Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

763.0221/12–3052: Telegram

No. 841
The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of State¹

secret

Vienna, December 30, 1952—6 p.m.

1844. Reference (a) ourtel 1568 December 5;² (b) 1810 December 24;³ (c) ourtel 46 to Moscow rptd Dept 1832 December 30.⁴

Pursuant threats reported reftel (a) and (b) Soviets initiated action December 24, lasting several days, of sending military details to all Soviet Zone gendarmérie posts to confiscate all rubber truncheons. Austrian Government and most gendarmérie officials did not direct gendarmes to turn in truncheons, but told them not to resist removal. Reports indicate removal has proceeded with minimum assistance but negligible interference from gendarmes themselves. In one or two cases, those who offered minor resistance have been ordered out of zone by Soviets.

Austrians addressed letter of protest to AC December 23 which Soviet Chairman failed to deliver to other elements until late 24th.

Question equipping Austrian police and gendarmes has long and complicated history of Soviet obstruction. Gendarmes authorized carry rifles in 1946 subject AC approval of plan of utilization which Soviets never gave, but rifles long issued in all zones anyway. 1947 AC decision approved issue “hardwood truncheons” to “police of all ranks”. Rubber truncheons issued to gendarmes in lieu of sabers over past two years by Austrians after notification of four occupying powers. Three Western Powers agreed while Soviets never acknowledged letter.

Precise purpose this half-way measure Soviet interference not clear, but obviously connected with forthcoming election and with other demands reftel (a), all of which would tend to reduce government control and could be used support Volk on opposition in Soviet Zone, particularly crucial Wienerneustadt area. Soviets may want freer hand for terrorist pressure during campaign and for breaking up non-Communist political meetings; may intend discredit Minister Interior Helmer and Socialists; may be releasing trial balloon with intention push control further if unopposed this time. Last feature troubles us most since practical effect this move not too great considering other possibilities impromptu armament and proven ability Socialist activists to handle Commies.

In view customary Soviet technique of moving first against police in any area they intend to take over, we are concerned by possible seriousness Soviet action and propose strong reaction, calling attention that this is a retrograde step in liberation of Austria and direct interference with Austrian obligation maintain internal security. British and French seem less concerned and former at first took attitude we should almost ignore situation as unimportant. We have agreed, however, request Soviets call special meeting Internal Affairs Directorate for December 31. If Soviet Chairman evades doing so, US Chairman will call meeting January 2 (no AC or EC meeting that day) with objective bringing matter to EC January 9 and AC January 16. First objective of directorate meeting will be to probe for Soviet position. Today’s Oesterreichische Zeitung states Soviet element is only forcing Minister Helmer to obey AC decisions which is obvious nonsense.⁵

Thompson

1. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.
2. Telegram 1568 reported Soviet efforts to pressure Interior Minister Helmer to accept a series of demands concerning the Austrian police. (863.511/12–552)
3. Telegram 1810 reported the decision of the Austrian Cabinet to withdraw the rubber truncheons from the Austrian police in face of an ultimatum from the Soviets, although a protest would be sent to the Allied Council. (763.0221/12–2452)
4. Telegram 46 requested information from Moscow concerning the arms and equipment of police officials in Moscow. (763.0221/12–3052)
5. Following a confrontation with the Soviets in the Allied Council meeting of Jan. 16, 1953, concerning the seizure of the gendarmérie’s truncheons, telegram 2053 from Vienna, Jan. 16, reported that the three Western High Commissioners were in agreement that the basic motivation for this Soviet action was probably their anger at the intransigent and defiant attitude displayed by Interior Minister Helmer and the Soviet desire to show the Austrians who was boss. They also agreed that no further action in this field by the Soviets seemed likely at present and therefore any governmental statements on the subject would be unwise. (763.0221/1–1653)