Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5418 Series

No. 918
Statement of Policy by the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 5418/1

[Washington,] June 10, 1954.

U.S. Policy Toward Spain

general considerations

1. Spain’s strategic geographic location is extremely important to the immediate defense of Western Europe and the Middle East and to the security of the NATO area and of the United States.

a. Spain constitutes an important addition to the world wide base areas from which U.S. strategic air forces can launch operations against major aggression.

b. The use of military facilities in Spain makes possible control of the straits of Gibraltar and the Western Mediterranean, and provides wider dispersal of bases for the conduct of offensive or defensive operations.

c. Appropriate military forces operating from Spain can influence military operations in almost any direction over an area including all the Mediterranean, the Eastern sections of the North and Central Atlantic Ocean routes, Northwest Africa, and all of Western Europe.

d. Spain can also provide depth in the defense of Western Europe against an attack by the USSR.

e. Although Spain is not a member of NATO, its cooperation is essential from a military point of view if NATO is to be prepared strategically to meet an armed attack. Moreover, the use by the U.S. of military facilities in Spain is of major importance in order that the U.S. may discharge most effectively its assigned role in NATO.

2. Three agreements signed by the United States and Spain on September 26, 1953, provide for the development and use by the U.S. of military facilities in Spain, and the strengthening of Spain’s military posture through economic and military aid.^* Implementation of these agreements is expected to contribute materially to the defense of Western Europe and to the security of the NATO area.

3. To support this program of military cooperation with Spain, the U.S. informed the Spanish Government at the time the agreements were signed that, with respect to the aid envisaged by the agreements, the United States intended to provide a total program in the amount of $465 million over a period of four years, subject to Congressional appropriations. The Spanish Government was also informally given to understand that approximately $350 million would be allocated to military aid, leaving $115 million for economic and technical assistance. As the funds for military aid will equip considerably smaller forces than the Spanish desire, and as the funds for economic aid will be completely obligated before the end of FY 55, it can be anticipated that after FY 55 Spain will request assistance in addition to the $465 million total.

4. Spain (nominally a monarchy but without king or regent) is an authoritarian state with the strength and stability of the regime due in large part to General Franco’s dominant position. The government derives its support principally from the Army, the Church, the landed and business interests and the Falange Party. Of these elements, the most important is the Army, which is firmly under Franco’s control. Its prestige will be further strengthened by the U.S. aid and base programs.

5. Although the threat of popular unrest over living conditions which developed in the spring of 1951 has lessened, the major domestic problem of the government continues to be one of satisfying the requirements of the Spanish people with regard to their standard of living, which is lower than that of any other Western European country except Portugal. The Government’s position has been strengthened by international developments, particularly the signing of the Concordat with the Vatican (August 27, 1953) and the signing of military and economic agreements with the U.S. In the eyes of many Spaniards these agreements brought increased international prestige and the hope of individual economic gain. Furthermore the organized clandestine non-communist opposition, already weakened by police action, was further discouraged by what was regarded as an alliance with the United States, to which the opposition had looked for ultimate fulfillment of its political aspirations. Consequently, the position of the government of General Franco is probably stronger than at any time since 1940, and there is at the present time no effective alternative to the existing Spanish Government.

6. If the agricultural sector of the economy is not hampered by prolonged drought, the Spanish economy as a whole will probably show moderate improvement over the next few years. The U.S. economic aid and base program will help bring about moderate increases in industrial and agricultural production. The inflationary impact of the program cannot now be estimated. However, it is unlikely that there will be any substantial progress toward remedying Spain’s basic economic weaknesses. The economy will remain for many years generally backward, with a low level of living for the vast majority of the people.

7. In the event of Franco’s death, a successor regime composed of the same elements would probably attempt to continue the main outlines of his internal and external policies. It seems likely that such a successor regime would be able to preserve stability, though not to the same degree which now exists in Spain. However, a struggle for power might develop, with results which cannot now be estimated.

8. The program of U.S.–Spanish military cooperation has received wide public support in the United States. Nevertheless important non-communist elements in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent in the United States, still remain hostile to the Spanish Government and feel that the United States should now exert pressure to force changes in the Spanish political system in order to bring about such democratic freedoms as free trade unions, freedom of religion, assembly, the press, etc.

9. U.S. relations with Spain must be guided by the fact that the United States will have to cooperate closely with the government of Franco in order to insure effective implementation of military arrangements of great value to U.S. security. The United States must endeavor to avoid any identification with the policies of the Spanish Government not required for the effective implementation of these arrangements. While continuing to use its influence to persuade Spain to follow policies consonant with U.S. interests, it is important that the United States avoid steps that could be interpreted as an attempt to interfere in Spanish internal affairs. Such steps would be regarded by the Spanish Government as a threat to its security and would be considered by most Spaniards, who retain an historical xenophobia, as foreign interference in their affairs. The fundamental basis of cooperation, on which successful execution of the new arrangements depends would thus be jeopardized if not destroyed.

