Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

752.5 MSP/2–353

No. 878
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] February 3, 1953.

Dear Mr. Secretary: The receipt is acknowledged of the letter dated December 8, 1952,² containing the recommendations of the Department of Defense regarding military aid for Spain. The language of the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff would appear to indicate that the military aid program for Spain of approximately $440 million, recommended by the Joint United States Military Group on August 20, 1952,³ has been approved, and that this decision has been taken in the light of an impression that a satisfactory base rights agreement can only be concluded if the Spanish are assured such a program is planned. Your letter requests that the Department of State modify the United States negotiating position to bring about an early resolution of this problem, namely, it is assumed, the conclusion of a satisfactory base agreement.

Assuming the above interpretation is correct, this Department has the following comments on the military aid program for Spain and the course of action recommended by the Department of Defense:

Both the JUSMG report, and the JCS recommendations which are based on it, rest upon considerations which have been materially changed since this report was originally submitted last August. First, the $440 million JUSMG military aid program resulted from a screening of extensive Spanish requests for aid which they listed as indispensable for the defense of their territory. Even after this screening, the JUSMG considered some of the amounts included in their program too high, on a quid pro quo basis, for the acquisition of base rights solely. The report therefore concluded with the suggestion that the Air Force review the JUSMG analyses and “consider recommending to the JCS that certain tasks and obligations in Western defense be planned for Spain; and as a result thereof, that a plan be evolved, to provide over a period of four to five years, the reasonable amount of equipment for each Spanish service indicated herein.” The Department of Defense has now decided that it would be premature to assign such tasks to Spain at this time, a decision with which this Department fully agrees. However, this proposal was one of the principal factors on which the aid program recommended in the JUSMG report was based. Since it is not now to be considered, it would appear that the program of which this proposal was an important part should be revised accordingly.

Second, the JUSMG expressed the impression in its report of August 20, 1952, that the Spaniards would probably agree to conclude a satisfactory base agreement if assured of a military equipment program considerably less than the money value of the items they had listed. On the basis of the advice received from the US negotiators in October and November,⁴ the Department of State believes that this impression should not be construed as suggesting that a satisfactory base agreement can only be concluded if the Spaniards are assured that the military aid program recommended by the JUSMG in its August report is planned. As the Ambassador has emphasized, the Spanish, having received our statement of intent regarding the continuing nature of aid to Spain, and having been assured of our willingness to regard Spain as eligible in principle for US aid over a period of years on an equal basis with other nations, will not wish to show themselves unreasonable as regards conceding base rights in principle or accepting amounts and types of specific aid we may be able to furnish. He advised that the Spaniards have shown thorough understanding of our limitations in this connection, which we have pointed out, and warns against the adoption of the view that the Spaniards are anxious to extract the highest “price” possible from the United States regardless of our situation. Accordingly the Ambassador urged that a program be established which represents our own best estimate of what our situation will permit and which is also sufficient in amount to show that we regard giving aid to Spain in a serious light.

Third, based on these considerations, on their most recent calculations, and on their understanding of the purposes to to be served, the US negotiators submitted recommendations to Washington in October and November which substantially revised both the purposes and conduct of the military aid program recommended in August. The original program was designed to provide equipment for the buildup of the Spanish military potential for territorial defense—and, it is assumed, would also make possible the use of Spanish forces in Western defense under the commitment recommended. However, under the revised program the primary purposes of the military aid recommended are to assist in the development and protection of the bases and to develop improved military conditions in Spain which are desirable under the present program of US–Spanish cooperation and which will better prepare Spain for such future association with NATO as becomes feasible. Based on these purposes, an $85 million program of military aid to Spain was recommended⁵ which necessarily revised both the service and individual priorities of the end-items contemplated in the original recommendations made in August. At the same time the JUSMG pointed out that such aid could serve as a foundation for later assistance under the general program recommended in August, which it reaffirmed, and would make an important initial contribution to the broader objective of ultimate Spanish participation in Western defense.⁶

The problems involved in developing a military aid program for Spain have been thoroughly studied by this Department in the light of the various reports from the Ambassador and the JUSMG; the Defense Department’s views, as expressed in your letter; the new developments indicated above which materially change important considerations on which both the JUSMG report of August 20, 1952, and the JCS recommendations are based; and the political aspects involved. The Department of State has concluded that the recommendations made by the US negotiators on this subject in October and November, which represent their most recent advice, should be accepted for the following reasons: Their recommendations offer a basis both for the development of a satisfactory FY 1954 military aid program and for future planning purposes; a program based on their recommendations is more nearly in consonance with the objectives of NSC 72/6;⁷ such a program is in line with the statements made to the British and French Governments, prior to the opening of the negotiations, regarding the military aid program contemplated for Spain;⁸ and it would avoid the political consequences which a military aid program, designed to build up the Spanish military potential for territorial defense, would have on US relations with the British, French, and most other NATO members.

