Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–1254

No. 463
United States Delegation Record of the Third Restricted Meeting of the Berlin Conference, February 12, 1954, 11:35 a.m.–1:15 p.m. ¹

secret

Berlin, February 12, 1954, 11:35 a.m. to 1:15 p.m.

• Participants: United States
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Mr. Nash
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Bohlen
• France
  • Mr. Bidault
  • Mr. Parodi
  • Mr. De Margerie
  • Mr. Andronikow
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. Eden
  • Mr. Roberts
  • Mr. Allen
  • Major Birse
• USSR
  • Mr. Molotov
  • Mr. Gromyko
  • Mr. Malik
  • Mr. Troyanovski

Mr. Bidault, as Chairman, opened the meeting at 11:35 a.m. (Mr. Molotov arrived 5 minutes after the other delegations and the other members of his own delegation had been seated.)

Mr. Bidault stated that the Ministers had received the evening before the text of the new amendment to the Soviet proposal. He said he understood that the new paragraph 4 was in substitution for paragraphs 4 and 5 of the original Soviet proposal.²

Mr. Molotov acknowledged this to be the fact.

Mr. Bidault then said that he had read the new amendment and had tried to determine whether or not it constituted a positive step forward. It seemed to him that the original principle of paragraph 4 in the Soviet text had not been altered and that what was now suggested was still a conference of Five with a possibility of its enlargement.

Mr. Bidault then asked the Soviet delegation seriously to consider the situation as it existed and specifically the French proposal.³ He said that it covered, in his view, one important Soviet concern, which was the matter of accusations directed against Communist China. Mr. Bidault added that the French text reflected the exchange of views of all on a Five Power Conference, with particular reference to the dependence, insofar as Indochina was concerned, on the prospects for peaceful developments in Southeast Asia. In conclusion, Mr. Bidault said that he considered the French text to be the only one on which the Four Ministers could reach agreement without any one of them abandoning a question of principle.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet delegation had for its part carefully considered the French proposal and that as a result, he desired to confirm the following views of his delegation. He said that the principal point in paragraph 3 of the French text reflects the United Nations Resolution which, as Mr. Bidault knew, was unacceptable to the Soviet Government. The Chinese Communists were not present here but all present knew by Chou En-lai’s statement that it was also unacceptable to the Chinese Communists. How, therefore, Mr. Molotov asked rhetorically, can we agree on that text?

Moreover, Mr. Molotov, continued, he felt it necessary to point out the practical complexities of the French text. Indeed, it seemed to him instead of getting down to the business of discussing matters, in which all were interested, there were three stages proposed. This obviously complicated matters. The first stage of the French proposal would be the conference along the lines of the United Nations Resolution. On that the Soviet attitude was well known. The second stage would be that a conference of the Four Ministers would be required to agree on the convening of still another conference. The third stage would be a new conference on Indochina but of undefined composition. This, Mr. Molotov said, seemed to be a long drawn out plan hampering the settlement of any issues. Mr. Molotov then asked whether it would not be possible to find a middle way which would not give 100% satisfaction to everyone but which would not be in direct contradiction of the positions held by any of the Four Ministers.

Mr. Eden said that he did not understand Mr. Molotov’s difficulty with regard to the French proposal. He said he liked it because it was definite as to composition, place and date. Mr. Eden went on to say that the Soviet proposal tabled yesterday was indefinite on all these matters and that we would have to start discussing when we get to the conference the question of agreeing on what nations had the right to attend. This would lead us back to Panmunjom. Accordingly, Mr. Eden said, there were two basic reasons why he felt the French text reflected exactly Her Majesty’s Government’s views. First, the fashion in which the Big Five was treated did not result in raising Communist China to a special position to which it was not entitled. Second, the proposal does deal with the composition of the conference. If difficulty persists on this point here, then Mr. Eden said, there is no value in trying to find a text which conceals disappointment and merely postpones solution until the Conference meets.

Mr. Bidault then intervened to say that he believed the French proposal did constitute a middle way. He pointed out that the original U.S. text⁴ referred specifically to the United Nations Resolution which Mr. Molotov found objectionable, whereas there was no specific reference to it in the French draft.

Paragraph 3 of the French draft, according to Mr. Bidault, corresponded to the facts. The fact was that invitations had been already issued and could not be withdrawn. Moreover, it avoided the problem of the status of the Soviet Union at the conference, since it placed the latter in the position of a sponsoring power. Mr. Bidault said that the French proposal represented a serious effort at conciliation. He said that Mr. Molotov said that it contained certain stages but he wished to point out that the Soviet proposal started with a general discussion as its first stage. As for the alleged three stages, Mr. Bidault said that the Korean Political Conference had been envisaged for a long time; and that it had encountered great difficulty in getting started. According to the French text the Korean Political Conference could start at once.

Mr. Bidault said that Mr. Molotov was wrong in envisaging a second conference as necessary to decide on a third conference on Indochina. This could all be arranged though diplomatic channels. Indeed, that was what Ambassadors were for. Mr. Bidault went on to say that the conference on Indochina could be held very shortly after the Korean conference started, if progress was being achieved in the latter.

