Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203
No. 433
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Political Affairs, HICOG (Steere)1
Subject: German Views on Progress of Conference
I called on Ambassador Blankenhorn this morning to ascertain the Federal Government’s reactions to the latest developments in the Four-Power Conference. Blankenhorn opened his remarks by stating that the Chancellor was “completely satisfied” with the handling of the Conference by the Foreign Ministers and with the position which had now been achieved. Blankenhorn said he had had this information first hand from visitors from Bonn and by telephone this morning from Professor Hallstein. He repeated this assurance in two or three different formulations and voiced his own opinion that the situation was “excellent”.
Blankenhorn then stated that the Chancellor and his associates in the Coalition were of the opinion that the situation had now reached the point where the Conference should be broken off as soon as this could be appropriately done. The issues between the Soviets and the Allies had now been defined with the greatest clarity and the relative position of the Allies vis-à-vis the Soviets could scarcely be improved upon. German public opinion was strongly opposed to the Soviet proposals and equally strong in support of the Allied position. It was the Federal Government’s view that termination of the Conference would be supported as justified, by the great majority of the German people, notwithstanding their disappointment at the lack of results.
The Federal Government naturally understood that the Conference could not be broken off suddenly and that some further discussions would have to take place. On the other hand, Blankenhorn expressed the view that it was of the utmost importance not to run any unnecessary risk of destroying the psychological advantage which the Allies had now gained. He thought there were dangers in discussing the German problem any further, particularly at today’s meeting, as it might result in the Allies being treated with the “brush” of intransigence that has touched the Russians.
In further discussions with Blankenhorn the thought was developed that there might be advantages in today’s meeting “in laying [Page 977] aside”, without necessarily terminating, the discussion of the German question, and suggesting that the Conference pass to the discussion of Austria at the beginning of the week. Next week’s developments might make it easy not to return to the German question.
I pointed out to Blankenhorn that numerous German papers were suggesting that the only hope for progress now on the German question was to take the matter up in a restricted meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Blankenhorn immediately said that he thought it would be a great mistake to transfer discussions of the German problem to such a meeting because it would immediately arouse great hopes in the minds of the German people which were bound to be disappointed, and possibly great fears as well. Later he suggested that if it were possible for the four Foreign Ministers to discuss the German question at a dinner, and the results of this could later be drawn upon to show that an effort had been made to make progress in a secret meeting, this would go a long way to satisfy those who place their hopes in a secret meeting, and would tend to still the criticism of those who might criticize if no restricted meeting were to take place.
- Sent to Secretary Dulles, MacArthur, and Merchant. A notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it.↩