Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662.001/5–252: Telegram

No. 92
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State¹

secret priority

Bonn, May 2, 1952—11 p.m.

2639. Proposal contained in para 9 Deptel 2850 (London 5593, Moscow 752, Berlin 373, Paris 6418)² discussed with Chancellor this afternoon. Chancellor felt such a mtg would be helpful in persuading public opinion western allies sincere in their desire to bring about Ger unity on conditions acceptable to Ger people. He considered it important, however, that scope of mtg be limited purely to discussion of conditions permitting free elections and possibility of investigation by impartial, international commission. If it could be indicated possibly by ref that the Bundestag proposals for free elections would be considered by such a group, this would have most useful effect here Ger. It was important, however, in Chancellor’s opinion that mtg in Berlin be handled so as to avoid giving rise to any speculation re revival of four-power control commission. For that reason he thought possibly better if HICOMers themselves did not participate.³

In discussing proposal with UK and Fr representatives this afternoon they were in agreement that, while mtg in Berlin might provide some protection from unpleasant Sov activities there, nevertheless there was danger that such a mtg would not be at sufficient high level to provide a real indication of Sov intentions thus defeating our purpose in holding it. Brit express concern that in the present phase of Bundestag opposition to contractual agreements negots would be slowed up by an early offer to talk to the Sovs and signature might not therefore take place before talks began thus delaying it indefinitely. They argue that possibility of early talks may strengthen those elements which are reluctant go ahead and increase the Chancellor’s difficulties in obtaining authority to sign. They suggest therefore that a more general offer be made which would not tie us down until the Sovs had accepted our conditions and since quadripartite talks would not thus be as imminent, the more general offer would not have same result in slowing up present negots.

The Fr on the other hand, while less concerned with the immediate effect upon signature, thought that once the negots had been begun on the Berlin level, the Sovs could have every excuse and possibility of so prolonging them that it would be difficult to break them off later and thus endanger ratification. They are also inclined to favor the general offer contained in the original tripartite version instead of our specific suggestion.⁴

Both UK and Fr representatives expressed view that, given the present state of Ger opinion and apparent hesitancy about going ahead with integration, it might not be bad to hint through resumption of quadripartite talks in Berlin that there was the alternative of return to ACC procedure if the Gers refuse to agree to the contracts.

In our opinion Dept’s note still somewhat negative and does not take advantage fully of opportunity (and necessity) of restating our objectives and policy. It is an improvement on earlier drafts in concentrating on conditions for free elections.

I recognize there is danger that making any specific offer to talk to the Sovs might slow up the negots here. Nevertheless, I am firmly of the opinion it is important that prior to ratification quadripartite conversations will have taken place which can clearly demonstrate the insincerity of the Sov offer. Otherwise ratification will have been seriously endangered. Furthermore, we have adequate time before the autumn sessions of the European Legislatures to prove our point. To argue conditions for mtg through an extended exchange of notes will not carry same conviction as mtg itself. I agree that we must establish some conditions prior to any mtg and consider this can be achieved by going clearly on record that we demand the liberation of the Sov zone population as a precondition to final peace settlement. I believe that opposition to contractual agmnts has not been stimulated by the Sov offer but is inherent in the terms of the contracts themselves and that therefore if some improvement along the lines suggested by the Chancellor in our mtg yesterday can be made we are all right.⁵ It can be argued that the west bargaining position has been strengthened thereby and there will be time enough before ratification for a review of the whole situation if the talks by any chance be productive of real results.

If by any chance as a result of this exchange Sovs shld eventually agree to free elections, we must guard against neutralization of Ger in period after formation of all Ger Govt and the conclusion of the peace treaty when forces will be withdrawn. Even tho as result of peace treaty Ger is given freedom of action, it is difficult to see how, when Sov troops remain in one-third of Ger, it can be fully integrated with west and peace treaty negots can be greatly prolonged. This is, however, a danger of which I am sure you are aware.

McCloy

1. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Berlin.
2. Supra.
3. On May 3 McCloy reported that after further thought Adenauer concluded that the U.S. proposal for a meeting in Berlin would be a mistake. If the meeting were proposed, Adenauer feared that the Federal Cabinet in addition to SPD opposition would insist that the meeting take place before signature of the contractuals and the EDC. (Telegram 2649 from Bonn, 662.001/5–352)
4. A reference to the draft transmitted in telegram 4863, Document 89.
5. For a report on the High Commissioners meeting with Chancellor Adenauer on May 1 to consider contractual relations, see Document 24.