762A.5/6–2454
No. 244
Memorandum of Conversation, by
Coburn Kidd of the
Office of German Affairs1
Subject: Consultation with European Sub-committee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Regard to Plans for Germany.
Mr. Merchant, accompanied by Mr. Brown of the Office of Congressional Relations and Mr. Lyon and Mr. Kidd of the Office of [Page 578] German Affairs, conferred with the members of the European Subcommittee today with regard to action which it might be necessary to take in Germany to prevent deterioration in Adenauer’s position if the French do not ratify the EDC in the near future. Senators Wiley, Fulbright, and Humphrey, Dr. Francis Wilcox and Mr. Carl Marcy participated in the conversation, which was on an informal and confidential basis.
Mr. Merchant outlined the Department’s thinking on the subject, the elements of which were as follows: Adenauer had gone all out in support of western policies, including EDC and European integration; his critics were now charging him with misjudgment and lack of success for Germany in these policies; if the French Parliament should adjourn without having taken action on EDC, a very serious situation would develop in Germany, with the consequences that Adenauer would be discredited and the Germans might adopt a more “Germanic” attitude favoring independent action and playing off East against West; these consequences appear to the Department so grave that the conclusion has been reached that it may be necessary to take certain action on the political side in Germany to save the support for Adenauer while gaining a little more time to work on the German defense contribution. Mr. Merchant explained that what the Department had in mind was separation of the Contractual Conventions from the EDC Treaty, with a view toward implementing as much of the Contractual relationships as possible. What stood in the way of this was Article 11 of the Convention on Relations,2 which had been ratified by the Senate. This article provided that the Contractual Conventions could not come into effect until ratification of the EDC. We proposed, by a short treaty or protocol which would have the effect of amending this section of Article 11, to free our hands in order to put the Contractual agreements into effect in Germany. This would be received with great satisfaction in Germany and would hold the situation for Adenauer for the time being.
Mr. Merchant explained that we had given thought to various possibilities of obtaining the necessary Senate approval. The normal thing, of course, would be for the four governments (US, UK, France and the Federal Republic) to negotiate a short treaty, which would then be laid before the Senate for approval. The difficulty in the present case was that the situation might become critical in August and September, when we should need to take prompt action, while the Congress was adjourned until next January. We had therefore thought of the possibility of asking for Senate approval [Page 579] in advance, in the form of a resolution authorizing the President to negotiate the amendment of Article 11. Although unusual, there was a precedent for this, and since it involved no substantive change to speak of, but merely an unfettering of the Bonn Agreements from the Paris treaty, we thought the Senate might be willing to take this unusual step. At any rate, we wished their advice on the point. Our general idea was to make the proposal to the French Government in an open and above-board fashion, after agreement was reached with the British and with Adenauer. If the French agreed, for which there was a modest chance, there would be no difficulty from a foreign affairs viewpoint. If the French did not agree, we had in mind that it might be necessary for the U.S. and U.K. to proceed on their own toward abolition of the occupation status and putting into effect the Contractual relationship to the extent this would be possible. Mr. Merchant said that we had tried our hand at a draft of the resolution, which we would be glad to leave with Dr. Wilcox, although we wished to give further consideration to the matter and might later present an alternatively phrased draft. We wished no specific action at the present time, and indeed felt that the whole subject should be treated in strictest confidence. Mr. Merchant would get in touch with the Sub-committee again after the Churchill discussions.
Senator Humphrey said that he gave his wholehearted endorsement to the course proposed. No one could deny that he had been an ardent supporter of EDC, but he had reached the end of his patience. There was a feeling among the people in his State that American foreign policy was bogged down; troubles in southeast Asia, troubles in Guatemala, and now the European alliance was sagging. People were worried; they badly needed some reassurance that the United States was making progress somewhere. Steps to restore German sovereignty and obtain a German defense contribution would provide a badly needed shot in the arm. The people in his part of the country did not put much store on the Italians and French; they felt that we should have allies in spirit as well as legally, and the people they regarded as capable of supporting such an alliance were the British, the Germans, and the Scandinavians. Senator Humphrey said that the reports he had received from Germany filled him with deep concern about the weakening of Adenauer’s position. There was nothing but obscurity in the position of the Socialist opposition, in the FDP, and in such meetings as those recently sponsored by the Ruhr magnates.
Senator Fulbright said that although he too had been a strong proponent of EDC, he agreed entirely with the Department’s analysis and proposals to do something to strengthen Adenauer’s position. [Page 580] He thought that the Senate would be disposed to take favorable action.
Senator Wiley asked a number of questions regarding the legal aspects of the step proposed. On the political side he said that he felt satisfied that the step would be welcomed in this country; that it might conceivably influence the French to speed up action with regard to the EDC; and he would recommend that the sooner we took the step, the better. Senator Wiley agreed that the proposal to seek authorization in advance was unusual, but he thought it might be accomplished in this case. He for one did not see who could object—surely not the Courts and both the Administration and the Senate wanted it—for he felt the majority of the Senate would be in favor of the proposal. He thought that with the number of German voters in Ohio, Senator Bricker would not be so apprehensive about any possible derogation from the legislature’s prerogatives. In fact, if the resolution were framed as a request from the Congress to the Executive, authorizing and requesting that steps be taken to renegotiate for the purpose of restoring German sovereignty and obtaining a German defense contribution, Senator Wiley thought that Senator Bricker would have little objection. Senator Wiley told Mr. Merchant that the conversation would be kept on a confidential basis and the Senators would expect to hear from him again after the Churchill–Eisenhower discussions.
- The source text was attached to a memorandum of transmittal from Merchant to Dulles, dated June 24. This conversation took place on June 22.↩
- For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed May 26, 1952, at Bonn, see Document 51.↩