10. The primary interests of the United States with respect to Spain lie in (a) the success of the U.S.–Spanish program of military, economic and technical cooperation, with emphasis on the development and security of U.S. bases in Spain, (b) the improvement of relations between Spain and the NAT nations in order to tie Spain as closely as possible to Western plans for regional defense and to obtain Spanish participation in NATO at an appropriate time, and (c) the continued internal stability and non-communist orientation of Spain.

11. However, the reluctance of some NATO members to deal with Spain as an ally, the strained relations between Spain and France and Great Britain as well as Spain’s distrust of multilateral organizations and accords for collective security, and particularly its lack of faith in some members of NATO, will make close Spanish association with the Western defense system and eventual Spanish participation in NATO difficult to achieve.

12. The U.S.–Spanish Agreements represent an important change from the post-World War II years when Spain was largely isolated. By signing these agreements, Spain recognized the desirability of a degree of cooperation in the interest of collective security. In the eyes of the Spanish Government, this newly-adopted concept of international cooperation is for the purpose of strengthening Spain nationally and is limited mainly to bilateral collaboration with the United States and Portugal. Spain does not feel called upon to align herself closely with other leading members of NATO such as Great Britain and France. There are no indications—indeed, there are signs to the contrary—that the Spanish Government has been moved to accept the underlying aims of the North Atlantic Pact or of the European Defense Community. However, in time of general war, Franco would almost certainly permit the United Staes to use bases in Spain.

13. Spain is not a member of the UN, having been barred from membership by UN resolutions in 1946 although it has become an active member of many of the UN specialized agencies since one of these resolutions was modified in 1950. Spain would probably apply for UN membership whenever it felt assured of support by a majority of the Western nations, even though it would be barred by a Soviet veto. The U.S. has advised the Spanish Government on two occasions that it would support Spain’s application.

objectives

14. Development and use of the military potentialities of Spain’s strategic geographic position and of its armed forces for the common defense of the West.

15. Increased understanding on the part of the Spaniards of the importance of the concept of collective security and international political and economic cooperation.

16. Improvement of relations between Spain and the NATO nations in order:

a. To tie Spain as closely as possible to Western plans for regional defense.

b. To achieve a cooperative Spanish attitude toward the objectives of the NAT.

17. Continuation of Spanish internal stability, non-communist orientation, and close relations with the United States.

courses of action

18. Provide appropriate military, economic, and technical assistance to Spain designed:

a. To support the program of U.S.–Spanish cooperation, established by the agreements of September 26, 1953.

b. To develop forces which will increase Spain’s capability primarily to defend the Iberian peninsula, including defense of U.S.-occupied Spanish bases.

19. Implement the economic aid, military aid and base development programs in such a manner as best to support U.S. objectives in Spain while, insofar as practicable, avoiding adversely affecting Spain’s economy.

20. Utilize the unique U.S. relationship with Spain to promote closer cooperation between Spain and our NATO allies.

21. a. Endeavor to avoid any identification with the policies of the Spanish Government not required for the effective implementation of the U.S.–Spanish agreements.

b. Continue to use U.S. influence to persuade Spain to adopt policies consonant with U.S. interests, but avoid steps that could be interpreted as an attempt to interfere in Spanish internal affairs.

22. Support Spanish participation in international economic and financial activities and organizations, as appropriate.

23. Direct informational policy toward:

a. Increasing Spanish understanding and support of U.S. foreign policy objectives, including particularly the collective defense efforts of the Western nations.

b. Encouraging more active and closer Spanish association with the Western European community of nations.

24. Encourage broader cultural contacts between Americans and Spaniards in the interest of building up influences within Spain favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives, including both official and privately sponsored programs for an expanded exchange of students, intellectual leaders, military and technical personnel and private individuals.

. . . . . . .

26. Encourage Spanish application for membership in the UN at an appropriate time and support that application when presented.

27. Consult at appropriate times with representatives of the governments allied with the U.S. in NATO about U.S. policy objectives toward Spain.

1. This policy statement was a revision of NSC 5418 (see the memorandum of discussion, supra). In addition to the policy statement, NSC 5418/1 included a covering memorandum, dated June 10, by Lay, a financial appendix, the NSC Staff Study, an annex summarizing the base and related agreements, and a map of Spain.
2. For a more detailed summary of the Defense, Economic Aid, and Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements, see Annex. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is not printed here but for information on the agreements, see Document 907.]