Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662.001/4–2552: Telegram

No. 90
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

secret priority

Washington , April 30, 1952—8:01 p.m.

5592. 1. Dept fully appreciates disadvantage at which you were placed in having to deal with complete Brit and Fr draft replies to Sov note while not yourself possessing complete US draft. However, Dept does not find draft text satis (Embtel 4863, Bonn 538, Paris 2217²). It is not in line with suggestions in Deptel 5324, rptd Paris 6157, Bonn 2636,³ and observations on UK draft in Deptel 5472, rptd Paris 6290, Bonn 2748, Moscow 736,⁴ latter of which we realize did not reach you in time for consideration in tripartite discussion. On basis of ideas expressed below and taking into acct UK, Fr and FedRep views, Dept believes note on lines of text in next fol tel⁵ wld best serve our common purposes.

2. Dept believes drafting problem will be simplified if we can first reach agreement on certain principles to govern our reply. We think there are four main principles.

3. First, we shld present the policy of Eur integration strongly and positively but in so doing we shld be careful not to present it as a policy which the three Powers have formulated and are insisting upon, but rather as a policy of the FedRep and other Eur countries which we (US and UK) support. This presents some drafting problem as Fr relationship to policy is somewhat different from ours but we believe our suggested text meets needs of all three. Believe this point important as many Gers tend to feel we are forcing Ger down path of our choosing.

4. Second, the reply shld not contain any discussion of treaty provisions except what may be considered strictly necessary to maintain positions already taken. Lines of thought and argument shld be simple and concentrated. We took line in first note we wld not discuss treaty provisions now and believe we shld adhere firmly to this position, seeking to force Sov discussion onto ground of our choosing. Accordingly, we omit all reference to questions of natl armed forces, boundaries or even status of Ger Govt. Although we recognize that some reference may be necessary to positions in previous note on these points, we feel these are questions for future; discussion of them now only scatters our fire and detracts from first essential, i.e., investigation of conditions. We have made our point already that we have our own views on these questions and that they must be resolved at various stages. There is of course much valuable material of historical nature, such as reference to Sov walk-out from ACC, our past proposals for elections, etc., but believe this can better be used in press statements at time note sent. We plan to make such use of this material.

5. Third, with regard to unification, we shld seek to center the discussion on, and so far as possible pin the Sovs down to, essential first steps.

6. Fourth, since talks of some sort are probably necessary, it is therefore desirable to take the initiative in proposing them in order to convince Gers we mean business and are not afraid to talk, and to control level, substance and timing of talks. Dept has come increasingly to conclusion in this regard that we have much to gain and nothing to lose by making specific proposal in this reply for talks (see para 9 our text). Timing will be about right so that talks wld not begin until after signature of EDC treaty and contractuals, but early in ratification period. Believe also that talks in Berlin wld have good effect there and provide some protection against any unpleasant Sov moves there this summer. On whole, think it much wiser to take pessimistic line in notes but end with concrete proposal for action than to start with rather enthusiastic utterances in favor of talks but end inconclusively with wide variety of queries and statements disputing what Sovs have said. Draft in Embtel 4863 in placing emphasis on points which need clarification before talks can begin, might lead us into trap of wanting to start talks satisfy Ger and other public opinion before clarification demanded has been obtained.

7. You shld emphasize point which has also been stressed by Adenauer that Sov attempt to disrupt our plans will not cease when agreements are signed but will probably be intensified during ratification period. Accordingly, it is in our interest to expose Sov insincerity at earliest possible date and in any event before legis debates are concluded. We believe mtg at level of HICOMers, or their reps, for restricted purposes is most useful procedure (see our text). If Sovs are really prepared to open Eastern Zone, we shld force their hand. We can not allow our plans to be thwarted merely by speculation that Sovs may be ready actually to pay a high price.

8. Believe you shld keep clearly before your colleagues need for real consultation with Adenauer and Reuter at earliest possible date, on basis of semi-agreed text as soon as we have one. Reuter seems quite bitter, according our info, over cursory nature of “consultation” with him on first note.

9. Especially desire comments from Bonn as to desirability of proposal for talks in para 9 our text. Would also like Bonn’s judgment as to whether a specific date, say June 3, should be proposed. Would proposal of this sort coming shortly before signing of contractuals in any way hold up signing?

Acheson

1. Drafted by Laukhuff; cleared with Jessup, Bruce, G, C, EUR, GER, S/P, P, and UNA; and initialed for Secretary Acheson by Jessup. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.
2. Supra.
3. Document 87.
4. Telegram 5472 transmitted Department of State general observations on the British draft reply to the Soviet note (see footnote 3, supra), but stated that it was unnecessary to get into drafting changes at that stage of the discussions. (662.001/4–2252)
5. Telegram 5593, infra.