Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–454: Telegram

No. 414
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

confidential

Berlin, February 4, 1954—10 a.m.

Secto 81. Department pass OSD. Following is summary of first part Ministers meeting February 3, Bidault presiding:²

Molotov began discussion by asking questions relating to EDC,³ importance of which he remarked was indicated by time which French and Italian Parliaments were taking to consider it. He reiterated charge that Bonn Convention⁴ gives three Western Powers right to interfere in German internal affairs at any time for indefinite future period, saying that no answer had been made to his comments on this point. He said that Eden statement Germany would not be bound by Bonn and Paris agreements and Bidault statement that France does not make entrance of unified Germany into EDC a condition to unification were contradicted by terms of agreements themselves. He cited paragraph 2 of Article 7 of General Convention and last sentence of paragraph 3 as evidence that FedRep would be obligated not to agree to any unification of Germany which would not provide inclusion of unified Germany in EDC. These obligations were inconsistent with the holding of free all-German elections and with freedom for united Germany.

Molotov further cited fifth paragraph of tripartite declaration of May 27, 1952⁵ as evidence that, once West Germany had entered into EDC, there would be “no road back,” since any attempt by Germany to leave EDC would be regarded by US and UK as threat to their security. This means that if West Germany should try to leave EDC, Three Powers would prevent such action by any means at their disposal including use of force. This demonstrated Eden and Bidault statements regarding Germany’s freedom of choice to decide whether it wished to be member of EDC had no foundation.

Referring to Secretary’s quotation of his speech in fall of 1939, Molotov said that Secretary did not indicate circumstances in which it was made. USSR had sought throughout summer of 1939 to negotiate with UK and France to insure maintenance of peace. Chamberlain and French did not wish agreement with USSR. Chamberlain, who was supported by US, had encouraged Germany to attack USSR. Chamberlain and his French colleagues helped expedite German attack on Poland and bore responsibility for unleashing war in 1939. He recommended publication issued in Moscow, 1949, entitled “Falsifiers of History” for statement of true facts.

In regard to Secretary’s statement that authorities in East Germany do not represent people, Molotov suggested that referendum be held in Germany to ascertain whether German people favor Bonn and Paris agreements or whether they favor conclusion of peace treaty. Results of such a referendum would indicate that GDR, which favors peace treaty, represents wishes of German people.

Secretary commented one could take satisfaction from fact that Molotov’s remarks had been addressed to heart of problem although he would have preferred to hear also clear statement of Soviet proposals which Molotov had promised. Text Secretary’s remarks cabled Secto 77.⁶

Replying to Molotov, Bidault said Bonn Convention does not run for 50 years but only until there is peace treaty. Once peace treaty enters into force, Bonn Convention will cease to have force. He reiterated with reference to Paris EDC treaty,⁷ there is no question of automatically extending treaty to all of Germany and that unified Germany would have freedom of choice to determine whether it would accept obligation. Article 7 paragraph 2 of Bonn General Convention contains statement of purpose which is shared by Three Powers and FedRep. FedRep has no veto over unification and text of General Convention does not constitute obstacle to unification nor does it have binding force on united Germany. It does bind Federal Republic. Under Western proposals, German people would decide through free elections what course of action united Germany would take. West hopes results of election will be that Germans will choose course of action desired by the West, but there is no certainty of this and all-German Government will be completely free to make decision. He said this involved risks which were felt by some to be drawback but this of course was inevitable.

Bidault said tripartite declaration involves no threat to freedom of choice of all-German government. The language cited by Molotov applies to community in existence. It will exist for all-German government only if all-German government chooses to enter community, in which case it will have to accept rules of community. Molotov suggestion of referendum involved two problems. First, whether one voted for men or ideas it was necessary to guarantee freedom of vote. Second, suggestion of referendum involved problem of presenting proposal in such clear terms as to permit people to choose. He could not accept Molotov formulation since in his view there was no contradiction between Bonn and EDC treaties and the conclusion of a peace treaty. If Ministers could reach agreement on Eden proposals⁸ or proposals Molotov⁹ might put forward for holding elections it would be possible to make progress without going into substance of Bonn and EDC treaties. In conclusion he urged that Ministers devote themselves to organization of all-German elections and measures to guarantee their freedom.

Eden said that he did not wish to go into history. However, he felt obliged to say that it was fantastic to say that Chamberlain was responsible for German attack on Poland, pointing out that Chamberlain government gave guarantee to Poland openly and honorably and that, in response to this guarantee, had declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939.

He felt that Secretary’s and Bidault’s comments in interpretation of Bonn Convention had made clear that it relates only to period before treaty, and agreed with their statements regarding complete freedom of decision of all-German Government.

He also supported Bidault’s remarks on undesirability of attempting to settle issue by referendum. Eden said that Ministers had had general exchange of views on German problem and suggested that they proceed to details, addressing themselves to main questions of principles raised by his proposal. He asked whether agreement could be reached on following points:

1. Free elections to be held throughout Germany as first step.

2. Safeguards to insure freedom of elections will be established well in advance and guaranteed throughout. Further, in view of present abnormal conditions, there would be adequate supervision.

3. Election law would be prepared by four powers which will provide for principles of free elections, guarantees of freedom, and supervision.

Eden remarked Bidault had expressed preference for inclusion of neutrals in supervisory commission and asked for views of other Ministers on commission and composition. He pointed out that successive steps envisaged would be preparation of election law, holding of elections and convening of national assembly whose first task would be preparation of constitution.

1. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, and Moscow.
2. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the ninth plenary, USDEL PLEN/9, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194. For a record of the second part of the meeting, see Secto 82, infra.
3. For Molotov’s statement, see Berlin Discussions, pp. 142–146, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 73–76; it was circulated as FPM(54)29.
4. For text of the Convention between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.
5. For text of the Tripartite Declaration, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 686.
6. Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210) For Secretary Dulles’ remarks, see Berlin Discussions, pp. 147–148.
7. For the EDC Treaty, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 116–162.
8. For Eden’s proposals, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.
9. For text of Molotov’s proposals, see FPM(54)24, Document 512.