Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 142A

No. 180
United States Delegation Minutes of the Second General Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Dulles, Conference Suite, 1778 Pennsylvania Avenue, April 8, 1953, 3 p.m.¹

secret
GPT MIN–3

Washington, April 17, 1953.

• Participants
  • United States
    • Secretary Dulles
    • Dr. Conant
    • Mr. Matthews
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Riddleberger
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. Linder
    • Mr. McCardle
    • Mr. Reinstein
    • Mr. Margolies
    • Mr. Kellermann
    • Mr. Morris
    • Mr. Martin
    • Mrs. Eleanor Dulles
    • Mr. Kitchen
    • Miss Wilson
    • Secretary Humphrey
    • Mr. Willis
    • Mr. Nash
    • Mr. Baringer
    • Colonel Gerhardt
    • Mr. Stassen
    • Mr. FitzGerald
    • Mr. Schelling
    • Mr. Harris
    • Mrs. Houghten
    • Ambassador Draper
  • Germany
    • Chancellor Adenauer
    • Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein
    • Dr. Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan
    • Mr. Hans von Herwarth
    • Mr. Felix von Eckhardt
    • Dr. Alexander Boeker
    • Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler
    • Mr. Friedrich-Karl Vialon
    • Mr. Von Haeften
    • Dr. Gunther Harkort
    • Dr. Georg Federer
    • Dr. Albert F. Ernecke
    • Mr. Jaenicke
    • Mr. Sigrist
    • Mr. Schulze-Boysen
    • Professor Grewer
    • Dr. Pelckman
    • Dr. Werner
    • Mr. Heins Weber
    • Mr. Hans Podeyn

The second plenary session opened with Secretary Dulles inviting Chancellor Adenauer to speak with regard to financial aid with particular reference to refugees and Berlin.

Refugees and Berlin

Chancellor Adenauer commented that the problem involved not only the refugees in their present existence in Berlin but also those which must be accommodated in Western Germany. He remarked that the question has its human side to the extent that these people must have some form of security, but emphasized that the problem also had its political ramifications since those refugees who have not yet been worked into West German economic life must be protected from exploitation by both the extreme right and left political wings. He commented that many refugees would be able to work if adequate housing could be provided near their jobs, and noted that the Federal Republic is now building 400,000 dwellings. In view of the destruction in Germany, however, he said that the Federal Republic cannot do enough in this line by itself. He noted that the Federal Republic has allocated 25 billion DM for these refugees and referred to the law passed some months ago for the equalization of burdens which imposed a 50% tax on savings for support of the refugees. He asked for MSA assistance and noted that several European countries had provided money for houses which must be built in the industrial regions. He referred to the plan envisaged in the 1951 report of a group of experts headed by Christian Sonne,² and asked for US aid through an international refugee loan, commenting that the Federal Republic can not solve this problem by itself.

Mr. Stassen expressed US appreciation of this problem and said that a thorough study of the question of aid for Berlin and the refugees was now underway as part of a global review of MSA assistance. He noted, however, that the amount of aid which had been spoken of appeared to be large in view of the world-wide commitments of the US. He said the US was not prepared to make such a commitment at this time because the problem was being included as a part of the general MSA study and because new appropriations must be obtained from Congress in May. He told the Chancellor that approximately the first week in May the US will be in a position to tell Germany what we are recommending to Congress in this connection. He said the US is pleased to note the progress the Federal Republic had made in assimilating these refugees into Western Germany and in making them productive working members of the German economy and assured the Chancellor that the problem will have sympathetic and friendly consideration in the US.

Chancellor Adenauer said he understood completely the role of Congress in this matter and the reasons why no US commitment could be made now. He said, however, that he had felt he should take advantage of the opportunity to speak of this matter while in the US. He referred again to the equalization of burdens law pointing out that such a measure, which had never been taken before, provided clear evidence that Germany was making the greatest possible effort to solve the refugee problem. He noted that the German people are determined to help themselves as far as possible and expressed the hope that the measures which had been taken in this regard could be pointed out to the US Congress.

