Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762A.5/1–253: Telegram

No. 164
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn ¹

top secret

Washington , January 2, 1953—6:56 p.m.

3246. For Emb and Reinhardt.

1. Brit and Fr Embs have inquired re US position on problem emergency planning discussed by Special Security Comite in HICOM/P(52)32.² Dept has considered this question with Defense in accordance Deptel 1794 to Bonn rptd Paris 2192³ and fol represents combined views.

2. It seems to us that problem involves two separate (though related) matters. One is conduct of emergency planning for FedRep and other is reconciliation of polit and mil questions which will emerge from such planning. We contemplate that guidance in relation to emergency planning for FedRep will be incorporated in overall guidance on emergency planning in Eur furnished to SACEUR by the Standing Group in accordance with polit decision and guidance on this matter from NAC. Moreover, the Standing Group staff has prepared a draft study on “Necessary Modifications in Mil Relationships Upon Ratification of the EDC Treaty” which has been forwarded to SHAPE for informal comment of that hdqtrs and informal views of appropriate sections of EDC Interim Comite and Allied HICOM. Accordingly it is not necessary for HICOM to extend special invitation to SHAPE to engage in emergency planning, and we suggest ltr proposed in HICOM/P(52)32 be withdrawn.

3. Re coordination of polit and mil questions which will arise from emergency planning, we think this will have practical application only after emergency planning is undertaken and questions needing coordination have been presented. We shld prefer to see matter put off until it can be taken up in context of more immed reality, and in any case after SG decision on and subsequent MC and Council approval of, modifications in mil relationship upon ratification of the EDC Treaty. We see fol disadvantages in trying to decide problem now.

4. For one thing, problem wld raise matter of direct SHAPE FedRep contacts, on which Fr position likely to give difficulty. We think there wld be more trouble with Fr in trying to decide this question now, when it is largely academic, than later, when it has become practical issue. To press matter now wld involve risk of consolidating Fr opposition in advance, and this might prejudice chances of reaching satis solution at time when practical consequences wld be more imminently involved.

5. Further disadvantage in attempting now to decide what procedure to use in coordinating polit and mil questions arises from fact that there are too many elements involved which cannot be predicted at present time. Even process of emergency planning for FedRep has not been defined, so it is not yet possible to say just how questions to be coordinated will arise or who will present them for solution. Nature of procedure to be used shld correspond to nature of problems that will arise, and here also essential factors are unknown. For example, will questions to be reconciled be numerous or few? Will they raise predominantly polit or mil difficulties? Will they require high level decision or can they be handled lower down? Will they always involve interests of three powers, FedRep, SHAPE, and EDC, or will they often be of concern only to some of these parties? Answers to these and similar questions can be provided with greater certainty later on. Such answers will be needed to indicate whether some sort of group shld be set up on permanent or ad hoc basis, and which interests shld be represented and in what capacity.

6. In suggesting that consideration of problem of coordinating polit and mil questions be postponed until there is practical need for solution and until elements of situation can be more precisely known, we do not expect that any important time will be lost, for all parties concerned will be readily available in FedRep when need arises, and permanent procedure might be estab more advantageously in light of actual experience. Wld appreciate your comments and info re later developments so that we can answer Brit and Fr Embs.⁴

Acheson

1. Drafted by Auchincloss; cleared with Perkins, Bonbright, Riddleberger, Parsons, and the Department of Defense. Also sent to Paris.
2. Dated June 16, 1952, this paper was prepared by the Special Security Committee of the Allied High Commission for Germany to consider the problems which might arise after the contractual agreements had come into force and which might require coordination between SHAPE and various Allied and German agencies. A copy is in lot 311 D (52) 1454.
3. Telegram 1794 stated that the question of the coordination of political and military problems arising from emergency planning was under consideration with the Department of Defense and that joint views would be forwarded in the near future. (740.5/10–1352)
4. On Jan. 8 Reinhardt replied that the question of emergency planning had been the subject of continuous study at SHAPE, but that the prevalent view was that no urgency existed and that precipitous action might give rise to disadvantages. (Telegram 3834, 762A.5/1–853) On Jan. 23 Reber reported similar views from Bonn, stating that neither the British nor French had pressed HICOG on HICOM/P(52)32 for 2 months. (Telegram 3399, 762A.5/1–2353)