old goals but varies from time to time the emphasis it places on tactical maneuvers, there are still many concessions it can make in Austria which, like those already offered, would give continued impetus to the current “peace” line without entailing any loss of Soviet power or position. Among such possible concessions are the return of USIA (former German assets in Austria seized by the Russians) to the Austrian Government, since there is good reason to believe that many of the USIA enterprises have become a liability to the Soviet Union; abolition of newspaper censorship; permission for Austria to develop civil aviation; relinquishment of Russian control over RAVAG, the Austrian radio network; and cessation of Russian interference with the Austrian police force in the Soviet Zone.

American policy in reply to these Soviet tactics, emphasizing the State Treaty as the sine quo non of Austrian independence, has been successful in the main. A change does not appear to be called for. From the reasoning evolved in the course of this despatch there would seem to be some dangers in our pointing to Austria as a touchstone by which to measure general Soviet intentions, and it may be desirable for us to reconsider this position with respect both to public statements and policy planning. While the Embassy does not at this time believe it probable that the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops, it is, rather, a possibility which the Soviet leaders could translate into reality whenever it would suit their purposes, and for which we should, of course, be prepared in advance.

Austrian public opinion, while welcoming Soviet “concessions”, has not been deluded by these moves and remains pro-Western. There is no reason to expect a change in this respect. The same is basically true of the Austrian Government; occasional public statements that seem to have a touch of neutralism by Austrian cabinet members do not, generally speaking, reflect distrust of the West but a desire to encourage continued Soviet concessions and to convince the Soviet Union that it can safely sign a State Treaty. The Soviet Union still has a long way to go before it will have ameliorated its occupation’s hardships to Austria to the extent that the United States did years ago. The Austrian public is aware of this fact, and it is therefore unnecessary for us to engage in a race of concessions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Should the situation change, so that some dramatic moves by the United States become necessary in Austria, we will still have some room for maneuver, primarily in the State Treaty field where, barring a Russian reversal of form, we will continue to have the opportunity of exposing the power motives behind superficially conciliatory moves by the Soviet Union.

For the High Commissioner:

Richard H. Davis

Counselor of Embassy

1. Drafted by Johnpoll and distributed to USCOA, London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.
2. This despatch summarized recent Soviet actions in Austria from April through June. (763.0221/6–1253)
3. See Document 872.
4. Not printed. (661.63/6–2953)
5. See Document 872.
6. See Document 870.
7. Reference to the Soviet note which was delivered to the Embassy in Moscow on Aug. 4. For text, see Document 259.