711.56352/9–852
No. 869
Memorandum by the Director of the Office
of European Regional Affairs (Moore) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)1
- Subject: Spanish Base Negotiations
I refer to the memorandum of Sept. 5, 19522 from you to Mr. Matthews, subject, Spain: Report from General Kissner and Probable JCS Review of U.S. Military Policy towards Spain. RA supports the recommendation in para 5 (a) of the referred paper that we should let JCS know that the Department is prepared to advise and consult during the Defense study of the Kissner report. In view of the implications of this report, RA would like to participate in any discussions with the Department of Defense.
With reference to the recommendation in para 5(b) that we advise the JCS that the Department does not believe that the U.S. is in a position at this time to seek a commitment from Spain regarding [Page 1882] a military assignment outside Spanish territory, RA is not persuaded that this conclusion is correct. This matter is discussed more fully below.
The logical approach by complete JCS review of the Spanish problem at this stage of the base negotiations would, it appears to us, commence with the determination of whether or not there was some role which the Spanish armed forces could perform connected with the defense of the West. In view of the fact that it is our overall NATO strategy to hold as far to the North and East as possible, a mission for the Spanish armed forces of holding behind the Pyrenees and not being involved in any hostilities unless we were forced back to the Pyrenees, would appear to be giving Spain a negligible role in the defense of the West. A concomitant to this aspect would be the fact that equipment and dollars which might otherwise go to forces which will be engaged in the opening days of battle would be held in reserve for forces which might never be engaged in battle. Not only is this aspect one which might create problems vis-à-vis our NATO partners, but it indicates a lack of faith in our ability to hold in Germany. Had this proposal been made and were it to be implemented prior to the NATO build-up, it might have been quite realistic. As it is, implementation will occur in 1953 and 1954 when the NATO forces presumably will have obtained some reasonable degree of strength, and the reason for creating a Pyrenees line of defense appears to have been dissipated.
Whether Spain can perform any military mission outside of the Spanish Peninsula is another question. Of course that mission would have to be integrated with the thinking of our NATO Commanders with respect to NATO areas or with respect to other appropriate Commanders with respect to non-NATO areas. Even though such planning has not gone forward, it appears to us that some sort of commitment should be sought from Spain that she will make her forces available for association with the forces of the Western World in the defense of the West under the concept of a forward strategy. To fail to do so would not only permanently relegate Spain to a role of an outsider with respect to the defense of Western Europe, blocking our long-range policy as set forth by NSC, but would result in Spain going no further than to undertake the defense of her own territory—which she is already bound to do—in return for which she would receive assistance from us.
The next aspect of the problem is the strategic value placed upon the proposed complex of Spanish bases. This is tied into a multitude of political-military matters with which you are familiar. In the final analysis, the military value to be placed upon these bases will be a very strong determining factor and all of the implications [Page 1883] connected therewith would be thoroughly explored at appropriate levels.
Finally, we have the problem of the amount of aid, viewed from the point of view of both dollars and equipment, which would be involved. Clearly the JUSMG recommendations for the Army list would not begin to cover equipping 22 Divisions from our point of view. We have obligated an average of $120 million for each NATO division we are supporting through MDAP, and the Spanish deficiencies are certainly no less than these. It is apparent that the 213 million dollar list would be only the first slice of a large and continuing program, were we to determine that there was a role actually to be performed by 22 Divisions. As General Garvin has remarked, it is an extremely high price to pay for bases only. It is also too low a price to pay for an efficient Army force.
Faced with the shortage of funds and equipment which confronts us for at least the next two years, and faced with a possible continuing requirement for further equipment and further forces for NATO after 1954 to support our agreed NATO plans it appears that we must weigh our requirement for these bases against the requirement of NATO forces for this equipment or its equivalent in value.
RA believes, in light of all these factors, that this matter should be drawn to Mr. Matthews’ attention along the foregoing lines as a supplement to your memorandum of September 5. It is also believed that joint staff work at the working level between representatives of the Joint Staff Planners and of the Department should be tentative only, with final consideration of the matter being the subject of discussions between Mr. Matthews and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.