Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/1–1054: Telegram

No. 331
The Assistant United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn ¹

secret
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Berlin , January 10, 1954—3 p.m.

831. In course of January 7 and 9 meetings with Dengin re building site for meetings of Foreign Ministers,² US representatives have been ever mindful of and have striven to attain objectives set forth in Paris tactics paper³ (and most recently reaffirmed in Deptel 430 to Berlin January 8 repeated Bonn 2002, London 3528, Paris 243, Moscow 446⁴) that agreement should be reached with Soviets on basis that (a) not more than one out of every four meetings be held in Soviet sector and (b) that in any case first meeting be held in ACA building in order that US might chairman meeting and make opening statement. After making realistic appraisal of situation existing after two hard-bargaining sessions with Dengin, however, we believe we are now confronted with either of two undesirable alternatives: (1) Making some concession to Soviets on either point (a) or (b) set forth above; or (2) holding out further for both objectives at very real risk of forcing postponement January 25 opening date (in view time required for other technical arrangements, including installation simultaneous interpretation equipment) without being in very advantageous position publicity-wise as to who is to blame for delay.

From tactical standpoint US representatives have found themselves handicapped in two Dengin’s meetings thus far by (a) premature withdrawal of French Cdt from tripartitely agreed position to hold out as long as possible for all meetings ACA building, which action considerably strengthened Dengin’s bargaining hand, and (b) rigidity of British instructions from London (and to lesser extent those of French from Quai d’Orsay) that Soviet Embassy was objectionable per se as site for any meeting of Foreign Ministers; as result latter development basis for possible proposal, as set forth Paris tactics paper, that chairman of each meeting be allowed choose building site for that meeting has now been completely destroyed. In face this situation, coupled with extreme character Dengin’s original proposal, US representatives have been left with very little room to maneuver and we have not thus far felt we were in position ourselves to budge from our original proposal all meetings be held ACA building. Dengin on other hand has to date been able make two substantial concessions: (1) By withdrawing from original (though not very strongly held) position that all meetings be held in Soviet Embassy building, and (2) by suddenly withdrawing completely from concept any meeting at all should be held in Soviet Embassy. While we gather from referenced Deptel that latter concession was not very material to us, it was of major importance to British and French and had loomed large as issue in January 9 meeting.

Having come this far, i.e., to point of now proposing that meetings be held alternately in Karlshorst and ACA buildings (with clear implication first meeting should be held in Karlshorst), Dengin, who was pushed quite hard at January 9 meeting, will be most grudging in making any further concessions. While we feel that at tomorrow’s meeting he may be prepared to concede further by either (a) agreeing three meetings ACA building to one in Karlshorst provided first meeting in Karlshorst, (b) agreeing first meeting in ACA building but only if alternating meetings West and East sectors, we seriously doubt he will go any further tomorrow. Thus basic question on which we require guidance is whether it is considered more important (a) to achieve all tactical objectives re meeting site and chairmanship out-lined Paris paper even if this should possibly involve postponement scheduled January 25 opening date, or (b) to reach final agreement with Dengin tomorrow on either of two bases indicated above in interests permitting other necessary technical arrangements go forward without further delay. Since we feel that in any event US Cdt must be prepared at some fairly early stage in tomorrow’s meeting to move forward at least to position of French Cdt (three meetings in ACA to one in Soviet sector), we should appreciate instructions urgently.

Re issue of location first meeting, chairmanship, first speech, etc. (on basis three to one meetings in ACA), we have tentatively considered with British and French here such devices as (a) determining site of first meeting by lot, (b) agreeing to first meeting in Karlshorst provided US be permitted make opening speech, and (c) insist first meeting in ACA building but permit Soviets have chair and make opening speech. Do HICOG Bonn and Department have any views these points?⁵

Parkman

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. For records of these meetings, see telegrams 720, Document 327 and telegram 733, supra.
3. See item 1 of Fuller’s memorandum, Jan. 5, Document 320.
4. See footnote 3, Document 327.

5. On Jan. 10 Conant replied that he appreciated the difficulties reported in this cable, but wondered if it would not be better to restore Western solidarity before making any concessions to Dengin. (Telegram 2190 from Bonn; 396.1 BE/1–1054) On the same day Berlin was informed, apparently before the receipt of this cable, that the Western Commandants should:

   • “(a) remain adamant on ratio three to one for meetings on basic right of each chairman to choose place;
   • “(b) raise no special objections to Karlshorst;
   • “(c) if agreement on three to one ratio reached, as last resort agree to draw lots re first meeting.” (Telegram 439 to Berlin, 396.1 BE/1–1054)