Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762A.022/2–552: Telegram

No. 609
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State¹

secret
niact

Bonn, February 5, 1952—10 p.m.

1435. Fr have informed Brit and ourselves this evening that Schuman prefers not to suggest Anglo-Amer intervention in Saar crisis as had been proposed by Gers (see Bonn’s 1405, London 374, Paris 439²) since this might imply pressure on France.

In substitution for Ger proposal Schuman has instructed Fr HICOM to make communication to Chancellor tomorrow morning along fol lines:

(1) In unofficial approach Chancellor has allowed it to be understood that he would be favorable to exchange of views in order to seek a definitive settlement of Saar question which would involve the creation of a Eur territory where certain supra-national Eur organs would be established. In a recent conversation with HallsteinSchuman recalling a previous declaration had declared that France would agree that the determination of the definite status of the Saar would be made the subj of an agreement prior to peace treaty concluded under identical conditions and that he would not object to an exchange of views for this purpose between the parties directly interested (i.e., Fr and Ger).

(2) As Schuman had said to Hallstein it would however be neces for the Fed Govt to indicate in advance the manner in which it envisaged the Europeanization of the Saar. It should also now be made clear on the Fr side that any Eur solution of the Saar problem must include the maintenance of the Franco-Saarois econ and monetary union as well as respect for Saar autonomy. Only on these bases could an exchange of views be undertaken.

(3) Schuman would have no objection if in Bundestag debate Chancellor should say that he knows France is not opposed to beginning study of a definitive settlement prior to and in place of the peace treaty. During the debate in the Fr assembly Schuman cld reflect the Chancellor’s declaration.

We were not given copies of the foregoing communication but only could take notes. It was explained at the same time that France would only be prepared to enter upon this exchange of views with Ger if it received assurances that in conformity with previous undertakings US and UK would continue to maintain their position with respect to the maintenance of the Franco-Saarois econ and monetary union and the autonomy of the Saar.

Although we indicated to Fr that their communication did not appear satis to us on first reading we are informed that it will be given Gers tomorrow. In our opinion introduction of conditions for any exchange of views and the tone are not designed to help situation here and will definitely increase difficulties in obtaining satis settlement of such issues as Ger relationship to NATO and security controls (in latter connection see report of our talk with Chancellor today which follows in separate tel³). It is doubtful if Adenauer will be able to make enough out of Fr communication to offset attacks in Bundestag.

McCloy

1. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. Telegram 1405 reported that Blankenhorn had been authorized to suggest a formula for solving the Saar crisis along the following lines: the United States and the United Kingdom would propose an immediate exchange of views between the French and German Governments to bring about a definitive Saar settlement that would be submitted to the Saar population for approval. The settlement would involve the creation of a European territory in the area of Saarbrucken where certain supranational European organizations would have their seat. (762A.022/2–352)
3. Telegram 1437 from Bonn, Feb. 6. (762A.0221/2–652)