Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662A.00/6–2552: Telegram

No. 116
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

secret priority

Bonn , June 25, 1952—7 p.m.

970. For Secretary and Jessup.² In temporary absence from Bonn of HICOMers, Berard, Ward and Reber called on Chancellor this morning to ascertain views concerning latest Allied draft reply to Sovs (ourtel 966 to London; rptd Dept 3511, Paris 1114, Moscow 152³).

Berard summarized agreed portions of draft Allied reply and outlined two alternative suggestions for mtg as contained in bracketed portions. He further inquired whether new schedule for ratification, i.e., postponement until Sept, had affected Chancellor’s views concerning mtg with Sovs.

Chancellor expressed considerable anxiety over press reports and published views of Brit Labor Party that advantage shld be taken of interval between signature and ratification to hold quadripartite mtg for purpose of sounding out sincerity of Sov offer. He said that such reports were creating considerable uncertainty in Ger and were having serious impact upon public opinion here, giving rise to questions as to Allied intentions of negotiating with Sovs behind Ger’s back.

As to schedule of ratification, he was convinced Bundestag wld approve agrmts with substantial majority and had accepted a postponement of second and third readings until Sept only in order to eliminate any grounds for criticism that treaties were being rushed through without full parliamentary consideration and because he had been assured by parl leaders that first reading with its vote early in July wld give convincing proof of united Ger decision to accept treaties. He spoke of recent public opinion polls in Ger as showing marked increase in support of Govt’s policies.

He did not agree with thesis that another Four Power mtg was necessary to convince public opinion of futility of Sov offer. Whereas he was not opposed to a mtg if it were properly prepared and gave reasonable prospects of success, he felt very strongly that any mtg which wld give Russians possibility of delay wld be a serious mistake and wld play straight into their hands.

In latest reply Sovs had not only ignored essential point raised by Allies in their note of May 13 but had added new demand that future all-Ger govt be subjected to Potsdam decisions which was of course completely unacceptable to Ger. It was essential that Allies shld not give impression that they had receded from position taken in their earlier notes. If it is not clear that Sov demands with respect to neutralization of Ger or reestab of Potsdam controls have been rejected and if any mtg shld take place without prior clarification of Sov position re freedom of action of all-Ger govt to associate itself with Western defense community and to take part in peace negot, any mtg even if limited in scope wld be a victory for Sovs and weaken Allied position in Ger. May 13 note had given Gers confidence as to firmness of Allied position and latter shld insist upon clairification of all points raised in this note.

Adenauer said he understood alternative proposals, both wld permit mtg to take place if agrmt cld be reached upon necessity of holding free elections, and of full participation of future all-Ger govt in peace treaty negots. In his opinion this was not enough. Other points must equally be clarified prior to any Four Power talks. He re-emphasized that if this were not done, it wld cause serious setback in Ger and EDC. He felt that second alternative, which wld permit preliminary mtg with Sovs for purposes of discussing appointment of a comm to investigate conditions for free elections, even though they had accepted Allied conditions for comm, wld constitute an even more serious recession from position taken on May 13. Chancellor said he feared such mtg wld create sitn in Ger similar to that created by armistice talks in Korea where Sov Union was using discussions merely to strengthen its own position and that of its satellites and delay a corresponding increase in Western strength. In conclusion Adenauer urged that Allies agree to no reply which did not first insist upon obtaining a clear-cut expression of Sov views with respect to all points of Allied note of May 13.

Chancellor subsequently sent word that he is very disturbed over nature of Allied response as described to him this morning and is considering a further personal appeal to Secretary.⁴

McCloy

1. Repeated to Washington, Paris, and Moscow; the source text is the copy sent to Washington.
2. Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Jessup were in London for meetings with Eden and Schuman as the first step in a trip which would take the Secretary to Berlin, Vienna, and Rio de Janeiro.
3. Telegram 966 reported that the British and U.S. High Commissioners had urged the French to agree to discuss the differences in the draft reply with Chancellor Adenauer, and that on June 24 Berard had finally received instructions that authorized him to discuss alternative solutions with the Chancellor. (662A.00/6–2452)
4. On June 26 and 27 Chancellor Adenauer reiterated his concern over prejudicing the favorable Allied position as a result of a premature meeting with the Soviet Union. The Chancellor’s concern was reported directly to the Secretary of State in London in telegrams 976 and 980 to London (3544 and 3581 to Washington) from Bonn, June 26 and 27. (662A.00/6–2652 and 6–2752)