Mr. Stassen noted that, although the refugee situation was the principal point in the MSA consideration of this matter, the study goes beyond to consider the general Berlin situation, including the strengthening of consumer and lighter industries in Berlin for the purpose of creating employment and the question of the stockpiling of food and other essentials. He commented that both he and Secretary Dulles believed Chancellor Adenauer should take this opportunity to tell the American people about the German efforts in this regard, particularly about the burden-sharing law.

Chancellor Adenauer commented that he had mentioned the problem in his luncheon speech at the National Press Club³ and believed the 500 representatives of the US press in attendance represented an effective channel for reaching the American people. He repeated that he understood Mr. Stassen’s points and commented that the refugees now reaching Berlin will be taken care of and will remain in Germany. He mentioned the problem of unemployment in Berlin and the necessity for enlarging employment opportunities and commented that neither the new refugees or those which had been in Berlin for several years should be forgotten.

Secretary Dulles then asked Assistant Secretary Linder to report on the meetings of the economic working group.

Report on Economic Working Group

Mr. Linder said that the economic working group has discussed and were in general agreement on the question of trade expansion and the desirability of currency convertibility.⁴ He said the US representatives had expressed pleasure at the recent German trade liberalization measures and at the decisions taken at the recent OEEC meeting. The US representatives also outlined the Administration’s plans for a general study of foreign economic policy including its efforts with regard to reciprocal trade legislation, and reported on the progress made on the question of customs simplification. Mr. Linder referred to the President’s statement to Congress with regard to reciprocal trade legislation which had been announced during the working group meeting and said that the German representatives had understood and appreciated this move.⁵

He said that the group had discussed and had undertaken to consider further the problem of an increase of US off-shore procurement in Germany and had agreed to find out more about the problems involved in the production of certain types of synthetic rubber in Germany and to aid the Germans in this regard if possible. He said that discussions were continuing with regard to a treaty of friendship and commerce and that the US had undertaken to explore further with other agencies the question of the treatment of German trade marks and copyrights in the US. He expressed the hope that some reference could be made to these last two questions in the communiqué.⁶

With regard to East-West trade, Mr. Linder said the US and German representatives had reached complete agreement with the exception of two problems and he hoped the German representatives could agree on language to be included in the communiqué. He said the US was happy to hear that the balance of the Schlosmann[?] Mill would not be shipped to Hungary but regretted that the Germans could not give the same assurances with regard to the shipment of steel scrap to Hungary. He emphasized the nature of US legislation in this regard and expressed the hope that the Germans would reconsider and cancel these scrap shipments. Otherwise, he said, the President must consider whether or not to grant an exception under US legislation which would involve consultation and clearance through several Congressional committees with the probability of much unfavorable publicity. He noted that if the President were not able to grant such an exception, he would be required by US law to cancel all aid to Germany.

Mr. Stassen emphasized the importance of the East-West trade issue and gave his full support to Mr. Linder’s statement.

Chancellor Adenauer said he recognized the importance of this question and suggested that individual cases be discussed further by US and German experts.^*

War Criminals

Ambassador Conant explained the US position with regard to war criminals, suggesting that the US approach France and the UK with regard to the activation of the Mixed Board as soon as German EDC ratification was completed. If the UK and France would not agree to such a step he said the US would then consider urgently the possibility of a new review procedure for war criminals under US jurisdiction. He said that the State and Defense Departments were considering the possibility of the establishment of a US–German parole board (not a clemency board) similar to that established in Japan, and asked if Chancellor Adenauer could comment on his reaction to the establishment of such a board.

Chancellor Adenauer said he would welcome a mixed parole board which he felt would be a great step forward and would help the public opinion situation particularly among the German people.

Ambassador Conant said that the US would hope to have either a Mixed Board or some new procedure for war criminals under US jurisdiction in the near future, and certainly before the September elections in Germany. He suggested that little publicity be given to these plans and that any public reference be made only in general terms.

With regard to conditions at Spandau prison, he said that the US would continue to seek amelioration of the treatment of prisoners in Spandau and agreed with the Chancellor that this might afford a good opportunity to test the sincerity of recent Soviet friendliness.