This Department believes, therefore, that the US negotiating position need not be modified. It recommends, rather, the following program which is based on the general purposes recommended by the US negotiators:

1. The content of the military program would be determined by two military objectives:

(a) To provide equipment necessary to the protection of US bases in Spain and to train the Spanish armed forces in its use. Since the United States is short of AA equipment, which would be an important aspect of base protection, we could logically endeavor in the first few years of the program to supply only a few AA prototypes, sufficient to permit the establishment and operation of AA training centers. The arrival of this and other first-line training equipment should be timed to permit the earliest setting up of training centers and to provide some early tangible evidence of the military aid program.

(b) To supply the Spanish armed forces with, and train them in the use of such equipment as may be readily available, which would not be required for NATO or other high priority purposes because of obsolescence and which would strengthen the capacity of the Spanish armed forces to resist.

2. The program would also include:

(a) The training of Spanish officers in the US who would return as instructors in the training schools to be set up in Spain;

(b) The supply of equipment and technical assistance, including US specifications for weapons-production, to Spanish munitions plants so that Spain could ultimately produce larger stocks of modern equipment.

3. At the end of the preliminary phase of this program, which might be reached when the base construction program in Spain is well on the way to completion, the US should re-examine the fundamental question of Spain’s relationship to NATO, in the light of the circumstance existing at that time, and determine what the nature and scope of future military aid to Spain should be. Presumably, in any event, a modest military aid program could be continued, the magnitude of which might be determined principally by practical necessities related to the construction, operation and protection of US base facilities in Spain.

In addition to the reasons mentioned above, this Department believes a program along the foregoing lines would have the following advantages: it would be generally consistent with the Ambassador’s comments and recommendations and with the position the negotiators have outlined to the Spaniards with respect to the limited ability of the US to supply end-items at this time; it would provide aid in connection with the development and protection of the bases and also training equipment, which would assist in preparing Spain for such future association with NATO as becomes feasible, and yet would not commit the US to large-scale re-armament investments for Spain far in advance of the time when Spain could realistically be expected to assume military tasks outside its own territory; and it meets present requirements and at the same time provides the US with a flexible program which permits it to retain considerable freedom of action.

If a program along these lines is agreed upon, the question remains of discussion of it with the Spanish Government, as mentioned in paragraph (d) of the JCS paper. Since the size of the program outlined above would be determined largely on an annual basis the problem would appear to be limited to whether the negotiators should mention any figure regarding the program presently contemplated for FY 1954. It should be noted in this regard that we have not in the past undertaken to give similar indications to other countries. However, since no final decisions have yet been made regarding the FY 1954 military aid program, this Department believes it would be preferable to hold this matter in abeyance at this time unless or until it should arise as a problem in the negotiations.

Should the criteria recommended above as a basis for a program of military aid to Spain be acceptable to you, this Department recommends that representatives of our two Departments collaborate in working out a refined program based upon them.

Sincerely yours,

H. Freeman Matthews

1. Drafted by Dunham on Jan. 15 and cleared with Wolf and Battle.
2. Document 875.
3. See Document 868, for a summary of this report.
4. The advice was contained most notably in Document 872; in telegram 354 from Madrid, Oct. 31, 1952, not printed (711.56352/10–3152); and in telegram Jusmg 117 from Madrid, Nov. 8, 1952, not printed. (Spanish Desk files, lot 58 D 344, “Negotiations—U.S.–Spanish, Oct.–Dec. 1952”)
5. This figure, which was $5 million higher than that proposed by MacVeagh in Document 872, thus resulting in a total aid figure of $142 million rather than $137 million, was a refinement, based on further studies by Kissner, which was transmitted in telegram 383 from Madrid, Nov. 12, 1952. (711.56352/11–1252)
6. These views were communicated in telegram Jusmg 117 from Madrid, Nov. 12, 1952. (Spanish Desk files, lot 58 D 344, “Negotiations—U.S.–Spanish, Oct.–Dec. 1952”)
7. For the text of NSC 72/6, June 27, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 1, p. 820.
8. For the substance of these statements, see telegram 892 to Madrid, June 18, 1951, ibid., p. 819.