Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108
No. 44
Minutes of the Meeting of the Foreign
Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
With the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 24,
1952, 4:45 p.m.1
- There were present:
- United States
- Mr. Acheson
- Mr. McCloy
- Mr. Jessup
- Mr. Perkins
- Mr. Lewis
- Mr. Reber
- Mr. Harris
- Mr. Reinstein
- Mr. Calhoun
- Miss Kirkpatrick
- United Kingdom
- Mr. Eden
- Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
- Mr. Roberts
- Mr. Ward
- Mr. Trevelyan
- Mr. O’Neill
- Mr. Bathurst
- Mr. Shuckburgh
- Mr. Ridsdale
- France
- M. Schuman
- M. François-Poncet
- M. Alphand
- M. Berard
- M. Seydoux
- M. Leroy-Beaulieu
- M. de Guiringaud
- M. Sauvagnargues
- M. Patey
- Federal Republic
- Dr. Adenauer
- Herr Schaeffer
- Prof. Hallstein
- Herr Blankenhorn
- Prof. Grewe
- United States
[Here follows a seven-point index to the minutes.]
[Page 96]1. Opening of the Meeting
It was agreed that Mr. Acheson should act as Chairman. Mr. Acheson welcomed the Chancellor and asked him if he would care to make a general statement before consideration of the agenda began.
The Chancellor said that he had no general statement to make, other than to extend a welcome to the Foreign Ministers and to express the hope that the following Monday would see the completion of the first part of a very great undertaking.
2. Title of Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
The Chancellor accepted the proposal of the Three Ministers conveyed by Mr. Acheson that the official title of the Convention should stand as proposed, but that each country might be free to adopt its own version of a short title for unofficial use.
3. Special Arrangements for Entry into Force of Parts of the Contractual Agreements Prior to Complete Ratification of the EDC Treaty
Mr. Acheson said that a suggestion had been made that certain provisions of the conventions might enter into force when they had been ratified by the Four Powers and when the EDC Treaty had been ratified by certain but not all of the powers party to this agreement. The Ministers felt that this arrangement was inadvisable because owing to the close interrelationship of the two treaties many complications would result. The best solution would be for all the nations concerned to press for the earliest possible ratification. It was the intention of the United States Government to place the contractual agreements before the United States Senate during the course of the next week and he hoped that other Governments would take similar steps designed to ensure ratification at the earliest possible date. If, however, hopes for speedy ratification were not achieved because of the failure of one of the parties to the EDC Treaty to act, a new situation would be created. The Ministers agreed that in this event a meeting with representatives of the Federal Republic should be held to consider the situation. A draft letter to this effect had been prepared for the Chancellor to consider.2
The Chancellor replied that he fully recognized the difficulties created by his suggestion for the prior entry into force of parts of the contractual agreements. At the same time he felt bound to draw attention to the difficulties which would confront the Federal [Page 97] Republic and other Western European countries if the EDC Treaty were not promptly ratified. The Federal Government would seek ratification of the agreements by the end of July and for this purpose the Bundestag would probably extend its sessions at least a fortnight beyond the normal closing date. He reminded the Ministers that the Schuman Plan Treaty, signed fourteen months ago, had not yet been ratified by all the signatories. He had also been informed that the Netherlands Government had stated that it would not be able to ratify the EDC Treaty until December.
The prospect of delay caused him concern not only as regards the contractual conventions, but also in connection with the forces which were to be raised and made available for Western defense by the Federal Republic. Twelve divisions were to be raised by July 1954. In view of the lack of any existing military establishment, it would be difficult to do this unless ratification were prompt.
As to the internal political situation, unless the contractual arrangements came into effect quickly, the benefits which they conferred on Germany would not have been felt by the German public prior to the 1953 national elections, and this situation would have a serious effect on those elections.
With respect to the draft letter, he asked that phrasing should be added to indicate that the three Governments were prepared to meet with the Federal Government, not only to consider the situation created by delay in ratification of the EDC Treaty but also to consider whether certain of the provisions of the contractual arrangements could then be put into effect.
Mr. Eden said that he could agree to this suggestion.
M. Schuman said the Chancellor’s proposal might be acceptable, but added that such a statement of intention would have only a theoretical value until the difficulties which might exist at that future date were known and agreement were in fact reached on just what parts of the conventions might be put into effect. He said that Parliamentary prerogatives had to be kept in mind and therefore that only those provisions which did not require ratification could be applied in advance. He also stressed the fact that there could be no question of whole parts of the agreements being applied. Only certain measures could be put into effect in advance and a special agreement would have to be concluded for this purpose. The Chancellor said that he could agree to a wording of the statement which would take M. Schuman’s point into account. It was agreed that experts should be asked to redraft the letter in the light of the discussion.
