611.52/3–1252: Despatch
No. 845
The First Secretary of Embassy in Spain
(Anderson) to the Department of
State1
confidential
No.
933
Madrid, March 12, 1952.
- Ref: Embtel 934, March 4,
19522
- Subject: Brief Comments on Spanish Foreign Minister’s Interview
With Assistant Secretary Perkins
Although copies of the memorandum of conversation describing the courtesy
call of February 28 which Mr. George
W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs,3 paid on Spanish Foreign Minister Alberto Martin Artajo have already
been forwarded to the Department and to our Embassy in Lisbon, there are
several aspects of that conversation which are perhaps worthy of brief
comment. For ready reference a copy of the memorandum is enclosed with
the paragraphs therein numbered.
As a general comment, Artajo’s summation of Spain’s position at the present
juncture, with particular reference to her relations with us (paragraph
3), was masterfully done and clearly showed his grasp and logical
exposition of a complicated subject. The following additional points, it
is believed, are worthy of note:
Lack of Desire to Join NATO
Artajo’s statement that
Spaniards have no desire to join NATO
now is believed to reflect accurately the Government’s attitude, which
has perhaps not been well understood outside of Spain. While there has
been a tendency to attribute this attitude to a “sour grapes”
position—like that of a man who knows in advance that he will be
blackballed by an exclusive club—we believe the Spanish Government
sincerely lacks any desire to become involved in NATO. If a member, Spain would undoubtedly
have to play second fiddle to such a despised power as France, a role
for which she has no stomach. In contrast, Portugal has long and
ardently desired Spain’s NATO
membership to fill the strategic vacuum between herself and the
Pyrenees. We suspect that the Spanish have learned from their Portuguese
friends about the complications and headaches involved in NATO membership.
[Page 1820]
Change in Public Opinion Toward the
United States
It is believed that what Artajo described as a recent change in Spanish “public
opinion” toward the United States and “evidence of a growing lack of
confidence in us and in our policy”, reflects the feelings of elements
within the Spanish Government rather than of public opinion. Artajo quite correctly mentions
the consternation caused by the resignation of Ambassador Griffis,4 to
whom the regime undoubtedly looked for the rapid and generous
implementation of our new policy. The regime, more than the masses, has
been dismayed by the delays in undertaking negotiations and by the
“offensive statements out of Washington”—obviously a reference to
President Truman’s remark of
February 7.5
Artajo Playing “The American Card”
The Minister referred to his having “played the American card” and to
having been constantly on the defensive before critics of his policy. To
us this smacks of some rather stiff criticism in the inner circle of the
Government, probably within the Cabinet itself. That Artajo has, in fact, tried to play
down the Truman incident, is
reflected by statements made during his press conference in London (See
Embdes 854, February 216).
Difficulty of Explaining Ambassador
Griffis’
Resignation
We believe the Minister was correct in saying that it was difficult to
make the people believe Ambassador Griffis had resigned for purely personal reasons
(paragraph 5). Although some key officials in the Government undoubtedly
knew in advance of the Ambassador’s plan, the resignation came as a
shock and surprise to many Spaniards, who believed that a serious hitch
had developed in the United States plans for negotiating with the
Franco regime
and that the Ambassador was being removed by the United States
Government for a definite purpose.
Artajo’s Version of Spain’s Urgent Needs
The Minister’s rather modest presentation of Spain’s urgent needs
(paragraph 6) was the most interesting aspect of the interview. In view
of the exaggerations fostered by the press in both countries during past
months, it was heartening to learn of the sweet reasonableness of his
statement, which we hope reflects the
[Page 1821]
Government’s thinking at the present time and
which, fortunately, appears to coincide very closely with our own.
For the Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.:
Daniel V.
Anderson
Enclosure
confidential
Madrid, February 29, 1952.
Memorandum of Conversation7
Participants:
- Excmo. Sr. D. Alberto Martin
Artajo, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
- Mr. George W.
Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs;
- Mr. John Wesley Jones, Chargé d’Affaires,
a. i.;
- Excmo. Sr. D. Pedro de Prat y Soutzo,
Marqués de Prat, Director of the
American Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 1)
- Mr. Perkins made
a courtesy call on the Spanish Foreign Minister at 7:30 last
evening. Mr. Jones accompanied him to the
Foreign Ministry and was present during the interview. The
Marqués de Prat acted as
interpreter.
- 2)
- The Minister opened the conversation by stating that he was at
Mr. Perkins’
disposition for any questions the latter might have on Spain or
Spanish policy, particularly with respect to the defense of
Europe. Mr. Perkins
replied that he had not come to Spain with any mission or with
any message; that he had wanted to call on the Foreign Minister
to pay his respects and to have the pleasure of meeting and of
knowing him. The Minister said that nevertheless if Mr.
