Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF–Subject file

No. 546
Memorandum of Discussion at the 118th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, June 11, 1952¹

top secret

June 11, 1952

The following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the 118th Meeting of the National Security Council, at which you presided. The Vice President did not attend the meeting, and the Deputy Director, Mutual Security Agency, attended for Mr. Harriman, who was out of the city. General Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, attended the meeting for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

1. The Situation in the Far East

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral briefing by Major Richard Rule, AF, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military situation in Korea.

2. United States Policy and Courses of Action To Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin (NSC 132; SE–30; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 6 and June 10, 1952; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “The Berlin Stockpile Situation and An Analysis of Airlift Capabilities”, dated June 6, 1952; NSC Actions Nos. 84–b and 645; NSC 24/3; NSC 73/4, pars. 37–c and 42; NSC 89³

After the briefing by Major Rule, the President turned to the report on Berlin, and Mr. Lay called the attention of the Council to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the report, to the changes recommended by the Senior NSC Staff in the light of these views, and also to the reference staff study which Mr. Lay noted was uncoordinated and uncleared by the two departments but represented the best available background information on the subject.

The President then asked Secretary Acheson for his views on the report.

Secretary Acheson replied that he supported the paper subject to the changes recommended by the Senior NSC Staff. On the whole he thought the report an excellent analysis and a good strong policy, and he knew of nothing better that we could do in the present very tough situation. In any event, he believed that NSC 132 offered the best hope of our being able to remain in Berlin.

Secretary Acheson said that he had one question to ask with respect to the analysis of the airlift capabilities. He was concerned with the statement on page 9 of this analysis which seemed to him to indicate a dangerous delay in the capabilities for SAC deployment in the event that it became necessary to resort to an airlift.

Mr. Lay pointed out that the statement on page 9 was not intended to mean that there would be a delay of seven days in initiating the SAC deployment, but rather that the full impact of the SAC deployment would be delayed.

General Twining enlarged on Mr. Lay’s point, but agreed that this was the interpretation which Admiral Wooldridge had made of this statement when it was discussed in the Senior NSC Staff.

The President then inquired about the danger of a Soviet destruction of planes which might be used in the airlift and whether this had been taken into account.

In response, Secretary Lovett pointed out that the danger consisted less in air attacks by Soviet planes in the air corridor than it did in a surprise attack on these planes while they were grounded. Consideration had been given to this problem, and the net of the thing was, said Secretary Lovett, that we can probably do this thing short of global war.

At this point Mr. Lay called attention to the CIA estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities in Berlin.…

The President observed that he had discussed the question at some length with Mr. McCloy on the previous day,³ and he requested the advice of the Council as to whether Miss Margaret Truman could safely accept an invitation to visit Berlin this summer in the course of her European travels.

From the point of view of her personal safety, General Smith expressed the view that it would be safe for Miss Truman to visit Berlin within the next few weeks or months. There was no disagreement with this assurance.

Mr. Gorrie asked permission to raise a question as to the timing of possible Soviet action. Did the Council have any estimate of the approximate date when the Soviets might make the decision to try to expel the Western powers from Berlin by force?

Secretary Acheson said that it was difficult to give a reasonable guess as to such a date since much depended on the time that the treaty between the Bonn Government and the Western powers was ratified. He did not believe that the French, at least, would ratify the treaty before next October.

Mr. Gorrie said that his question arose out of concern as to the tempo of our over-all mobilization program. Since NSC 132 called for full mobilization in certain contingencies, NSRB was very concerned as to whether or not the mobilization program should be stepped up in order to be ready to meet these contingencies.

General Smith pointed out that it was probably safe to assume the passage of at least 24 months prior to the actual use of force by the Soviets in an attempt to expel the Western powers from Berlin.

Secretary Lovett said that if it were not for the steel strike, and if Congress did not cut down severely the military appropriations, we would begin to get maximum returns in war matériel from our present programs after next January 1st.

Secretary Acheson also called attention to two instances in NSC 132 in which the problem which concerned Mr. Gorrie seemed to him to have been taken care of. He then quoted from paragraph 19 on page 11 and paragraph 23 on page 13.

Secretary Lovett, followed by Mr. Lay, also noted that NSC 132 provided for prior preparation for full mobilization in the event of the failure of other measures to enable the Western powers to remain in Berlin.

The President then inquired whether, in the opinion of the other members of the Council, it would be desirable for him to go on the air and talk to the people about the seriousness of the steel situation as it bore on the Berlin problem.

Secretary Lovett offered the opinion that it would be undesirable to link these two situations, since so much of our strength in Berlin depends on a show of calmness and determination. He thought that the situation in Korea provided all that was needed to emphasize the gravity of a protracted steel strike.

Secretary Acheson and the other members of the Council agreed with Secretary Lovett’s advice.

The National Security Council:

Adopted NSC 132, subject to the revisions therein recommended by the Senior NSC Staff in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of June 10, 1952.

Note: NSC 132, as amended, subsequently submitted to the President for consideration.

[Here follows discussion of item 3, “NSC Status of Projects.”]

1. Drafted on June 12.
2. A separate memorandum in the PSF–Subject file states that President Truman; Secretary Acheson; Lovett; John Kenney, Deputy Director of MSA; Jack Gorrie, Chairman of the NSRB; John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury; Sidney Souers, Special Consultant to the President; General Twining, Chairman of the JCS; General Smith, Director of Central Intelligence; Commander M. D. Clausner, JCS; James Lay, Executive Secretary, NSC; and S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC, were present.
3. NSC 132 is not printed, but see NSC 132/1, infra. SE–30 is not printed. The three memoranda are not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 132 Series) NSC Action Nos. 84–b and 645 are not printed. NSC 24/3 is not printed, but see NSC 24/4 in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 839. For NSC 73/4, see ibid., 1950, vol. i, p. 375. Regarding NSC 89, see ibid., vol. iv, footnote 1, p. 867.
3. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.