Chancellor Adenauer remarked that if a parole board could be established, no publicity on its activities would be necessary. The press and public would merely need to know that those prisoners who deserve release would be released as soon as possible, and the manner in which it was done would make no difference. He commented that this parole board should not be connected with EDC but should go into effect before EDC.

Ambassador Conant reiterated, in clarification, that the US planned first to approach France and the UK with regard to the activation of the Mixed Board as soon as German ratification of EDC was complete. Failing that, activation of the US–German parole board would be considered also when German ratification had been completed.

Chancellor Adenauer pointed out that releases of individuals held in US captivity were less than those released by the UK and France. He said he realized that the fact that the US was less generous in this regard was due to the attitude, not of the High Commissioner, but of the US Army and expressed the hope that the Army could be brought to be as generous as the UK. He pointed out that the UK had gone far in the release of war criminals in the past few months and remarked that the UK High Commissioner had assured him that those prisoners who had been released on the grounds of ill health would not be returned to captivity once they had recovered their health. He expressed his belief that the US should be able to take steps similar to those of the UK. He pointed out also that the US Army has ceased its normal parole proceedings in anticipation of EDC ratification which would involve the activation of the Mixed Board. Now that EDC ratification appeared to be delayed, he felt the US Army should go back to its normal parole procedure.

Mr. Nash said that this was the first information that he had received that the Army was delaying parole matters or was more strict in this regard than the UK or France. Speaking for the Secretary of Defense, he said he would look into the matter personally and that everything that can be done will be done.

Chancellor Adenauer noted that since April 1950 the US Army had granted no worthwhile paroles. He cited figures on paroles of war criminals under various jurisdictions which indicated that of the total number of prisoners held in captivity by the various nations the UK had released ¾, France ¾ and the French Occupied Zone ⅔, while the US had released only ½.

Secretary Dulles reiterated to the Chancellor that the US would review the policies of its military authorities with a view to more liberal treatment of war criminals. Returning to the parole board question, he reassured the Chancellor that we anticipated the establishment of the joint parole board or commission prior to general EDC ratification, and that we will first discuss the activation of the Mixed Board with the UK and France. Then, if unsuccessful we will take up with the Germans the possibility of a joint parole board. He expressed the hope that the Chancellor believed that the US will do all it can in this regard and approved of the action which had been promised by Mr. Nash.

Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack

Chancellor Adenauer commented that the Federal Republic was entirely inexperienced in the field of civil defense against an atomic attack, noting that Germany can be reached in 20 minutes by Soviet bombers. He said that they would be glad for a meeting of US–German experts to see what could be done to defend the German people against atomic attack.

Secretary Dulles said that the US was prepared in principle to discuss this matter with the Germans. He remarked, however, that the problem was a delicate one since the US was closely bound by legislation which restricted the information on atomic matters that can be communicated to a foreign Government, and that we had already experienced difficulty in this regard in operations with other countries. He suggested that the question be explored with Ambassador Conant at Bonn who was an authority on the subject and was familiar with US legislative restrictions before such a group came to the US. In this manner he believed an area could be found for useful joint exploration of the question.

Chancellor Adenauer said he would be glad if Ambassador Conant would help them, and that he felt nothing should be said in the communiqué on this issue.

Secretary Dulles agreed that it would be best to omit any reference to this matter in the communiqué.

Vesting of German Property

Chancellor Adenauer remarked that the question of the vesting of German property in the US had not been satisfactorily concluded by the experts, and that Germany hopes that property and other interests in the US belonging to Germany would not be confiscated further. He also expressed the hope that, as the situation develops, such property might be returned to Germany.

Mr. Riddleberger said that the US had the question of vesting under consideration and thought it would be settled to the Chancellor’s satisfaction about the time of his departure from the US.⁷ He said there was a technical question of the date of the announcement but that we hoped to give the Chancellor a going away present. He recommended that nothing be said publicly prior to the anticipated announcement.

Chancellor Adenauer expressed his appreciation for this move.