Mr. Bidault said no single conference was feasible since, as he had pointed out, the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of Korea have nothing whatsoever to do with Indochina. Therefore, it was quite clear that one could not hold a single general conference. He said that it was quite true that the French proposal did not suggest the composition of the conference on Indochina, but that was something that could be discussed. The Soviets, he said, had made no proposal on composition, and had said that it would be necessary to ask the Chinese Communists and other possible participants whether they would accept, before issuing invitations. Mr. Bidault concluded by saying that the French draft permits us to get started immediately a Korean Political Conference and, thereafter one on Indochina. The French proposal represented a serious effort and should receive serious attention.

The Secretary then said that he had a few remarks to make since he had not yet spoken. The Secretary stated that, as he had said yesterday, the U.S. is prepared to accept the French proposal if it is acceptable to the other Three Ministers, though he still preferred the U.S. text.

The Secretary said that Mr. Molotov’s objections to the French proposal seemed to him the most convincing reasons why it should be adopted. The principal objection of Mr. Molotov seemed to be paragraph 3 of the French text because it was precise on the three matters which have been blocking for seven months a Korean Political Conference. If the purpose of the Soviet Foreign Minister is to throw in doubt the composition of the Korean conference, then surely there is little that can be accomplished here for that has been the principal difficulty so far at Panmunjom.

The Secretary said that it seemed to him the basic underlying theory of the French proposal was that the way to make progress was to settle difficulties that exist rather than multiply them. Since July there has been agreement that a political conference should be held. The reason why it had not been held so far is due to difficulties, not one of which would be resolved by the Soviet text. Apparently, the Soviet theory is that if you are in difficulty the best thing to do is to double your difficulties. From the standpoint of the U.S., the first thing to find out is whether or not the Chinese Communists are willing to hold a political conference on Korea which was promised seven months ago. The Secretary went on to say that if the Chinese Communists continue to avoid peaceful processes regarding Korea and also continue to avoid peaceful procedures with respect to Indochina, then calling a conference with time, place and composition undetermined would not merely prevent progress but in fact it might mark a retrogression from peace. The Secretary said that he was particularly disappointed in the fact that Mr. Molotov today seemed to find paragraph 3 of the French text objectionable, whereas yesterday he had understood him to say that he saw no difficulty insofar as the substance of that paragraph was concerned.

Mr. Molotov intervened to say that he would like to discuss first the question of whether or not there should be one or two conferences. The Bidault proposal would lead to two, one on Korea, the other on Indochina. The Soviet delegation preferred a single conference because the chief participants would be the same for both. A conference to discuss either Korea or Indochina, Mr. Molotov blandly noted, without the presence of the Four Foreign Ministers plus the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, “would yield no fruitful results”. However it is entitled—whether as one or two conferences—the main participants remain the same in both conferences.

Mr. Molotov said that we were now discussing principally French paragraphs 3 and 4 and he would like to deal with paragraph 4, which speaks of certain “favorable prospects” in the course of the discussions of the Korean problem and says that in such case a second conference on Indochina would be found possible. By following this approach, Mr. Molotov said we would subordinate the solution of one hard problem to the solution of another hard problem. This, he considered, inadvisable. Mr. Molotov said that the question then arises as to what constitutes “favorable prospects” in the Korean conference. He did not know and this puzzled him but perhaps his colleagues could enlighten him. Moreover, Mr. Molotov said if one speaks of a period of trial before discussing Indochina then he must state that this could not be taken to refer to Communist China because it was Communist China which had shown initiative in solving the Korean problem. If it had not been for that initiative, where would the Korean problem be today? Accordingly, Mr. Molotov thought it would be well if others could show initiative in Indochina since it was not proper that one party should show initiative all the time.

Mr. Molotov then reverted to the Soviet proposal which, he said, named two items. If the French preferred, he said, it would be possible to be more precise. We could stipulate both Korea and Indochina. In fact, Mr. Molotov said we could then have the following agenda for the conference:

• “1. The Korean Political Conference.
• “2. Statements on subjects mentioned above (which would include or specify Indochina) and the exchange of views on these subjects.” This would then provide a definite framework for the conference and for the statements which would be made at it.

Mr. Molotov then said that the Secretary yesterday, and Mr. Eden today, had emphasized the good aspects of the French text, specifically that it gave precision to time, place and composition. Mr. Molotov said that he likewise recognized these good points, particularly the first two and he felt that the time and the place could be agreed without great difficulty. This left only the question of composition. Perhaps, Mr. Molotov said, we could draw the conclusion from that that the Four Ministers have reached two-thirds of an agreement. In that case, only one-third of the problem was left and on this the Soviet delegation had certain views. Would it not be reasonable, Mr. Molotov asked, since he was ready to meet the wishes of the French on two points, for the other Ministers to meet the Soviet views on the third point?

