662.001/4–252
No. 81
Memorandum by Louis Pollak of the Office of the Ambassador at
Large to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)
Subject: Departmental Views on Germany
The following is an attempt to summarize the views on substance and on tactics expressed in the meeting held in Mr. Matthews’ office on April 1 to discuss the next steps on the Soviet note on Germany. Those present at the meeting were:
- Mr. Matthews
- Mr. Jessup
- Mr. Perkins
- Mr. Bohlen
- Mr. Nitze
- Mr. Ferguson
- Mr. Barbour
- Mr. Laukhuff
- Mr. Lewis
- Mr. Calhoun
I. Ideas on Substance
a. On the question of whether we really want German unification there seemed to be very substantial differences of opinion, and also—at least in terms of our fundamental European objectives—considerable uncertainties of opinion. On the immediate question of whether we presently favor German unification, Nitze was clear that we had put ourselves on record in favor of free elections leading to a unified Germany, and that we could not withdraw from this position.
At the outset, Nitze and Bohlen were in agreement that the preferred U.S. solution of the German situation would be a unified Germany within the EDC. (Nitze and Bohlen were both very doubtful whether the French would buy such a solution; there was no discussion of how the French would feel about a unified Germany outside the EDC, but presumably they would have very grave reservations [Page 195] about this, too, unless very strict controls on German war potentials were maintained.)
Laukhuff and Lewis took no exception to the objective of a unified Germany within the EDC, but they made it clear that their doubts as to the feasibility of accomplishing the objective placed them in opposition to German unity and the preliminary step of free elections at the present time. The Ger position seems to be that it is better to have Western Germany in the EDC than to gamble on a unified Germany which would be free to stay out of or to quit the EDC.
Discussion of the abstract desirability of German unification produced less rather than more conviction that a unified Germany was a desirable goal. Bohlen, while not convinced one way or another, feels that a unified Germany in a Europe which is still divided presents certain very grave dangers of German domination of the Continent or rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Bohlen feels that the present Soviet bid for a unified Germany is really directed at the right-wing industrialists who support Adenauer rather than at the German Socialists; it is the industrialists whom the Soviet Union could tempt with markets stretching from Eastern Europe to the Pacific (including China)—markets which it would be very difficult for Germany to duplicate in the West.
Nitze shares some of Bohlen’s apprehensions about the “unified Germany in a divided Europe” concept; but Nitze prefers what he regards as a more “aggressive” approach to the problem—i.e., that unification of Germany would tend to accelerate the unification of Europe as a whole.
b. There was also no clear agreement as to what the West Germans want—i.e., just how they are likely to respond to possible Soviet and Western moves.
Nitze and Ferguson seem to feel that the West Germans are primarily interested in German unity. Ferguson feels that if faced with the simple choice of West German integration into Western Europe or unification of all Germany, the West Germans would take the second. Nitze agrees that the Soviets can block the contractual arrangements and German participation in the EDC if they are genuinely willing to establish a free and unified Germany—which means liquidating the entire East German investment.
Nitze thinks it unlikely, however, that the West Germans would be confronted with a simple choice between integration and unification; he foresees a choice between unification in the near future and a present integration which would not preclude subsequent unification. Faced with that choice, the West Germans would, in the view of Nitze and also of Ger, take the latter course. Ferguson was very doubtful of this analysis; based on the intelligence reports [Page 196] which he has studied, Ferguson is pretty well convinced that the Germans want unity above all, and would buy what appeared to them a bona fide Soviet offer. Ferguson regards it as very difficult to pursue effectively the parrallel propaganda course suggested by Jessup pursuant to the Nitze analysis—i.e., simultaneous emphasis on German unity and German integration with the West. Bohlen, on the other hand, is inclined to feel that we may be exaggerating the West German pressure for unity; put another way, Bohlen wonders whether the West Germans are not more skeptical of Soviet good faith on the unification issue than we have been inclined to believe.
c. Assuming German integration with the West now, it was not agreed whether such integration would continue after the establishment of a unified German government. Laukhuff, Bohlen, and Ferguson all seemed to feel that we had departed considerably from the concept, recalled by Jessup, that the government of a unified Germany would merely be an enlarged Bonn government which would simply continue whatever obligations had been assumed by the Bonn government as now constituted. (It was pointed out that Adenauer had insisted on inserting a clause in the contractual arrangements which seemed to look toward a continuity of rights and responsibilities for an expanded German government; it was not known whether there was any parallel provision in the EDCtreaty.)
There was some feeling that our March 25 reply to the Soviet note had already placed us on record in support of the proposition that a unified German government would be free to affirm or repudiate its obligations under the contractual arrangements for the EDC. This feeling was based on the language in paragraph 3, to the effect that “the United States Government considers that the all-German government should be free both before and after the conclusion of a peace treaty to enter into associations compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.”
