Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–654: Telegram

No. 427
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

confidential priority

Berlin, February 6, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 96. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes second part of February 5 meeting:²

Molotov opened post-intermission speech by stating difficult problems and wide divergencies faced by conference necessitated careful attention.³ Through over-simplifying terms of discussion one easily got into easy criticism and polemics. Simplifying of other delegations’ position does not simplify one’s own. Regarding Dulles’ assumption that he could easily criticize Soviets because he knew Molotov’s thought, Molotov knew he had better information on that score. Molotov then turned to review of Soviet proposal.⁴ He had adduced certain proofs from books and documents about German events in 1930’s which had been ignored by other speakers except Eden’s cursory reference. Parliamentary methods had certain advantages for previous age but failed to prevent rise of Hitler and resultant world war. Four powers should take precautions to prevent recurrence of German events.

Molotov then asked why reference in Potsdam Agreement which is still in force regarding establishment of German Government appropriate for signing of peace treaty was ignored in this discussion.

While over-simplified arguments implied Soviets did not want free elections, they did in truth favor reunification, quick progress toward this goal and free elections which would not be postponed. This was Soviet position.

Free elections were serious matter because of historical experience with Germany, previous commitments of Allies and question whether West really favors free elections. Whereas West called elections under supervision of occupation powers free, to Soviets German supervision of elections meant freedom for Germans. In any event discussion oversimplified because held while German representatives absent. This is wrong approach. Regarding Bidault’s proposal to add neutrals to Supervisory Commission he had already replied presence of outsiders on Election Control Commission not desired.

Many sharp words regarding GDR regime had been said, including assertion it was going under. Of course some people did not like West German regime. Everyone knows events of June 17⁵ (he thought that was date) had resulted from hands stretching out from West Berlin to do improper things and this showed weakness of GDR. Events cannot be repeated “because they have no ground under them”. (Quote omitted from Molotov’s first phrase and he hastened to amend sentence.) Also some people do not like China though its people do. Therefore, they call it Formosa, a place kept going only by foreign aid, but many millions like China which is not represented at UN as it should be.

Two aspects to substance of Soviet proposal. (1) Four powers should render their assistance to reconcile views of East and West Governments so that through negotiations they may set up one government. Meanwhile powers would not surrender any occupation powers. (2) Troop withdrawal to insure independence of elections. This was an equitable proposal which equally affected all four powers.

Why is establishment of provisional government as Soviets proposed termed impossible? It should be short lived and also four powers in conjunction with Germans would set time limit for elections. Germans will question fairness of elections run by occupation powers but not those administered by themselves. Five or six conditions for Soviet proposal mentioned by Bidault not in accord with realities. On Eden’s points that two regimes were irreconcilable, “that too is incorrect”. They are not irreconcilable and should talk to each other. Four powers had different kinds of regimes but could still negotiate together with peaceful ends in view.

To reduce fears expressed about GDR Molotov wished to cite facts. After 1945 number of states had Communists in their governments. Some later became People’s Democracies; others did not omitting Communists (Molotov does not know if this strengthened these regimes). Apprehensions not understandable when only purpose is to find common ground for democracy, peace and German interests.

Apprehension over troop withdrawal would not hold water. Whereas it was alleged West Germany or even West Europe would be left undefended, all troops would be withdrawn simultaneously except for small contingents left behind. Matter could well be discussed because it is practical question. Such actions would please Germans and other countries and would facilitate free elections. Large size of GDR police forces compared to West German is not proved and cannot be because assertion has no basis in fact. At any rate in January 1951 GDR proposed willingness to discuss size, equipment, and location of police in both parts of Germany. This can still be done.

Molotov reached two conclusions on substance of Soviet proposal. (1) Four powers should assist in establishing provisional government and instruct that government to hold free elections. Simultaneously withdraw troops except for “certain limited contingents”. (2) Regarding paragraph 7 of Soviet Proposal for Peace Treaty⁶ (Germany should not enter alliances directed against any country which fought Germany), four powers should agree to this principle reached during war if they value signatures and accords reached thereby. While some of statements during day may be regarded as reflecting unwillingness to reach agreement, USSR does seek agreement.

Secretary proposed devoting Monday to agenda item (1) and procedural questions. Bidault interjected to say he too believes four powers should reach agreement but they cannot. Molotov’s speech raised no new elements. Does not propose ending discussion items but suggests recourse in Monday’s meeting to procedure which as Molotov knows has sometimes proven successful before. Eden said all were anxious to find way out of difficulties of which all are increasingly conscious. Asked if Monday restricted meeting would be devoted to item (1) and nothing else. Secretary declared item (1) would be only substantive point.

Molotov agreed to restricted meeting. Ministers also agreed each Minister would bring four advisors including interpreter and confirmed Saturday meeting.

1. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.
2. For a record of the first part of the eleventh plenary, see Secto 95, supra.
3. An extract from Molotov’s statement is in Berlin Discussions, pp. 110–117.
4. FPM(54)33, Document 514.
5. For documentation on the uprisings in the Soviet Zone of Germany beginning June 16, 1953, see Documents 713 ff.
6. FPM(54)24, Document 512.