Office of the Historian

662A.00/6–453

No. 189
Chancellor Adenauer to President Eisenhower1

top secret
Bonn, May 29, 1953.

Informal Translation

My Dear Mr. President: In the present phase of the development of relations between the Allies and Soviet Russia—a phase of such vital importance for the fate of Germany—I am anxious once more to emphasize most strongly that as the responsible head of the Federal Government I endorse the policy which the American Government has pursued since your assumption of office with regard to the settlement of the East-West conflict. I fully agreed at the time with your address of 16 April.2 My attitude today is unchanged.

We shall achieve positive results in the controversy with Soviet Russia only if we ourselves know clearly and unambiguously what we want and say so unequivocally before the opening of any negotiations with Soviet Russia.

When I read Premier Churchill’s speech of 11 May,3 I felt concern. When I was in London on 14 and 15 May4 on a visit which had been planned for some time I stressed the view, both in my [Page 461] public statements and in conversations with the leading British personalities, that unity among the Western Allies and concerted action on their part was an essential prerequisite for a successful solution of the tension between East and West.

In my discussions with Premier Churchill we agreed—as we did during our talks in Washington—that the Treaties and the mutual obligations contained therein must be observed and respected. I further expressed the view that the Allies should not come to any settlement of the German problem with the Soviets without the Federal Government having been consulted and having approved of any such settlement.

In view of the fateful significance of a settlement of the German question for the German people and for Europe, I venture the suggestion that a meeting of the Allies with the representatives of Soviet Russia should be preceded by a conference of the Western Allied and German Foreign Ministers’ Deputies at which agreement should be reached on the course to be taken at a Four-Power Conference to solve the German question. I believe that such a request cannot be denied its justification if one bears in mind the tasks which devolve on Germany within the Western community.

I should also like to express one more request. It would be desirable, both in the Allied and in the German interest, if the Federal Republic were represented at the place where a Four-Power Conference might take place by a prominent personality who will be kept currently and fully informed by the delegations of the Western Powers on the progress of the negotiations. This would ensure a rapid co-ordination of views.

I also attached to this letter a memorandum on views and objectives the due consideration of which appears to me essential from the German point of view to the settlement of the German problem. In respect of points 1 to 5 of the memorandum, agreement existed between the Federal Government and the three Western Allied Governments on the occasion of the exchange of notes with the Soviet Government last year (cf. notes by the Western Allied Governments of 25 March, 13 May, 10 July and 23 September 19525).

Accept [etc.]

[Page 462]

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany6

[Translation]

[Bonn, May 29, 1953?]
1)
The reunification of the Federal Republic with the Soviet-occupied Zone and Berlin can be effected only by free, equal, secret and direct elections on the basis of a uniform electoral law for the whole area. The freedom of the elections must be guaranteed by international control. The requisite conditions for the holding of free elections must obtain not only on polling day but also before and afterwards.
2)
On the basis of these elections an All-German Government is to be freely and democratically formed.
3)
The All-German Government must be free from foreign control; this freedom is essential both before and after the negotiation of a peace treaty.
4)
The All-German Government must not be denied the right of a free and equal nation to combine for peaceful purposes with other nations.
5)
The All-German Government is to participate from the outset as a free and equal partner in the negotiations concerning a peace treaty.
6)
In that peace treaty full account should be taken of the right of all people to their homeland, as derived from principles of Christianity and natural law.
7)
No German Government will ever be in a position to recognize the Oder-Neisse line; Germany will, however, endeavour to settle the relevant territorial problems in a new spirit of international peaceful co-operation.
8)
The Treaty establishing a European Defence Community limits the future armed forces of the Federal Republic and thus safeguards the security of her neighbours. Germany for her part counts on her own security also being safeguarded.
  1. Attached to a memorandum, dated June 11, from Dulles to Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams, which states that in view of President Eisenhower’s conversation with Blankenhorn on June 4 (Document 194), the message to Adenauer on the same day (telegram 5415, Document 195), and Adenauer’s reply thereto (footnote 2 to telegram 5415), there was no need for a written reply.↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 182.↩
  3. See footnote 3, Document 186.↩
  4. For Chancellor Adenauer’s account of his visit to London, May 14–15, see Adenauer, Erinnerungen, pp. 205–208.↩
  5. For text of these notes, see Documents 78, 101, 124, and 138.↩
  6. For the German text of this memorandum, see Adenauer, Erinnerungen, pp. 217–218.↩