Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662.001/5–652: Telegram

No. 94
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State ¹

secret priority

London , May 6, 1952—7 p.m.

5036. Tripartite working group on reply to Sov note on Ger today completed tentative draft text contained next following cable.² Crouy-Chanel reported he had spent several hours yesterday with Schuman analyzing problem of framing reply under present conditions and studying Brit text submitted at Saturday’s meeting (Embtel 5000, May 3³) which does not differ substantially from Brit revision mentioned Embtel 5009, May 5.⁴ Schuman considers that growing difficulties in Ger may, unless checked, be beginning of success for the Soc move. The greatest danger is that Gers may be tempted to seek unity at all costs. Western reply must preserve the possibility of maneuver against contingency that Gers may be further seduced by this hope. Western reply must not encourage it. It would, therefore, be a mistake for the reply to concentrate too much on free all-Ger elections. The Sovs may well be ready to concede much or most of what we would demand. This is a subj on which if the Russians wish, it would be easy to agree quickly, but if elections were held while Four Power control were maintained, Sovs would be in a position to feed out concessions bit by bit, thus maintaining themselves for years in a strong bargaining position. To prevent this situation the Western reply must be directed toward bringing out the fact that it is the Sov purpose to keep Ger under the closest Four Power control possible and therefore to show the Gers that their interests require not only free elections and a reunited Ger, but a free Ger. Slogan of West must be not merely free elections but free elections for a free Ger. Fr therefore propose that the obtaining of suitable guarantees of the freedom of Ger during period after elections and before treaty should be made condition to holding of quadripartite mtg, in addition to condition suggested by Eden that impartial investigation of conditions for holding elections must first be held.

While setting up conditions precedent to holding quadripartite meeting on elections may detract from value of note as seizure of initiative by West Emb nevertheless strongly impressed Adenauer second thoughts as to risk of delays to signature contractuals (Bonn’s 2649, May 3⁵). Emb considers this risk justifies conditions Brit and Fr seek to attach to offer of quadripartite meeting on elections.

Eden’s expression of hope that draft might be ready by Wednesday (Embtel 5009, May 5 and Deptel 5710, May 5⁶) now obviously impossible.

Emb doubts if Fr and Brit will agree to delivery of Aust note May 8 in absence substantial tripartite agreement April note by end of day May 7.⁷ Dept’s views therefore urgently requested.

Gifford

1. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.
2. Telegram 5037, infra.
3. Supra.
4. Telegram 5009 reported that a new British draft had been received, but its text would not be transmitted until the tripartite drafting group had met. (662.001/5–552)
5. See footnote 3, Document 92.
6. Telegram 5710 stressed, inter alia, that the lack of agreement on even the fundamentals of a draft reply made delivery of the note on Wednesday, May 7, impossible. (662.001/5–552)
7. Regarding the tripartite note of May 9 concerning the Austrian Treaty, see Document 798.