Return of former German Vessels

Mr. Riddleberger referred to the 350 naval vessels, mostly small craft, which had been allocated to the US by the Tripartite Naval Committee and said that the US now plans to return these ships to West Germany. He asked if a reference could be made to this return in the communiqué.

Chancellor Adenauer said he was very grateful for this action and would be very glad to have it referred to in the communiqué.

Communiqué

Secretary Dulles suggested that the draft communiqué⁸ be submitted to the working group for further study and that it might be discussed at the meeting at the White House on Thursday.⁹ He asked if Chancellor Adenauer wished to comment on the communiqué at this time.

Chancellor Adenauer said he would be greatful if nothing were said in the communiqué about the Saar question, since every mention of that issue appears to make it more difficult of solution. He also expressed the hope that Mr. Stassen could give some hope in the communiqué that refugees and expellees would be given some help.

Secretary Dulles said it would be necessary to give more thought to the omission of any reference to the Saar in the communiqué. He noted that the Saar issue had been prominently mentioned in the press after the recent meeting with the French and said he feared that the absence of any reference at this time might be misunderstood to mean that the US was not interested, whereas in reality the US believed an early settlement of this question was extremely important. He said that if the Chancellor felt that the particular expression of the Saar issue in the draft communiqué would be hurtful with regard to German public opinion, we would be glad to consider changes of language. However, in view of the importance of this issue in the eyes of both the US and European public he felt that a three-day discussion followed by a communiqué which did not mention the Saar would give rise to much undesirable speculation. He commented that this would be contrary to public expectation and indeed to reality and that such an omission might do more harm than good.

Chancellor Adenauer said he recognized the true kernel in what the Secretary had said and that it might be enough if the Saar question were not tied to the EDC and the Schuman Plan. He said that the Saar had not been brought into question with regard to EDC and the Schuman Plan and that the German public would object if the Saar issue were raised in discussions of these arrangements after they had been agreed.

Secretary Dulles suggested that the experts be asked to study the text of the communiqué, having in mind the US and German point of view. He said that we would try to find language to meet the Chancellor’s suggestion but would like to consider the question more carefully.

Chancellor Adenauer agreed but pointed out that experts are not always politicians.

Cultural Convention

Secretary Dulles noted that certain technical drafting difficulties might make it necessary to change the form of the cultural convention to an exchange of notes, and suggested that conclusion of the agreement be postponed to Thursday.¹⁰

Chancellor Adenauer agreed.

1. A summary of this meeting was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 4867, Apr. 9. (611.62A/4–953) For Chancellor Adenauer’s account of this meeting and GPT MIN–2, (supra), see Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 443–447.
2. Under reference here is The Integration of Refugees Into German Life, a 109-page report with appendices, presented to Chancellor Adenauer on Mar. 21, 1951, by H. Christian Sonne, the Chairman of the ECA Technical Assistance Commission on the Integration of Refugees in the German Republic. A copy of the report is in file 862A.411/6–651; it was released to the press shortly after its presentation to the Chancellor.
3. Adenauer had addressed the National Press Club at a luncheon on Apr. 8; extracts from his address are printed in Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 451–453.
4. Regarding the work of this group, see telegram 4927, Document 184.
5. For President Eisenhower’s message to Congress, Apr. 7, concerning the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 163–165, or Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 634–635.
6. For text of the final communiqué, see Document 185.
7. On April 13, 1951, Dr. Von Maltzan advised Mr. Riddleberger that the files and experts of the Federal Government were in Bonn, and requested that further discussion by experts be pursued there. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. On Apr. 17 the White House announced the termination of the program for vesting German-owned properties in the United States. The same day Adenauer made a statement welcoming the termination of the vesting program. For the texts of the White House announcement and Adenauer’s statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 18, 1953, pp. 720–721.
8. The draft under reference has not been further identified; for text of the final communiqué, see Document 185.
9. For an account of the meeting at the White House on Thursday, Apr. 9, see Riddleberger’s memorandum, Document 182.
10. For text of the notes exchanged by Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer on Apr. 9 concerning cultural relations between the Federal Republic and the United States, and their remarks at the time of the exchange, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 567–568.