Perkins would
permit, he would like to outline briefly for him the Spanish
position. Mr. Perkins replied that this would be very helpful
and that he would of course be interested in whatever the
Minister would have to say.
- 3)
- The Minister’s summation was more or less as follows:
Spain is an anti-communist country; the temper of the
Spanish people is anti-communist. A war has been fought
on this question within Spain and the anti-communist
forces were victorious. There can hence be no question
as to where Spain stands in the present international
struggle. Spain will not shirk her duty in the
anti-communist struggle since the present situation is
entirely too grave to be concerned with other less
important considerations. Spain has a strategic position
at the mouth of the Mediterranean which is
[Page 1822]
just as
important to the defense of Europe as Greece and Turkey
at the other end of the Mediterranean Sea Spanish
soldiers are brave, hardy and dependable but they lack
equipment. When Admiral Sherman was
in Madrid last summer, the Caudillo had readily given an
affirmative reply to send (1) a military survey team;
and (2) subsequently a negotiating team to develop
certain military facilities in Spain for the defense of
Europe. The Generalissimo had, however, pointed out the
need for economic assistance to and strengthening of
Spain in connection with any responsibilities of a
belligerent nature which she might have to assume. There
were two things that Spain needed to contribute
effectively to Europe’s defense: (a) a strengthening of
the Spanish economic position to permit Spain to support
a prospective war-time economy; (b) arms and ammunition
for her fighting army. Both American survey teams,
military and economic, had received the greatest
cooperation and help from Spanish officials and they had
gone away with very complete information on Spain in
both fields. While Spaniards had never asked to join
NATO nor did they
have any desire to join it now, they did feel that they
could make an effective contribution to the defense of
Europe by direct agreement with the U.S.A. Recently,
however, Spanish public opinion toward the U.S. had
changed and there had been evidence of a growing lack of
confidence in us and in our policy. The reasons, he
thought, for this were: (a) the resignation of
Ambassador Griffis before his job was completed;
(b) the inexplicable delays in undertaking negotiations
for military and economic agreements; and (c) recent
offensive statements out of Washington by highly placed
personalities.
- 4)
- The Minister added that he was an optimist; that he had based
his foreign policy on rapprochement and
close relations with the U.S.A., that he had “played the
American card”, that in these last few weeks he had been
constantly on the defensive before critics of his policy which
he referred to as “public opinion” but which undoubtedly meant
elements within the Spanish Government opposed to close
relations with the U.S.A.
- 5)
- Mr. Perkins asked
if he could comment on one or two of the points in the
Minister’s review. The Assistant Secretary said that Ambassador
Griffis had
resigned purely for personal reasons, ill health and private
business interests which were incompatible with his continuing
to hold public office. The Minister admitted that he knew this
to be the fact but said that it was difficult to make the public
believe it. Mr. Perkins reminded the Foreign Minister that this
would be an unusual year in the U.S., that it was an election
year and that local political problems would loom large and
sometimes be overwhelming in relation to foreign policy
problems. He said that because of the rearmament program in
Britain and France, those two countries were in desperate
economic straits and we were seeking ways and means to help them
economically again this year. He referred to the costly war in
French Indo-China and
[Page 1823]
the need for greater American help there. He explained the
original fear of the NATO
countries, when an integrated European army was first discussed,
that the British would abandon Europe and withdraw to the
British Isles to defend themselves and that U.S. forces would
withdraw behind the Pyrenees. The NATO countries now have greater confidence in
themselves and their organization but are still concerned that
any priority interest in Spain would mean a denial of the real
meaning of NATO to defend
Europe at the point of attack rather than to liberate it
subsequently.
- 6)
- The Minister said that Spain was in no great hurry for great
quantities of arms and armaments; that the most urgent needs
were (1) economic assistance which could be granted in fields
that would assist both military plans and civilian economy, such
as railroads, highways, airports, and (2) a limited amount of
training equipment for the Spanish Army. The Minister asked if
the new teams that were being formed in the U.S. to come to
Spain with Ambassador MacVeagh would have definite instructions to
negotiate or if their terms of reference were such that they
would have to waste time in further investigation and study. Mr.
Perkins replied
that he believed both to be the case; that the negotiating teams
would have specific instructions to negotiate and that those
were presently being drawn up in Washington but that there might
be various alternative considerations which would require
further on-the-spot study. He said that he was unable to predict
how soon agreement would be reached in Washington on the various
terms of reference and that in any event, he did not wish to
make any statement which might prejudice Ambassador MacVeagh’s forthcoming
mission; that we would have to wait and see what instructions
Mr. MacVeagh
brought with him when he arrived in the latter part of
March.
- 7)
- The forty-minute interview ended in the usual exchange of
pleasantries and best wishes.
