Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

No. 357
Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group at British Headquarters, Berlin, January 26, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

secret
BER MIN–3¹

January 26, 1954

• Principals
  • United States
    • Mr. MacArthur
  • United Kingdom
    • Sir Frank Roberts
    • Sir F. Hoyer Millar
  • France
    • M. R. de Margerie
    • M. Seydoux

1. Soviet Proposal for Inclusion of Five-Power Item in Agenda

Mr. MacArthur summarized the Secretary’s preliminary reaction to Molotov’s proposal for putting the Five-Power item first on the agenda.²

De Margerie said that Bidault felt there were some advantages in accepting the Soviet proposal for considering the Five-Power item first. De Margerie made it clear that Bidault stood by his commitment to adhere at least for the present to the agreed “first position”.³ He said that at the same time if there is any chance of a peaceful settlement in Indochina by negotiation, no French Government could flatly refuse an exploration of such an opportunity. It was Bidault’s thought that it might be possible to extend the Korean Political Conference, if held, to include Indochina after Korean questions were disposed of.

Bidault felt that it would be possible to explore the possibility of a Southeast Asian Conference (not a Five-Power conference) to bring about a settlement of Asiatic problems, primarily the hostilities in Indochina. He agreed with Mr. MacArthur’s suggestion that it would be desirable for the three Foreign Ministers to get together at lunch today before the Secretary speaks this afternoon so as to be sure they present a united front.⁴

M. Roux said that there was no basic change in the military or political situation in Indochina which would call for a modification of the French position. The military situation was moderately good. The French had effected a junction of their forces in Central Laos and Northern Laos; Buu Loc⁵ had succeeded in forming a new cabinet; the atmosphere in Cambodia was less tense. The situation was “not bad“.

Roux recalled that in the National Assembly debate last November the Government had been requested to explore every possibility of a settlement in Indochina. If the Soviets were agreeable to a non-Five-Power conference which would include Indochina, it would be very difficult for Bidault to explain a refusal to accept the opportunity. Roux recognized, however, that the French could not negotiate at the present moment even if they wanted to and seemed to have an opportunity: the political and military situations in Indochina were not yet sufficiently favorable to permit it. Roux indicated that the French expected a political conference on Korea to be arranged eventually and that a conference on Indochina might come immediately thereafter.

De Margerie recalled that Bidault was careful to say as little as possible on the Chinese Communist conference issue in his formal speech of yesterday. Some members of the Cabinet would be disappointed that he did not go further. Bidault had taken something of a chance in being as noncommittal as he was. De Margerie said he thought it was sufficient to say that Bidault would not take any initiative on a ministers conference to include Communist China. The question would not arise so far as France was concerned unless Soviet Russia took a new initiative, abandoning the Five-Power theme.

Sir Frank Roberts said that he could not speak authoritatively for Eden although he believed he knew the general tenor of his thinking. Eden felt that we must avoid getting into a wrangle with the Soviets over the Chinese Communist issue. Eden had not gone as far or as fast as the other two Foreign Ministers in his reaction to the Soviet agenda proposal. However, Roberts guessed that Eden would welcome acceptance of the Soviet proposal to put the Chinese item first. However, two pitfalls must be considered: (1) Adverse public relations, especially in Germany, if it seems that the main business of the conference is being subordinated to the alien issue of Communist China; (2) the danger of serious delay in the proper business of the conference.

MacArthur recognized the possibility that the Soviets might try to weave the Five-Power issue into the proceedings throughout the conference but he felt we should not be deterred by this possibility.

Roberts said that the British would not take any initiative in moving away from the agreed “first position”.

Roberts felt there was danger of our being put in an awkward position if Molotov got down to particulars and exposed the slight difference of approach of the three western powers toward the Communist China problem.

MacArthur felt that this danger could be avoided if we agreed not to get involved in a hassle. It should be possible to deal with the item without getting deeply involved in it if we refrained from being drawn into a cat-and-dog fight and forced Molotov to talk himself out. There were only a limited number of variations he could play on his theme. Molotov’s filibuster could hardly last indefinitely if he received no encouragement from the other three Foreign Ministers.

Sir Frank Roberts raised the question as to how the Delegations would treat the press if the Soviet agenda were accepted in light of German expectations that Germany would be the first item on the agenda. Mr. MacArthur said we should state that we were accepting a procedural point in order to get quickly to the business for which the Western Powers came to the Conference. M. de Margerie said that we should avoid giving the impression that we were merely accepting the first item in order to quash it.

2. The Austrian Item

It was agreed that unless the Soviets raised the question of the participation of the GDR the three Ministers would not take the initiative to raise the question of Austrian participation prior to the time the Austrian item was reached on the agenda. If the Soviets raise the question of participation by the GDR prior to discussion of the German item, this would be answered on its own merits and at that time the Western Ministers could state that although we had not planned to discuss the point at this time there was also the procedural point of the participation of representatives of the Austrian Government.

3. Consultations with Other Governments

It was noted that the three delegations should respond to requests from other Governments to participate as an observer or to receive special consultation that machinery had been developed to keep other countries informed such as the NATO and EDC countries. Non-member countries of these organizations will receive information on matters directly affecting them through normal diplomatic procedures.

4. Germany

The Working Group had completed a revision of the Declaration of Intent (BER D–4/4⁶) which will be submitted to the Working Group its next meeting. The “Plan for German Re-unification in Freedom” at (BER D–4/42b⁷) was discussed and the last paragraph of Section IV concerning rights of occupying powers was submitted to the HICOM legal advisers for further work.

1. Records of the two previous meetings of the Tripartite Working Group (BER MIN–1 and 2 for Jan. 24 and 25), during which various procedural matters, Austria, German unification, and an electoral law were discussed, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192.
2. Regarding Molotov’s proposal and the Soviet agenda, see Secto 17, Document 355. For Secretary Dulles’ response to this proposal, see Secto 24, Document 360.
3. Regarding the “first position” on a five-power conference, see paragraph 3 to Secto 12, Document 347.
4. Regarding the Foreign Ministers luncheon meeting, see the memorandum by MacArthur, infra.
5. Prince Buu Loc, Prime Minister of Vietnam.
6. Not found in Department of State files. A copy of BER D–4/4c, dated Feb. 1, 1954 is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 200.
7. Not printed. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 168, “Four-Power Meeting in Berlin”)