Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–1054

No. 449
Memorandum of Conversations, Prepared by the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference¹

confidential

Berlin, February 10, 1954.

• Participants:
  • First Stage—Three Western Ministers and Advisors
  • Second Stage—The Same with Addition of Austrian Delegation

Subject: Austria

First Stage

Austrian Presence at Reception:

The Ministers agreed that it would not be appropriate to invite the Austrian delegation to the Tripartite Reception on February 11th on the grounds that with no Germans present, such action might be misinterpreted in Germany.

Austrian Participation:

The Ministers discussed the situation arising from the opening paragraph of Dr. Figl’s speech before the conference,² in which he thanks the Four Powers for granting full participation to the Austrian delegation, and from Figl’s press statements along the same line. In the view of Mr. Eden, there were no real obstacles to full Austrian participation in the sense that they should be present at the meetings and be allowed to speak at appropriate times. The Secretary concurred but thought occasions would arise when the presence of the Austrians would be undesirable either in their own interests or in those of the Western Powers. After reviewing the quadripartite record on this matter, it was agreed that the Soviet position had been left open, although from the invitation sent by Mr. Bidault to the Austrian Government the implication was clear that the Austrians would not have full participating status. In view of the several elements in Dr. Figl’s speech which the West would like to remove or alter (participation, oil field development, and neutrality), it was thought advisable to support some greater participation for the Austrians so that they would not feel under compulsion to put in their opening speech all the matters they wished to lay before the conference. The Secretary summarized the position by proposing the following. The Austrians would give their speech and then the meeting would be recessed. When discussions would be resumed, with the Austrians absent, the three Ministers would seek Soviet agreement to having the Austrians admitted and to have it understood that they could express their views later in the discussion of the Austrian item but the four Ministers would reserve the right to meet without the Austrians. Mr. Bidault and Mr. Eden concurred.

Austrian Neutrality:

Mr. Bidault reacted strongly against the sentence in Dr. Figl’s speech referring to the Austrian readiness to abstain from all military alliances. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden agreed that efforts should be made to have this point omitted.

Meeting After Entrance of Austrian Delegation

Introduction:

The Secretary stated that it had been the original intention of the three Ministers to place the Austrian item first on the conference agenda. The Austrian negotiations had gone so far in the past that for their conclusion now only Soviet good will was necessary, since the success of the Ministers in this matter would have engendered success on other items on the agenda. However, when the Soviets had proposed a reverse order of the agenda, the Western powers had accepted in order to avoid a long wrangle on the agenda. At the time, the Secretary had remarked that Austria was the easiest problem to resolve. He hoped this was true in the light of the poor results of the conference on other matters. He wished Figl good luck in his aim and hoped that he would bring good luck to the conference. Before the discussions turned to the points which appeared in the morning meeting, of the Western and Austrian experts,³ the Secretary asked if Dr. Figl wished to speak.

Dr. Figl expressed his thanks for the opportunity to meet the Ministers and to discuss certain procedural matters. He was happy that Austria was on the agenda even if it was the last item. Perhaps this was just as well.

Participation:

The Secretary stated that the precise form of Austrian participation had not yet been decided among the four Ministers. The Western Ministers anticipated “a large measure of participation” but thought that in the interests of Austria, the Ministers should be allowed, on occasion, to meet in the absence of the Austrians.

Dr. Figl pointed out that the desire of his government for full participation arose from the fact that the government would have to bear the consequences for the results before the Austrian people.

The Secretary then set forth the procedure the Western Ministers would follow. The Austrian statement would come first, followed by a recess. After the recess, the four Ministers, in the absence of the Austrians, would consider the form of participation in the light of the Austrian request. Mr. Eden pointed out that if this procedure were adopted, the Austrians would have other opportunities to express their views; hence certain points in Dr. Figl’s speech could be postponed until later. The Secretary informed Dr. Figl that he could take it for granted that he would be heard more than once. Mr. Bidault thought the Austrians were certainly not in Berlin on a symbolic trip.

Reference to Nazi Development of Oil Fields:

Dr. Figl explained that the language used in his speech had been inserted in order to stress that the oil in question is Austrian, and not German, property. This was the same principle as the UN had enunciated. The Soviets have no right to the oil but only to the installations for its production. He was willing, however, to insert the phrase “to a considerable extent”. The oil was in Austria a long time before 1938 and some of it was produced before the Anschluss.

In Mr. Bidault’s view, Dr. Figl’s argument made the entire sentence unnecessary. Mr. Eden added that the sentence strengthens the Soviet claims to the installations as German assets. Dr. Figl disagreed with these interpretations, saying that the sentence was meant to indicate that first the Germans and now the Soviets had exploited the oil illegally. Mr. Bidault then remarked he did not understand how the reference to the Nazis strengthened the Austrian request for alleviation of Article 35. To this, Dr. Figl replied that the sentence established the basis for alleviation, including the division of oil fields on a 60–40 split. By making the statement under reference, the Austrian Government removed the Soviet argument that the assets are all German. The Secretary concluded discussion of this point by recommending that the experts look into the matter further. He wished to say, however, that he was very gratified with the general Austrian approach to the subject of Article 35.

Acceptable Treaty Clauses:

With regard to willingness of the Austrian Government to accept each treaty provision, Dr. Figl wished to insert the word “Draft” before “treaty” and substitute “in every respect” for “on all sides” in the last sentence of the antepenultimate paragraph.

Neutralization:

Dr. Figl declared that Austria’s intention to abstain from military alliances had been said repeatedly by the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, and the Austrian Parliament. When, as anticipated, the Soviets raised the arguments of remilitarization, U.S. bases, EDC, NATO, etc., the Austrians would have cut the ground from under them. It was better to anticipate these arguments by showing Austria with a force of only 53,000 men and excluded from any military alliances. It was better to keep the initiative by laying all the cards on the table at the start rather than being forced into the defensive by waiting for the inevitable attack.

Mr. Bidault stated that there was a difference between the statement of the Austrian Government and one made in the four power conference. What did Dr. Figl propose to do if Molotov wished to pursue the matter further and put the statement in as a treaty article? With some hesitation, Dr. Figl answered the Soviets would have a hard time introducing a new treaty article as it would limit Austrian sovereignty. Since the present government cannot commit future ones, a treaty article would mean that a country which is about to be freed would have its freedom restricted indefinitely. Thus the statement would have to be sufficient. In Mr. Eden’s view, the Soviets would immediately ask for a treaty article on neutralization if the sentence were retained.

Dr. Figl said that he would have to consult on this matter with Chancellor Raab since the sentence was an important and integral part of the speech. He would inform the three Ministers tomorrow. The Secretary concurred with Mr. Eden’s and Mr. Bidault’s views. If the sentence were postponed until after the Soviets had raised the matter, an Austrian statement on this subject might be a sufficient compromise. Dr. Figl doubted if this tactic would be successful. Mr. Eden thought the present wording is bad, whether made now or later, provided, of course, that the Austrian Government did not wish to bind itself permanently. The Secretary concluded the discussion by remarking that the Soviets were very shrewd traders—if you tried to meet them halfway at the outset, they would want you to go farther.⁴

1. The first conversation (first stage) took place at noon at the Secretary of State’s residence; the second conversation (meeting with the Austrian Delegation) took place at 12:30. Copies of this memorandum were sent to London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.
2. No copy of Figl’s draft speech has been found in Department of State files.
3. Regarding this meeting, see the editorial note, supra.
4. A summary of this meeting with Figl and the reaction to his proposed speech was transmitted in Secto 112 from Berlin, Feb. 10. (396.1 BE/2–1054)