On the matter of composition Mr. Molotov said he would like to repeat what he had already said, which was to the effect that the language of the United Nations Resolution should not be reiterated because the Soviets had opposed it. He said he would repeat that he had no objection to the participation in the conference of the countries specified in the U.S. and French drafts. It would be possible to make the formulation more precise perhaps, along the following lines: “that the countries directly concerned in the consideration of the Korean problem and who would take part would be the Republic of Korea and the Korean Democratic Republic and the other countries whose armed forces had taken part in the hostilities in Korea and who desired to attend.” Mr. Molotov pointed out that this would avoid the possibility of vetoing any country who desired to attend. This, he said, constituted a suggested amendment to the Soviet paragraph 4.

Mr. Molotov concluded by saying that it might be wise to make more precise the composition of the conference on Indochina.

At this point the Secretary said, that insofar as the U.S. was concerned, the U.S. was not prepared to accept a formula in any guise which promoted Communist China to a community of big powers with special responsibilities; nor does the U.S. accept the theory of an hierarchy among nations under which any member number—2, 3, 4, or 5—has a predominant position.

The Secretary said that Mr. Molotov had said that the five named Big Powers are indispensable to solutions both in Korea and in Indochina and that he would be implying that others are of secondary importance. As far as Korea is concerned, the Secretary said that the U.S. considers the Republic of Korea the most indispensable country of all. Insofar as Indochina is concerned, there are certainly others, including the Associated States, which are more indispensable than the U.S. Therefore, the Secretary concluded, the general theory of the Soviet text is unacceptable to the U.S. and he would greatly desire that Mr. Molotov should address himself to the scheme of the French proposal.

Mr. Bidault then said unfortunately he did not have any written text of the new Soviet amendment but that nevertheless it seemed to him to still rest on the basic Soviet principle which seemed to him nonutilitarian. He was being told that the solution of Indochina depended upon the solution of the Korean problem. Mr. Bidault pointed out that it depended not on the solution of the Korean problem, but on progress in the Korean discussions. This was a moral and not a technical problem. What was needed was the development of a new and peaceful climate in all of Asia which would apply both to the situation in Korea and in Indochina. “Favorable prospects”, Mr. Bidault said meant constructive and visible prospects toward peace.

With respect to Southeast Asia, Mr. Bidault said that he had called very clearly for cooperation from Communist China. He said that the question of one or two conferences was not a matter of substance but that it was clear that the composition could not be the same for a discussion of both questions. Mr. Bidault said it was immaterial whether there were two separate conferences or the first one transformed itself into the second conference. Obviously, the two Korean governments have nothing to do with Indochina.

Mr. Bidault said that it might be well to discuss composition since this very question had prevented the convening of the Korean Political Conference for months. The method used for the Korean matter seemed a poor approach. Moreover, it was not useful to send out invitations to countries by name when the first problem was to establish an environment of peace in the whole of Asia. After that everything would be easy.

Mr. Bidault concluded by saying that the Soviet text, even as amended, was not likely to lead to agreement and that in any event he could not reserve any special position for the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Bidault then, in his capacity as Chairman, noted that it was 1:10 P.M. and made the suggestion that the committee of experts set up the day before to make plans for the future work of the conference should take into account the rationing of time for Restricted, as well as Plenary Sessions.⁵

Mr. Bidault then asked for the names of each Minister’s representative.

The Secretary named Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Bidault named Mr. Seydoux, Mr. Eden named Sir Frank Roberts, and Mr. Molotov named Mr. Sobolov.

It was then agreed that the communiqué would merely state that the Four Ministers had resumed their discussion of Agenda Item I in Restricted Session at 11:30 A.M. and had adjourned at 1:15 P.M.⁶

All agreed to Mr. Bidault’s suggestion that the Plenary Session this afternoon should be deferred until 4 o’clock.⁷

The Restricted Meeting adjourned at 1:15 P.M.

1. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of this meeting in Dulte 68 from Berlin, Feb. 12. (396.1 BE/2–1254)

2. This proposal, which replaced paragraphs 4 and 5 of the previous Soviet proposal, Document 518, reads as follows:

   “Agree to call a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the interested countries.

   “Agree, also that in addition to the USA, France, UK, USSR, and the Chinese Peoples Republic as participants in the discussion of questions under examination at this conference, there shall be invited to take part in the conference during the examination of the Korean question, the Korean Republic, the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic, and other countries directly concerned with this question, and also, in connection with the examination of questions relating to the reestablishment of peace in other regions of Asia (Indochina)—representatives of the corresponding Asiatic regions.” (Dulte 70 from Berlin, Feb. 13, 396.1 BE/2–1354)

3. For the French proposal, see the U.S. Delegation record of the second restricted meeting, Document 459.
4. Transmitted in Dulte 44, Document 436.
5. The quadripartite working group, consisting of Seydoux, Roberts, MacArthur, and Sobolev, met immediately following the conclusion of the restricted session, and drafted the following schedule: Feb. 13 and 14, plenary sessions on Austria; Feb. 15, morning, restricted session on Item I, afternoon, plenary on Germany; Feb. 16, plenary on Austria; Feb. 17 and 18, sessions as necessary to wind up the conference. This schedule was drafted ad referendum. (Secto 128 from Berlin, Feb. 12, 396.1 BE/2–1254)
6. A copy of the communiqué, circulated as FPM(54)51 in the records of the conference, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197.
7. For a record of the plenary session, see Secto 129, infra.