Jessup suggested that we could take the position that a freely negotiated peace treaty with Germany could effect modifications of the contractual arrangements now under negotiation, and that if Germany and the Soviet Union could present persuasive reasons for such modifications, they would of course be considered in the negotiation of the peace treaty.
There was some separate discussion as to the possibility of an “Austrian situation” in which there would be a unified German government prior to the negotiation of a peace treaty. Perkins feels that any extended repetition of the Austrian pattern would be most unfortunate, but it was agreed that paragraphs 2 and 4 of our [Page 197] note of March 25 envisaged the establishment of an all-German government with which the peace treaty will be negotiated.
II. Ideas on Tactics
a. With regard to the content of our next note on Germany, Bohlen suggested that the following two-point policy would most accurately reflect our objectives, would be the simplest of exposition, and would be the least likely to get us tripped up:
- 1.
- We are going ahead on integration.
- 2.
- If the Soviet Union is genuinely prepared to permit free elections and the consequent establishment of a unified Germany, we are prepared to let the ultimate all-German government decide whether it wishes to continue its adherence to the integration program.
[In speaking of “integration”, Bohlen has in mind not only the EDC, but also the Schuman Plan.]1
b. On the question of possible talks with the Soviet Union about Germany, there was general agreement that they should be avoided if possible. Matthews, Perkins, and Ferguson addressed themselves specifically to this point.
Laukhuff agreed that it would be nice to avoid talks at the present time, but expressed what was probably a general consensus that we might be put in a position where we could not avoid talks of some sort. Assuming talks are in order, it seems to be the general feeling that they should be on as low a level as possible. Laukhuff, for example, suggests that we propose a meeting of the Allied Control Commission to discuss what the four powers can do (perhaps in conjunction with the UN Commission) to explore the possibility of free German elections. Calhoun, reflecting certain fears about an apparent re-establishment of the Control Commission machinery, suggested a meeting of Deputy High Commissioners.
Jessup asked Bohlen what his reaction would be if the Soviets were to meet the two-point Bohlen proposal with the suggestion that the proposal be discussed at a CFM together with other matters. Bohlen felt that any discussion should be at a lower level, and that we should simultaneously push for completion of our integration program. (As a corollary of Bohlen’s feeling that we may exaggerate the West German emphasis on unity, Bohlen is inclined to feel that we always overestimate the extent to which conversations related to German unity may obstruct progress toward integration. Bohlen feels that if the West Germans stop supporting EDC and the contractual arrangements simply because we have exploratory talks with the Soviet Union, we are building our German integration [Page 198] program on shifting sands indeed. Accordingly, Bohlen thinks we should point out to the Germans that any Soviet concessions which give promise of unity are solely based on Soviet fears of German integration, and that further progress on integration is the key to those further Soviet concessions which could make unity a reality.)
c. There was general agreement that we should step up our propaganda in Germany in accordance with whatever substantive objectives we agree upon. It was specifically suggested by Bohlen, pursuant to his analysis outlined above, that we lay increasing stress on the dangers to Germany of the Soviet armies and the need to counter those dangers by accelerating the intergration program.
As a companion propaganda piece, Jessup suggested that we must try to emphasize the idea that integration is in no way incompatible with German unification. Ferguson repeated his doubts that we could effectively persuade the Germans of this secondary proposition. (Ferguson’s propaganda doubts seem to correspond closely with his substantive doubts that we can keep the integration movement going if the Soviets appear to the Germans to be making substantial offers of unity; presumably, and it would seem correctly, Ferguson thinks it is very difficult for us to make effective propaganda on the basis of a position about which we are not ourselves convinced.)
d. It was generally agreed that there should be no talks with the British and French about possible further moves until the Soviet Union has replied to our March 25 note. Bohlen seemed to express the group’s sentiment in suggesting that talks which did not focus upon a particular Soviet text would simply tend to rigidify the separate views of the three powers as to a whole range of problems, most of which would turn out to be purely hypothetical. There was no agreement on whether the talks, whenever they take place, should be conducted here or in London or Paris.
III. Immediate Conclusions
The immediate conclusions reached at the meeting were as follows:
- 1.
- That Ger should prepare an analysis of the contractual arrangements and the EDC treaty to determine the extent to which those instruments envisage continued participation by a unified Germany. [It was also suggested that it would be well to prepare a time-phased appraisal of our concept of the German unification process—i.e., exploration of free election possibilities leading to free elections leading to a constituent assembly of an all-German government leading to negotiation of a peace treaty between the all-German [Page 199] government and the four powers. Nobody was assigned to do this Job.]2
- 2.
- Talks with the UK and France should not be undertaken before we have a Soviet reply to our note of March 25.3