Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

740.5/4–1753

No. 178
United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower, The White House, April 7, 1953, Noon ¹

secret
GPT MIN–1

Washington , April 17, 1953.

• Participants
  • US
    • President Eisenhower
    • Secretary of State
    • Secretary of Defense
    • Mr. Nash
    • Secretary of the Treasury
    • Mr. Burgess
    • Dr. Conant
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Riddleberger
    • Mr. McCardle
    • Mr. Morris
    • Mrs. Logins (Interpreter)
  • German
    • Chancellor Adenauer
    • Professor Dr. Hallstein
    • Dr. Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan
    • Mr. Hans von Herwarth
    • Mr. Felix von Eckhardt
    • Dr. Alexander Boeker
    • Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler
    • Mr. Heins Weber (Interpreter)

The President opened the meeting by welcoming the Chancellor to the United States. He thanked him for the offer of a complete medical unit for Korea which, he said, was greatly appreciated. He expressed the hope for complete frankness in the talks, and stated that, as Adenauer knows, we felt deeply the need for closer union in the western world. We realize there are many difficulties connected with European unity, such as the Saar, which the Secretary of State is prepared to discuss.

In reply Adenauer thanked the President for his attitude, both in his present office and before as Commander-in-Chief of SHAPE. Germany stands today on the side of the West and is determined to press ahead with the EDC and political union of Europe. Adenauer expressed certainty that the Bundesrat will during April approve the treaties, as the Bundestag has already done. He assured the President that Germany will be a reliable partner for the United States, and fully supports United States policies. At the airport this morning the Vice-President had referred to the “old relations” between the United States and Germany—our aim, said Adenauer, will be to re-establish and strengthen these. The agenda for these talks had been submitted, and he suggested that we do not go into details here at the White House. If there were any matters left after the talks with Mr. Dulles, they could be discussed at the White House on Thursday morning.

One question, said Adenauer, will be the Saar. On this he said he is at the full disposal of Mr. Dulles and certainly hopes this issue may be settled.

Adenauer also expressed approval of what he gathered, from the press, to be the views of the United States Government with respect to the U.S.S.R. and its new Government.

The President emphasized that the United States is as anxious for peace as any other power, but so long as the Soviets do not seek peace, we must be firm. The United States hopes, however, that as a result of developments now under way that we may succeed in lessening some of the world’s tensions and burdens.

The Secretary of State then referred to the Chancellor’s query on the views of the United States Government regarding the Soviet “peace” moves. In elaboration, he suggested that this is presumably a matter of particular significance in Germany, and may affect the attitudes of Germans towards the EDC. It seems to the United States that these Soviet moves are being made in response to our strong constructive policies in Europe and Asia. The obvious lesson to be drawn, in our opinion, is that we should continue to pursue these policies vigorously. Settlements with the Soviets can best be obtained through western strength, and if we push ahead, we may eventually get some of the things we want, such as a Korean settlement, an Austrian treaty and German unity.

In response, Adenauer assured the Secretary that the United States need not fear that Germany would wish to relax. There are a few Germans with such ideas, but, by and large Germany knows Russia and will not slow up. A similar situation developed after Lenin’s death. In the Soviet zone of occupation, pressure on the churches continues, and the current Soviet “peace melodies” certainly fit in well with the views expressed in Stalin’s “Bolshevik” article.²

At Adenauer’s request, the President, Secretary of State, Dr. Conant, Dr. Adenauer, Dr. Hallstein and Dr. Krekeler then withdrew into the President’s study for the discussion described in Attachment “A”.

Attachment A

United States Delegation Minutes of the Restricted Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower, the President’s Office, April 7, 1953 ³

secret

• Present: The President
• The Secretary of State
• U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
• The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
• Professor D. Walter Hallstein, State Secretary, Federal Republic
• Dr. Heinz Krekeler, Chargé d’Affaires, German Mission

The President spoke briefly about the Saar problem and its relation to EDC ratification. He referred to the recent conversations with Mayer and Bidault and said in effect that the French position was that the EDC treaty could not be ratified until the Saar question was solved, and he hoped the problem could be solved between Germany and France by both sides making as many concessions as they could. The President stated that in his own opinion he could not subscribe to the view that there was a necessary link between the two matters. To this the Chancellor replied that he was very glad that this was the President’s view, as he could not agree to any linking of ratification of the EDC with a solution of the Saar problem.

The Secretary of State and the President both indicated that, although they did not subscribe to the view that these two matters had to be linked, as a matter of practical politics, the United States view was that it was very unlikely that the French Parliament would ratify the EDC treaty until the Saar problem was solved.

The Chancellor ventured to disagree with this view of the French political scene. He said that as he saw it, Mayer had made some promises to the de Gaullists but that these were no longer valid since the de Gaullists would not vote for ratification now in any event. Therefore, the key to the French problem was the position of the Socialists. He had been informed that there were 20 against the treaty, and 20 for it, and 60 undecided. The question was how to win over these 60, for if that could be done, the Gaullists’ position wouldn’t matter. The way to win over the undecided Socialist vote was for the British to show sufficient interest in the EDC and show their readiness to associate themselves with the undertaking.

The President said that if he understood Mayer correctly, Mayer had said that the British had made some concessions along these lines but had not expressed them emphatically enough.

The Chancellor said that he believed that the British had been asked to do more than was reasonable, for they had been asked to make a firm promise to keep a certain number of divisions on the Continent, whereas the French had now asked for permission to withdraw divisions under certain circumstances.

The Chancellor then said that he was hoping to meet with Mayer without Bidault. This would have to be arranged by an “accidental” meeting, which he was hoping would take place May 13 or 14. The President expressed his satisfaction that such a meeting would take place in the near future and hoped a solution of the Saar problem would result.

In connection with the Saar problem, the Chancellor pointed out that the difficulty lay in large measure in the French insistence that the solution be a definite and final one. This the Chancellor could not agree to, because if the settlement of the boundaries of the Saar could be final now, the Russians could claim that the Eastern boundaries could also be settled now. The Chancellor said Schuman had originally agreed that the matter of the final boundaries could be left to the peace treaty, but at the end when he, Schuman, was in political difficulty, he changed this position and said that the matter would have to be “finally” settled. The Chancellor said he would be glad to give the outline of the program that he and Schuman had agreed on, which he felt went a long way toward the settlement of the problem. In the Chancellor’s opinion the people of the Saar did not want to be either French or German but to be primarily Saarland people.

At the end of the conversation, the President raised the question as to whether an important British statesman, for example, Winston Churchill, might not make a strong statement in favor of political, economic and military unity of the six nations and express at the same time a favorable opinion of British association with the EDC.

The Chancellor replied that he would welcome such a statement and as a matter of fact would prefer to have the British associated with this enterprise, as he preferred to deal with the British and the French rather than the French alone.

1. According to another copy of these minutes in Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, “Germany”, these minutes were drafted by Morris on Apr. 10. A summary of this meeting and GPT MIN–2, infra, were transmitted to Bonn in telegram 4845, Apr. 8 (611.62A/4–853). For the Chancellor’s account of the meeting, see Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 441–443.
2. Presumably a reference to the article entitled “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR”, which appeared in Bol’shevik, Sept. 15, 1952. Extracts from the article are printed in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 224–229, and the New York Times, Oct. 4, 1952.
3. The source text bears no indication of the drafter, but Attachment A to the minutes referred to in footnote 1 above, which is the same as the minutes printed here, shows that it was drafted by Conant in Bonn on Apr. 10.