Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–154: Telegram

No. 400
The Secretary of State to the President

secret
niact

Berlin, February 1, 1954—11 a.m.

Dulte 26. Eyes only for President, copy for Acting Secretary, from Dulles. First week’s negotiation gives following impressions:

1. Bidault showing strength and firmness. His two principal statements have been lofty in tone and statesmanlike in substance. So far as we can judge, he has not pursued Molotov’s hints that Indochina peace might be bought for price of concessions on Germany and EDC.

2. Molotov shows obvious desire appear reasonable to extent of making tactical concessions without substantive concessions. Significant moment was Thursday.¹ He suddenly injected new proposal for world disarmament conference—obvious purpose being propaganda and dilatory tactics so he could open on Germany in the East Sector Monday. I called him hard, stating we were making ourselves ridiculous and hinting continuance of old propaganda about insoluble matters would mean no more such conference. Molotov quickly allowed his proposal to be passed over and German discussion to begin. Then Molotov allowed himself to be out-maneuvered in his effort to interpose procedure on meeting East Germans so we got down to substance.

3. Molotov injects China recognition at every possible turn. This not only main theme of his official conference statements, but also theme of his private dinner discussion with me,² and Saturday at bilateral talk on atomic plan,³ he again introduced necessity of China being brought in. Two possible interpretations are: (A) China-Soviet relations such as to obligate him make insistent case on behalf China, or (B) he is deliberately pressing China on theory that this will make us more than ever determined not to recognize China for fear of doing what Soviet wants. Conceivably, two considerations combine.

4. UK, which at beginning seemed wobbly, has strengthened and informal talks with Eden have contributed to joint position to oppose India call for UN assembly, and better understanding and cooperation for northern tier security grouping in Middle East.

5. While Bidault has so far not mentioned EDC specifically, his expressed philosophy about German treatment leads logically to EDC.

6. See no prospect of any substantial agreement on German problem, but slight theoretical possibility agreement on Austria if Molotov concludes this is price worth paying to demonstrate four-power meetings can achieve some successes and are worth continuing, thereby perhaps enabling him to keep his fingers in West Europe pie and still work against EDC, NATO and bases.

Dulles

1. For a record of the fourth plenary session, Jan. 28, see Secto 43, Document 376.
2. For reports on Secretary Dulles’ dinner meeting with Molotov on Jan. 29, see the notes by Jackson and the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Documents 385 and 386.
3. For a report on this conversation, see Dulte 23, Document 393.