Before continuing to the next item, Mr. Acheson said that he wished once again to emphasize the importance which the United States Government attached to what the Chancellor had said about [Page 98] the necessity for early ratification. He also was disturbed by the Netherlands’ decision to defer ratification to December and would make this known to the Netherlands Government. Another important point to bear in mind was that by January 1953 it was probable that there would be a change in the principal officials concerned with the foreign policy of the United States Government. Although this would not mean a basic change in American foreign policy, it would be unfortunate if the new officials were obliged to deal with complicated political and technical problems arising from more than a year of negotiations, the background of which would be completely unfamiliar to them.
4. Text of a Letter to be Sent by the Federal Chancellor to the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments on Atomic Energy
The Chancellor accepted the Ministers’ proposal that the review of restrictions on the production of nuclear fuel in the Federal Territory should take place at the end of two years from the coming into effect of the conventions.3
5. Definition of Weapons in Annex to Article 107 of EDC Treaty—Guided Missiles
Mr. Acheson read to the Chancellor the text of the definition of these weapons agreed upon by the Ministers at their meeting earlier that day (see Minute 7 of the record of this meeting.4) He added that this text had been prepared by the UK delegation and asked Mr. Eden whether he had any comment. Mr. Eden then said that the proposed definition involved the understanding that short range missiles would not be produced in exposed areas. The Chancellor agreed.
Mr. Acheson then said that he understood that it was the Allied proposal that the undertaking on this matter should be treated in the same manner as that for the manufacture of propellants, i.e., in an annex to the EDC Treaty. The Chancellor said this would be satisfactory to him.
6. French Reservation on Reparations
Mr. Acheson called on M. Schuman to make a statement on this matter. M. Schuman said that he recognized that this problem was one of as great importance to the Chancellor as it was to the French Government. At Potsdam, agreement had been reached on only two categories of reparations and a third category, reparations out of current production, remained to be settled at the time of a [Page 99] final peace treaty with Germany. It was, of course, not to be expected that the three Allied powers would have recourse to such reparations under present conditions. However, it would be difficult at this time to include in the contractual agreements a formal statement renouncing such reparations without provoking great opposition in the French Parliament. He felt that the best solution would be to avoid making an issue of this matter now and suggested a formula by which the second sentence of Article 1 of Chapter Six (Reparations) of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and Occupation would be omitted and a new Article 6 added in which the Allied powers would agree not to claim from the Federal Republic reparations from current production pending a peace treaty.5
The Chancellor asked whether this Allied undertaking would apply only until the time of the peace treaty. If so, that would imply that the Allied powers reserved the right at the peace treaty to revise the undertaking and claim reparations from current production. M. Schuman replied that the question would, in fact, remain to be settled in the final peace treaty which, however, would be discussed with the Federal Government as an equal partner in the negotiations.
The Chancellor said that the omission of the undertaking on reparations from current production constituted a basic change of the text. He had already shown the text of the article as agreed upon by the experts to leading members of the coalition parties in the Bundestag in order to counteract in part the violent press attacks which had been made on the Government in connection with other provisions of the agreement. He said that opposition to the conventions had recently reached a new degree of heatedness and referred to Schumacher’s statement of 24 May that anyone who signed the agreement could no longer claim to be a German. No matter what intention lay behind the formula proposed by M. Schuman, the German public would interpret the wording as a reservation of an Allied right to claim reparations from current production in the peace treaty. He reminded the Ministers that the previous British Government had already declared that the reparations question was settled with the completion of dismantling and the seizure of German assets abroad. He then appealed to M. Schuman to join in finding a new formulation on this point which would help him (the Chancellor) with his internal political difficulties. The Chancellor indicated that if M. Schuman could meet him on this issue he would be prepared to make concessions which would satisfy French [Page 100] requirements on the application to the French forces of the provisions of the convention on the status of troops.
M. Schuman said that he was moved by the Chancellor’s appeal, but he had to point out that his Government had already met the Chancellor on a great many points. In this matter he had already gone beyond the limits of his instructions in an effort to meet the Chancellor’s needs. The whole difficulty was mainly a problem of formulation, because the French Government had never demanded reparations from current production and did not intend to do so at the time of the peace treaty. It was obvious that the party who had to pay reparations should be sensitive on the point, but it was equally true that those who had suffered damage should have strong feelings. The Communists in France were now creating agitation among persons who had suffered war damage by telling them that those who had suffered losses from the war in Russia had been adequately recompensed while the French Government refused to seek reparations with which to help its own people. He appealed again to the Chancellor to accept his formula.
7. Close of the Meeting
The Meeting adjourned at 6:45 p.m.
- There is no indication on the source text to show who prepared these minutes. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of the meeting in telegram 3050 from Bonn, May 25. (662A.00/5–2552)↩
- The draft of this letter has not been identified further. For the final text, see item 2, Document 48.↩
- For text of the letter from the Chancellor to the three Foreign Ministers on atomic energy, see Document 64.↩
- supra.↩
- For text of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and Occupation, see Senate Q and R, pp. 25–88 or Cmd. 8571, pp. 75–135.↩