Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203
No. 422
Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen)1
Last night Zarubin made some remarks which might afford some clue as to the manner in which the Soviet Delegation contemplates the final outcome of this conference in regard to Germany. I had told him that if the Soviet performance at yesterday’s meeting had been anywhere near up to the performance at the concert,2 we would have some grounds for optimism in regard to the outcome on Germany. He laughed. I asked him if he thought that the three Western Governments had lost their minds, to which he replied “no.” I then asked him if they realized it was apparent that there was no basis for agreement in Mr. Molotov’s proposal, to which he replied “maybe you are right.” He went on then to say that, however, there would be a de facto situation in Germany even in the event of no fundamental agreement and that possibly the Ministers might address themselves to consideration of measures which would prevent that situation from becoming a major source of tension [Page 962] and danger to the world. I did not pursue the matter any further since other people came up.
It is possible that Zarubin was giving us a hint as to what the Soviets have in mind. As I have frequently stated, I have always been convinced that they did not expect any agreement on Germany but at the same time they do not wish this conference to add to world tension and danger. It may well be therefore that, given those circumstances, they would like to have something come out of this conference which would be reassuring in that sense, that the two halves of Germany would live together without becoming a hotbed of tension and possible war. We might consider carefully if there are any tactical or practical measures which we might find of great advantage to our position in Germany and especially here. If there are such measures which could be agreed on without implying recognition of Pankow, we might be able to make the Soviets pay a price for their desire for some indication from the conference that despite its failure (1) the situation will not get worse, and (2) some contact with the West will be maintained.