662.001/6–252: Telegram

No. 106
The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Reber) to the Department of State1

secret priority

3182. Reply to Sov note. Our recommendations on this score stem from our reading of larger picture of power struggle as seen from Bonn.

As suggested in ourtels 1998 Mar 16 2189 Mar 292 we are inclined to opinion first Sov note was a serious move and that important part of note was terms for a peace treaty. Very harshness of these terms, when stripped of Bolshevik cart, gave Sov note a ring of authenticity, a take it or leave it tone. Our impression was and is that Kremlin had therein bluntly indicated basis on which it wld then, now and in indefinite future settle Ger problem by mutual agreement with West.

Altho terms were obviously unacceptable to West, Kremlin may have calculated note as a whole and attendant propaganda wld bemuse FedRep population as to undo our grand design for Europe. This did not occur.

Neither West nor FedRep having taken up Sov offer Kremlin’s only positive alternative was to: (1) Strive to outdo in East Ger what we were doing in West and (2) attempt in attendant war of nerves to achieve through intimidation of FedRep and West Europeans what it had failed to accomplish through proposals for Ger unity and neutralization-collapse of integration complex.

Second of these tactics, tough line, has thus far had slight effect in FedRep. It has not reached level discussed in ourtel 2803 May 133 necessary to intimidate West Gers. It is however too early to say what effect further GDR and Sov maneuvers will have.

More significant at this juncture is apparent decision to harden East Ger into a thorough going satellite. This is being undertaken through fostering militancy—hence border restrictions and demands for arming youth. End result is serious intensification rather than easing of East-West struggle.

But—and this is an important but—in all of this Kremlin has been careful to appear to leave door open to negotiate solution of Ger problem. That seems to us to be essential part of explanation [Page 258] of last Sov note. Note was more than agitators notebook for propaganda designed to undermine support for Western integration. It was also a protestation for the record of Sov efforts to find a peaceful solution to Ger problem.

Although we appear thus far to have bested Kremlin in this exchange of notes, we feel that larger turn of events warrants no easing of our caution and vigilance. We believe that it cannot be assumed that Kremlin is sobered and incapable of desperate action of one who imagines hostile force slowly closing in on him.

Our only recommendations re reply to Sov note are: (1) Do not let it appear that it is we who terminate exchange of notes or foreclose mtg. (2) Keep to forefront main issue, that it is we who seek peaceful solution of Ger problem.

Reber
  1. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.
  2. Neither printed. (662.001/3–1652 and 3–2952) For a brief summary of telegram 2189, see footnote 7, Document 80.
  3. Document 145.